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Thesis Abstract
This thesis examines the role of religion— both liberal and
evangelical Protestantism— in the development of a feminist
political theory in America during the nineteenth century
and how that feminist theory in turn helped to transform
American liberalism.
Chapter 1 looks for the genesis of women's rights language,
not in the republican rhetoric of the Founding Fathers, but
in the teachings of liberal Protestantism and its links with
laissez-faire economic theory. The antebellum understanding
of rights is shown to have encompassed social and civil
rights alike, and to have arisen from a vision of the mutual
benefits that derived from the individual's duties within
the family and community.
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the development of liberal feminism
in the post-civil War period, focusing especially on the
thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Stanton was a classic
liberal whose particular concern was with women's bodily
autonomy and with self-government as the basis for
citizenship. As a result of her efforts, it is argued,
debates about liberalizing divorce laws, marital abuse,
voluntary motherhood, and prostitution helped to widen the
definition of liberalism to include a new zone of privacy,
and to forge a consensus by the late-nineteenth century that
the liberal individual was autonomous in personal as well as
civil life, with rights extending to privacy of the body and
freedom from physical coercion even within the home.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the Woman's Christian Temperance
Union, evangelical feminists who made common cause with
progressive reformers in addressing the problems of
industrialization. The WCTU's vision of the maternal state,
it is contended, especially as developed in the thought of
its president Frances Willard, extrapolated the Christian
obligation to care for others to the state, conceived of as
a maternal and compassionate institution. The maternal
state thus foreshadowed the welfare state, though with a
vision of communal rights radically at odds with
liberalism's. The WCTU's religious philosophy both enabled
it to conceive of a welfare state and moved it to work
toward the establishment of a theocratic state that
contained the potential for the infringement of individual
liberties as well as the protection of economic interests.
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Introduction
To understand what significance "law" and "rights" had 
for nineteenth-century female activists, we must interpret 
their concepts of power and governance according to the 
Protestant ethos which informed their world vision. For as 
women and reformers they fell into two categories of people 
who were socially defined— and very often defined 
themselves— in religious ways. Historians have described 
the feminization of religion and the spiritualization of 
women's culture in the nineteenth century at some length. 
Citing phenomena like the popular identification of women as 
the pious sex; women's predominance in all areas of church 
life except the ministry; and a greater emphasis on mercy 
and love in place of the harsh doctrines of orthodox 
theology, they have outlined an elaborate antebellum social 
construction which characterizes the feminine element as 
naturally spiritual, pure, and loving, a construction with 
persuasive power even outside the middle classes where it 
originated.
Scholars' judgments of the process of feminization have 
ranged widely. Ann Douglas, for example, finds nineteenth- 
century spiritual forms cloying, sentimental, emasculating, 
destructive of the tough fiber of republican virtue and
1
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Puritan theology; while Barbara Welter's article cites 
purity and piety as critical components of an oppressive, 
man-forged domestic ideal.1 Others have seen these 
religious affiliations in a more positive light: religious 
and moral questions constituted women's special preserve, 
and allowed them to extend their authority outward to 
encompass many charitable and benevolent activities, and 
finally suffrage itself as a tool of moral guardianship, 
greatly enhancing women's power in public life.2 For in 
antebellum America, the concept of woman's spirituality had 
tremendous clout in the public domain, and was widely 
accepted by women themselves. Although arguments about 
woman's moral nature were often made in essentialist terms, 
they were received in a culture where the construction of 
womanly piety held sway, rather than representing a marginal 
position. In a society which still adhered strongly to the 
forms of Christian faith, arguments from woman's moral
*Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture (New 
York, 1977); Barbara Welter, "The Feminization of Religion 
in Nineteenth-Century America," in Clio's Consciousness 
Raised: New Perspectives on the History of Women. Mary S. 
Hartman and Lois W. Banner, eds. (New York, 1974).
2For an overview of the literature on the feminization 
of religion, see Elizabeth B. Clark, "Women and Religion in 
America, 1780-1870," in John F. Wilson, ed., Church and 
State in America, vol. 1 (Westport, Conn., 1986), pp. 370- 
374, 398-400.
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responsibility took on a deeply political nature. Feminists 
on one end of the spectrum and orthodox critics of woman 
suffrage on the other disagreed violently over the 
interpretation of woman's role, but in the antebellum years 
moral discourse was still an accepted form of political 
dialogue, although its influence was waning.
Although they eschewed orthodoxy, the advocates of 
woman's rights were not secular beings who had risen above 
some popular misbelief in the existence of God. The 
movement for women's emancipation, for women fully to 
control and develop their own individual talents and beings, 
was firmly tied to the widespread revolt within 
Protestantism against Calvinist orthodoxy. Freedom of the 
will was a critical tenet for women convinced that they must 
look to their own resources, work out their own salvation. 
Like other contemporary reforms, woman's rights took much of 
its philosophy and strength directly from the most 
progressive religious teachings of the day. Virtually all 
of the early leaders— those who began the movement at Seneca 
Falls— were raised with ties to some Christian group or 
denomination, and many made a common journey over the course 
of their lifetimes, not toward atheism or agnosticism, but 
toward the vigorous reform wing of liberal Christianity.
The break with clerical authority seemed naturally to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
accompany innovative political action both emotionally and 
intellectually, and many women experimented with 
increasingly liberal creeds as they sought a better fit 
between their sacred beliefs and their changing social 
ideals.
For these women, Quakerism, Transcendentalism, 
Unitarianism and Universalism, as well as the free church 
movement, were influential in the development of ideals and 
political creeds which underlay a lifetime's work. 
Quakerism's inner light provided the theology, and Quaker 
meeting the experience, of female equality: Blanche Glassman 
Hersh found that of 51 feminist-abolitionists she studied,
15 were cradle Quakers, a disproportionately high number; 
and the Society of Friends became the adopted religion of a 
number of feminists, like Sarah and Angelina Grimke.3 
Lucretia Mott, a figure of great authority in the Quaker 
community, had a profound influence on the first generation 
of rights advocates. So fierce a priest-baiter as Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton owed a deep debt to Quakerism and the more 
rationalist influence of Unitarians and Universalists for 
the values of moral equality of the sexes, the worth of the 
individual, and the imperative for his or her full
3Blanche Glassman Hersh, The Slavery of Sex: Feminist- 
Abolitionists in America (Urbana, 111., 1978).
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development as a human being, which underlay all of 
Stanton's political work.4
Much of the power of radical Christianity within the 
woman's movement can be traced to the movement's roots in 
abolitionism. In The Slavery of Sex. Hersh outlines the 
many links between the two movements; their female 
components were virtually interchangeable, for both activist 
men and women tended to be involved in multiple sympathetic 
reforms. Arising largely out of the Garrisonian anti­
slavery faction, known for its deep and radical if somewhat . 
eccentric piety, abolitionist feminism embodied a sense of 
divine mission, of a millennial movement called to cleanse 
the social soul of impurities through conversion. Hersh 
depicts religion as female abolitionists' sun and shield: 
though unorthodox, "their personal perfectionism and sense 
of moral duty and calling sustained them through many 
trials" {p. 33). The practical experience of organizing, 
writing, and the novelty of public speaking; the raising of 
consciousness of their own circumstances through the fervent 
rhetoric of bondage and freedom; and the great ideologies of 
universal human rights, moral equality, and natural law were
4Maureen Fitzgerald, "Religion in the Life and Thought 
of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," M.A. thesis, University of 
Wisconsin, 1985.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the gifts abolitionism imparted to feminism.
Another strain of religious influence, revivalism, 
which represented a cultural mainstream far more than 
liberal Protestantism did, also grounded women's efforts to 
improve their status. The Second Great Awakening, 
spearheaded by Charles Finney, produced a cycle of revivals 
which were particularly strong in the 1820s and 1830s, but 
which continued to wax and wane throughout the century. 
Though not of like mind with his liberal colleagues,
Finney's thrust was equally against Calvinist precepts of 
predestination and human inability, ideas which withered 
throughout the revival belt at the sound of his voice. The 
revivalist creed of "means," or human ability to prepare for 
and perhaps initiate a salvific conversion experience, was 
thoroughly in harmony with the social creed of the day as 
well. Reformers were galvanized by the doctrine of 
perfectionism, or the potential perfectibility of human 
beings, initially for the sake of salvation, but 
increasingly for the sake of a purified society.
Alice Rossi in The Feminist Papers makes the 
distinction between "Enlightenment feminists" and "Moral 
Crusader feminists," and places virtually all mid-century
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
woman's rights leaders in the latter category.5 As 
exemplified by Stanton and Lucy Stone, she describes them as 
native born, middle class, small town joiners and exhorters, 
deeply influenced by the revival culture in which they grew 
up. For these women, a "bit of reform would not do": with 
conversion as the model, the piecemeal change of political 
life was unthinkable, because once truth was manifest, 
change would follow as a natural consequence. Perfectionism 
underlay "the upward tending spirit of the age, busy in a 
hundred forms of effort for the world's redemption from the 
sins and sufferings which oppress it ..."*
The "hundred forms of effort" included charitable and 
benevolent societies, temperance, abolitionism, woman's 
rights, dress reform, spiritualism, health diets and water 
cures, running the spectrum from the staid to the 
outrageous. The great early leaders of the woman's movement 
were all raised on temperance, abolitionism, and other 
charities and reforms. Thomas Wentworth Higginson showed 
the interconnectedness of reform when he reported a friend's 
comment, "Not know the Briggs girls? I should think you
5Alice Rossi, The Feminist Papers (New York, 1974), 
introduction to part 2.
‘"Call for the First National Convention for Woman's 
Rights, Worcester, Mass..October, 1850" (n.p.. 1850), pp. 
23-24.
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would certainly know them. Work in the Globe Mills; 
interested in all the reforms; bathe in cold water every 
morning; one of 'em is a Grahamite."7 The bustling female 
do-gooder often became a comic stereotype like Dickens' Mrs. 
Pardiggle ("I am a School lady, I am a Visiting Lady, I am a 
Reading Lady, I am on the local Linen Box committee, and 
many general committees, and my canvassing along is very 
extensive”), but this activity did not represent an isolated 
women's politics. Reformers saw themselves as attacking, 
not piecemeal or isolated evils, but the varied symptoms of 
a larger corruption. Feminists were never without the 
active support and participation of a number of leading male 
reformers of the day— Henry Ward Beecher, William Lloyd 
Garrison, Wendell Philips, Henry Blackwell, Parker 
Pillsbury, and Thomas Wentworth Higginson, to name only a 
few. Woman's politics had its own special features, but it 
also developed alongside of and dialectically with male 
political theory in a way that this thesis will not do 
justice to. After the war, the reform community would come 
to bitterness over the place of woman's rights in the reform 
galaxy. But despite some tensions, notably within 
abolitionism, in the antebellum period many expressed a
7Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Cheerful Yesterdays (1899; 
reprint, New York, 1968), p. 119.
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belief in common action moved by the "upward tending spirit 
of the age."
Again, this spirit among reformers was the offspring of 
liberal Christianity and the perfectionism of the revival. 
Despite many reformers' divorce from the orthodox churches, 
they sought holiness in their lives in a disciplined way 
that went well beyond the norm: Higginson notes that his 
friends were concerned at his entering Harvard Divinity 
School, afraid he would become like another colleague who 
"used to be a real come-outer, interested in all the 
reforms; but now he smokes and swears and goes to church, 
and is just like any other young man."* The woman's 
movement too contained these contradictions, so that it was 
not unusual for the minutes of a convention to record days 
of -vigorous diatribes against the established church ending 
with the Doxology, sung to the tune of Old Hundred. Women 
activists were engaged in a search for a structure of church 
and state which would embody their social and spiritual 
values. They were reenvisioning God as well as the state, 
and often spoke of him as Allah, the First Cause, the 
Eternal Searcher of Hearts— names signifying not just poetic 
whimsey, but an attempt to find a divinity they could
'Higginson, Cheerful Yesterdays, p. 109.
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understand and respect.
Antoinette Brown Blackwell's is perhaps the most 
telling story about the reconceptualization of religion 
which accompanied and strengthened the quest for woman's 
rights. An early feminist, a seminarian from Oberlin, one 
of the first ordained woman ministers in the country, she 
was a woman of strong life-long faith. But even her gentle 
creed precipitated a crisis of faith during the first year 
of her ministry, and she resigned in doubt and spiritual 
anguish. After a time, her faith was restored, but in a new 
form, one which is emblematic of the liberal reformers' 
stand: "My present religion is a free one; all its truths 
are revelations from Nature's God to the soul; and one must 
be outside all sectarian pressures to speak it freely."
Blackwell's emphasis on nature, the absence of the 
restraint of formalized creed or institutional ties, is 
common to feminist thought while at the same time expressing 
the spiritual faith and longing which imbued the woman's 
movement in the years before the war. Women reformers did 
not accept the god of orthodoxy, but their belief in 
divinity and in transcendent natural laws was critical to 
their political development. God was a childhood familiar, 
and though protean in nature he remained a fixed point for 
many feminists, as he did for Henry C. Wright, the apostate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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abolitionist who explained his return to faith saying that 
in his loneliness he had been unable to erase the idea of 
God from his mind.
But if spirituality was a constant, organized religion 
itself was changing rapidly. In the transformation of 
women's movements from benevolent and reform societies to 
suffrage organizations in antebellum America, we see the 
shift of political life away from local, social settings 
toward organized politics at state and national levels. The 
personal, religious networks of the smaller community were 
well adapted to the exercise of women's influence: their 
status within the church and the social hierarchy were good 
bases of power. In towns where most transactions were face 
to face, women successfully pursued reform programs and 
influenced policy in their capacities as wives and 
churchwomen.
But by the mid-nineteenth century these networks were 
becoming seriously weakened by increased population, the 
growth of cities, impersonal work relations, the growing 
stratification of society— many of the effects of industrial 
capitalism. The Protestant Church's grip on public life had 
also loosened, further eroding women's base of power. The 
widened franchise gave most men some opportunity to 
participate in the newly important culture of electoral
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
politics. That option was foreclosed to women unless they 
themselves created new channels of power, and it is in this 
context that we must understand why the factions that 
developed after the Civil War within the woman's movement, 
although they worked for radically different social ends, 
were both scrambling to get a foothold in public politics: 
private politics no longer worked.*
This work will focus on two groups, one at either end 
of the ideological spectrum of organized feminism: the 
National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), a group 
spearheaded by the brilliant feminist theorist Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton; and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union 
(WCTU), whose charismatic president Frances Willard 
revolutionized its agenda. The differences between the two 
groups are striking, and are usually cast in contemporary 
feminism's terms as the "equality-difference" conflict. But 
to force last century's struggles into this century's molds 
distorts them, and tells us nothing about the historical 
conditions under which such a split originated. The
*See Paula Baker, "The Domestication of Politics: Women 
and American Political Society, 1780-1920," American 
Historical Review, vol. 89 no. 3 (1984), pp. 620-647; Judith 
Wellman, "Women and Radical Reform in Upstate New York: A 
Profile of Grassroots Female Abolitionists," in Clio Was a 
Woman: Studies in the History of American Women. Mabel E. 
Deutrich and Virginia C. Purdy, eds. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1980).
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assessment that one side believed in "equality" and the 
other in "difference," in addition to being simplistic, is 
the tip of the iceberg. The NWSA was an elite corps of 
educated women of liberal religious temperament and 
affiliation, centered in the East, whose strategy was a 
national one and whose strong suit was not grass roots 
organization. Most of its members had cut their political 
teeth on abolitionism, and understood well the 
constitutional remedies of Reconstruction. The WCTU, by 
contrast, was midwestern in origin with strength in the 
west, populist in flavor, and brilliantly organized to 
exploit the labors and loyalties of every woman in small 
town America. Its members were burghers' wives, not the 
elite; not raised on abolitionism; and came largely from the 
revivalist strain of Protestantism, belonging overwhelmingly 
to evangelical denominations, Methodism in particular.
What is as striking as their divergence is that, 
starting from such distant points, these two wings of the 
woman's movement had a common agenda that went well beyond 
their superficial agreement on suffrage: they shared the 
close bond of a common enemy, Calvinist patriarchy, which 
women reformers felt had pervaded public and private life 
alike. The death of theology and the minister's loss of 
authority can certainly be separated from the decline of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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patriarchy and the father's waning discretion within the 
home; but women on all points of the spectrum identified the 
two as one phenomenon, one knotty problem in governance.
This is the study of two groups who constitute one 
generation of women who came of age in Charles Finney's 
America; they were engaged in the common rejection of 
Calvinist patriarchy, but deeply split over the nature of 
authority in a post-Calvinist world.
The answer to the familiar riddle "When is a patriarch 
not a patriarch?" is, "When he's not home." By strict 
definition a patriarch is one who rules over children, and 
incidentally over anyone else in the way; the father who 
left the farm and went off to work every morning, whether to 
a factory or to his office, gave up that power. This left 
households in the hands of mothers, who for the first time 
became the Lockes, the Filmers, the Rousseaus of their 
world. Tales of family governance— now maternal governance 
— from women reformers of the mid-nineteenth century carried 
with them the seeds of new political theories. And like 
Locke, women reformers from both parties based their 
political theories on their views of human nature. Women's 
power originated in the private sphere— initially in power 
over children— and they became matriarchal in the sense that 
their view of appropriate family relations became the model
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for social governance as well.
This was true for both members of the WCTU and of the 
NWSA; but they were poles apart over what the appropriate 
model of the family, and therefore of society, should be. 
Many evangelicals showed themselves in their letters and 
autobiographies to be strongly mother-identified; they 
pushed for a heavily mother-dominated household which 
translated into a maternal state that was both compassionate 
and coercive. Few liberals identified with their mothers 
in the same way in print, or subscribed to the idealization 
of the mother; and again from autobiographical sources it is 
possible to say that Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. 
Anthony, Lucy Stone, and other more liberal suffragists 
either did not get: along well with either parent, or had 
more respect for their fathers. The liberal household, like 
the liberal state, was short on care and coercion both.
To call someone a "liberal” today is to mean one of two 
things: that they carry a card and care about civil rights, 
or that they are advocates of the welfare state— two 
positions that actually sit rather uneasily together. 
Antebellum feminist theory sought to combine the two, 
envisioning the use of rights for the full growth of the 
individual but in the context of that person's duties and 
obligations. After the Civil War these two positions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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emerged as separate strands of political thought; rights to 
further individual growth were set in opposition to rights 
which assisted the individual and the community in the 
context of a set of mutual obligations. Both strains 
contributed strongly to what we call liberalism today.
Nineteenth-century liberalism has sometimes been 
described as a static compound of free-market and laissez- 
faire principles grounded in a pessimistic view of human 
nature as self-interested. But so barren a philosophy could 
hardly have taken such a firm hold on the minds of 
Americans. Christian perfectionism and the optimistic 
belief in self-government, free of human regulation but 
under a larger system of laws, were tenets of the woman's 
rights movement that dovetailed with prevailing economic 
theory and helped to create a liberal ethic that nineteenth- 
century Americans could understand and accept. Woman's 
rights advocates helped to transform liberalism over the 
course of the century: Stanton and her followers worked to 
construct a liberal defense of privacy and individual 
autonomy based largely on freedom of conscience; while 
Christian feminists deployed the Christian obligation to 
personal charity to help lay the groundwork for an incipient 
welfare state. Both themes have become important components 
of twentieth-century liberal theory.
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17
The volume of paper generated by these two well-staffed 
organizations is tremendous, and the problem of what is 
representative looms large. I have chosen for the purposes 
of this thesis to concentrate heavily on two figures, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frances Willard; this method both 
enhances the comparison between the two groups because the 
source material is so rich and plentiful; and makes the 
comparison suspect at some level. Instead of opting to call 
this thesis "Stanton and Willard: Two Feminist Theorists," I 
have continued to see it as at least in part a group 
comparison; I have consulted the official papers of both 
groups, and read widely in the letters and papers of the 
women who worked with Stanton and Willard. Both women's 
views are often representative of the views of the rest of 
the leadership (although not necessarily the rank and file, 
especially in the case of the WCTU); are sometimes a taste 
of the future, as both were more radical than the 
mainstream, and were highly articulate and influential and 
never let go; and occasionally both were well out of the 
mainstream of their own followers, in which case I have 
tried to indicate the split.
I like to see studying Stanton and Willard as studying 
two sopranos in a municipal opera: they are out in front, 
singing louder than anyone else, often but not always in
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tune with the chorus, and always heard. In addition, the 
comparison itself is fascinating; despite the difference in 
their ages, both grew up resisting religious orthodoxy; went 
on to become leaders of major woman's organizations; and 
ended their lives as Fabian socialists. What lay in between 
is another story.
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Chapter I - Religion and Rights Consciousness 
in the Antebellum Woman's Rights Movement
The meeting of feminists at Seneca Falls in July of 
1848 marked the nominal beginning of the movement which in 
the nineteenth century was labeled "woman's rights." For us 
that term has become commonly interchangeable with 
"suffrage," and we often assume that "woman's rights" 
describes a seventy-odd year campaign to gain civil and 
political power and protection from a government which—  
although it had perpetrated outrages against women and 
blacks— had an unquestioned legitimacy as the guarantor and 
enforcer of rights.
Historical interpretations of the woman's movement have 
reaffirmed this picture, stressing the republican origins of 
women's claims and their easy fit within the tradition of 
American constitutionalism. The movement's biographers have 
placed feminists' arguments well within the secular 
political tradition of the nineteenth century. They have 
treated "natural rights" as a form of "super-right"— more 
emphatic, an appeal to historical tradition, but not 
qualitatively different from constitutional claims— and 
natural law language as formulaic fist shaking.1 Ellen
Eileen Kraditor takes this tack in The Ideas of the 
Woman Suffrage Movement. 1890-1920 (New York, 1965).
19
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DuBois, the foremost historian of the movement's early
period, has stressed suffrage as the activists' most radical
and most mature demand, and the highest evolution of women's
political consciousness. For DuBois, the quest for the
ballot reflected a rights consciousness rooted in the 
*secular, enlightened, liberal tradition of the American 
Revolution. She labels suffrage as the primary goal from 
the beginning for the right-thinking portion of the movement 
as represented by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the National 
Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), and sees the more 
conservative Woman's Christian Temperance Union's 
endorsement of the vote in the 1880s as a measure of the 
NWSA's success in setting a liberal agenda for the woman's 
movement as a whole.2
Historians have overstated both the secular identity of 
antebellum feminism and the centrality of suffrage to that 
movement, emphasizing the roles of Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
and Susan B. Anthony to the exclusion of scores of other 
activists more representative of the movement's mainstream.
2See Ellen C. DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: The 
Emergence of an Independent Woman's Movement in America. 
1848-1869 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978); and "The Radicalism of Woman 
Suffrage: Notes Toward the Reconstruction of 
Nineteenth-Century Feminism," Feminist Studies, vol. 3 no. 3 
(1975), pp. 63-71.
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The rather abstract language of rights used by the Founding 
Fathers was common currency in America, and women drew on it 
for help in fashioning their arguments and in making public 
appeals. But feminists did not don the Founders' philosophy 
of rights as a perfectly fitting suit of mail. Many were 
initiated into organized feminism through the philosophies 
of liberal Protestantism so prevalent in antebellum reform 
thought. The content of their rights thinking was informed 
by a deeply religious sensibility which stressed the 
interconnections between rights and responsibilities, 
between civil and domestic relations, and between the 
workings of the state and of the home. Suffrage did not 
automatically take pride of place in the panoply of rights 
womea sought in the period before the Civil War, but stood 
as one goal among many, and not the most important.
Further, rights consciousness was originally rooted in 
domestic concerns for many women, who saw them as a means of 
achieving protection for themselves and their families while 
pursuing the ends of social justice. Such an understanding 
of rights was in full accord with the liberal Protestant 
imperative for the full development of the individual and 
his or her full participation in society. The demand for 
rights did not emerge theoretically full-blown from any 
woman's head, but was born the usual way, amid a welter of
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personal and familial concerns.
Finally, although "equality" was the watchword of the 
movement, in the antebellum period it referred largely to a 
negative proposition; the removal of the false and 
artificial restraints of woman's sphere, restraints which 
prevented her full entry into public life. "Equal" was not 
"like," and although feminists ideally hoped that the 
destruction of spheres could bring about the growth of 
common sympathies between men and women, their attitudes 
toward male culture were rooted in the genuine, material 
differences in men's and women's lives which existed in 
education, opportunity, political entitlement, and social 
expectation in nineteenth-century America. Although women 
demanded equality, they also predicated their entry into the 
political world on a moral sensibility which most saw as 
uniquely feminine, and which served as the basis for their 
political agenda and their theory of rights.
The Christian Understanding of Politics and Power
To understand what significance "law" and "rights" had 
for mid-nineteenth-century female activists, we must 
interpret their concepts of power and governance according 
to the Protestant ethos which informed their world vision. 
Within this Christian framework, the possession of power was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
construed in a peculiar and particular way. Both 
evangelical revivalists and Garrisonian abolitionists— two 
groups which influenced budding feminist thought profoundly 
— were suspicious of power and of its potential for 
corruption in human hands, where it could so easily work 
against God's designs. The power of the husband, the 
father, the slaveowner, the legislator, the judge— all were 
potentially abusive, or abusive by the fact of their 
existence, as intrusions between God and the individual.3 
For many Christians, morality remained sharply antithetical 
to concepts of power or human governance, an attitude which 
in many respects early woman's rights advocates shared.4 
Certainly in the 1850s the Christian ethos still shaped 
women's apprehension of power relationships, and of what 
kind of action they could most effectively undertake in the 
world.
A case in point is Uncle Tom's Cabin: seeing the novel
3See Lewis Perry, Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the 
Government of God in Anti-Slaverv Thought (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1973), esp. chap. 2.
4One of the grievances in the original Declaration of 
Sentiments drawn up at Seneca Falls includes the claim, "He 
has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself, claiming it 
as his right to assign for her a sphere of action, when that 
belongs to her conscience and to her God." See "Report of 
the Woman's Rights Convention Held at Seneca Falls, New 
York, July 19th and 20th, 1848" (1848; reprint, 1969) 
(hereafter cited as "Seneca Falls"), p. 7.
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as nineteenth-century Americans did can show us the distance 
between their political understandings and our own. In 
recent decades "Uncle Tom" has become a term of contempt.
The slave's loving but dignified submissiveness in the face 
of brutality is seen as the behavior of a lackey, a cousin 
of Steppin Fetchit. This ahistorical reading ignores the 
devout nineteenth-century evangelical culture which received 
the book, where the power of docility and selfless love to 
work conversion constituted a power far greater than any 
political tool. The tremendous public response to the novel 
was not an acclamation of weakness but of strength from a 
public for whom the conversion experience still represented 
the greatest force for political or historical change.
Uncle Tom did not die moaning "Woe is me" but exclaiming 
"I've got the victory!" The success of the novel showed 
that the "feminine" values of submissiveness, Christian 
humility, prayer and love in the face of brutality 
represented for many a type of power beyond the ballot or 
the whip.5
The death of Uncle Tom— and "what majesty there is in a 
Christian death"— struck an answering chord in the vision of 
women as pious, submissive, workers of change through love
sJane Tompkins, "Sentimental Power: Uncle Tom's Cabin 
and the Politics of Literary History," Glyph, vol. 8 (1981).
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and moral suasion. The Lilv showed how women had to 
struggle to come to terms with, incorporate, or overcome the 
Christian model of submission. For both temperance 
activists and certain abolitionists, moral suasion was the 
only godly and effective way to seek change, and women as 
well were exhorted to work change through loving and 
peaceful means. The archetypal story of the weak 
vanquishing the strong is introduced in the pages of the 
Lilv, but in this case potential female Davids are advised 
that in confronting Goliath, "we must arm ourselves with but 
the simple sling of truth, and pebbles from the pool of 
love."* There is an element of self-sacrifice here: as Jane 
Tompkins describes it, Little Eva's death signifies that 
"the pure and powerless die to save the powerful and 
corrupt, and thereby show themselves more powerful than 
those they save."7
Well before the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin, the 
story of the dying child begging the sodden father to sign 
the temperance pledge and stop his abusive ways was staple
*Lilv, vol. 1 no. 7, p. 52 (July, 1849).
7Tompkins, p. 128. See also the Lilv. vol. 3 no. 12, 
p. 94 (Dec. 1851).
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fare.* Even when it was supplemented by more sophisticated 
political analysis, the moral suasion model maintained a 
great attraction for women; not just because it emphasized a 
socially acceptable submissiveness, although there were 
certainly cultural pressures on women to accept that role, 
but also because it spoke to women's perceptions of 
themselves as loving, and to their abhorrence of the culture 
of male violence. "The Moral Power of Woman" lauds the 
levelling potential of forgiveness to defeat the cycle of 
violence, suggesting that by a spiritual ranking women's 
acts were as weighty as men's. Another story relates with 
high praise how Dorthea Dix once disarmed a highwayman with 
compassion where her driver would have begun a bloodbath, 
clearly setting out two models of alternative dispute
resolution.9
Glory notwithstanding, Uncle Tom does die in the end, a 
fact h.iKv‘ did not escape woman's rights advocates who were 
beginning to ask, "when smitten on one cheek, we are
commanded to turn the other also. Does anyone suppose that
this carries with it the authority to strike?" The Lilv for
*For example in the Lilv, vol. 1 no. 10 (Oct. 1849), 
"The Drunkard's Child;" and vol. 1 no. 7 (July, 1849).
9Lilv, vol. 1 no. 7, p. 53 (July, 1849); vol. 3 no. 6, 
p. 43 (June, 1851).
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April of 1851 carried a story on the scourging of rumsellers 
illustrated by a fable showing many women's ambivalence 
about the use of direct power. An old lady one day found a 
frog in her tea kettle, who refused her polite request to 
hop out. "Well," she responded, "I shall not use force or
compel you to leave your quarters, but __ " she said,
putting the kettle on the fire, "I shall make you DREADFUL 
UNCOMFORTABLE.10
Given the early woman's movement's understanding of 
power— apprehension over its direct exercise, fear and 
distrust of the institutions of government, seeing morality 
and official power as antithetical, belief in change worked 
from within rather than from without— it is difficult to 
interpret the demand for woman's rights strictly within the 
framework of secular liberal political theory. Most 
feminists were more pragmatic than the Garrisonians; they 
lacked the wild, intense piety which prepared that group to 
renounce all human organizations on the spot, including 
their own, in favor of some form of mutual self-government 
which their faith had not yet revealed. Still, a strain of 
anti-institutionalism was strong within feminism in the 
antebellum years. Women repeatedly resolved to "rely no
10Lily, vol. 3 no. 9 (Sept. 1851); vol. 3 no. 4, p. 29 
(April, 1851).
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longer on organizations of any kind— upon neither national 
or state, secret or public societies of any description ... 
but to depend upon ... (our) own energetic, determined, and 
individual effort for ... the final triumph of our glorious 
principles"— hardly the stuff of legal positivism.11
The majority of feminists believed that legal and 
political change— changes in statutes, court rulings, the 
common law, interpretations of women's political rights—  
were symptomatic, and could only reflect deeper change on 
the level of public opinion worked by individuals coming to 
a real understanding of natural laws. Even Stanton, 
certainly one of the best versed of the feminists in legal 
matters and a fiery advocate of political measures, opined 
that "(P)ublic sentiment is higher than laws— laws in 
advance of the people are mere chaff."12 Most reformers
^Lilv. vol. 3 no. 3, p. 21 (March 1851).
^Lilv, vol. 1 no. 11, p. 86 (Nov. 1849); see also vol.
2 no. 1, p. 4 (Jan. 1850). At one national convention, Abby 
Kelly Foster and Ernestine Rose came into direct conflict 
over the question of whether laws shape people, or only 
follow public opinion, as reported in "Proceedings of the 
Woman's Rights Convention Held at Cleveland, Ohio...October 
5th, 6th, and 7th, 1853" (1854) (hereafter cited as 
"Cleveland"), pp. 81-82. Foster urged strongly that law was 
a creature of public sentiment. Rose's counter-statement, 
and her stance within the movement, are fascinating. A 
Polish Jew who grew to intellectual maturity in the 
free-thinking circles of enlightened Europe, Rose was 
probably the only atheist among the early feminist leaders. 
Much closer to the secular, European tradition which
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believed that reeducation of the moral sentiments was the 
way to bring public opinion around, and that old laws could 
not withstand new leanings: "The ballot box is not worth a 
straw, until woman is ready to use it ... The moment that 
woman is ready to go to the ballot box, there is not a 
constitution that will stand in the country."13 Far from 
looking to government for remedies and favors, there was a 
strong emphasis on self-help and a belief that, by readying 
themselves and their neighbors, activists could bring about 
the desired transformation without seeking direct political 
change or soliciting governmental intervention.14 Women 
strove, not for new laws to reshape public life, but to 
promote moral sentiments and their adoption by the whole 
community. Majoritarian democracy was not the standard of 
judgment here. The appeal was rather to communal consensus, 
to the "honest judgment of every member of the community,"
produced feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft and Frances 
Wright, Rose alone consistently denied any connection 
between rights and duties or any particular feminine 
qualifications for the franchise. She had the earliest and 
most emphatic vision of law as a strong, positive force in 
shaping human thinking and behavior. On the differences 
between European and American feminism see Alice Rossi, The 
Feminist Papers (New York, 1974), part 2.
“"Cleveland," p. 168.
“Speech of Abby Kelly Foster in Woman's Rights 
Commensurate with Her Capacities and Obligations: A Series 
of Tracts (1853).
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and to that community's right to formulate and prosecute its 
own laws according to its own communal mores, and so defend 
itself from harm.15 Women judged progress, not by citizens' 
begrudging acceptance of a law eked out through determined 
assaults on the legislature, but by a reorientation of each 
individual conscience toward God, and a consequent righting 
of public opinion.
This vision is at odds with the positivist view of law 
and government which plays an important part in our 
conceptualization of rights. Rights consciousness today 
implies at least a mediating state power to protect against 
encroachment, and usually looks to human government or a 
constitution as the source and guarantor of rights. Between 
1848 and 1860, however, positive or positivist attitudes 
were not a major feature of women's legal repertoire, which 
held only a nascent recognition of the law's transformative 
potential. For the many who believed that divine and 
natural laws ruled the world in intimate detail, human 
legislation loomed small. Stanton spoke for many when she 
said admiringly of the New York abolitionist Gerrit Smith 
that he went to the Bible for his policies, and to Christ
“Lily, vol. 3 no. 3, p. 21 (March 1851); vol. 1 no. 1, 
p. 4 (Jan. 1849); vol. 2 no. 1, p. 5 (Jan. 1850); vol. 1 no. 
8, p. 62 (Aug. 1849).
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for his social, moral, and political creed, "over the heads 
of Popes, Cardinals and Bishops, Judges, Jurists ... writers
on law and jurisprudence __ (and) over all laws, common and
uncommon, codified and uncodified"— a fairly comprehensive 
listing.16 The determined belief in law as a constitutive 
or transformative force grew as women became politicized and 
moved outward from the revival-style convention to 
engagement with state and national legislatures. But in the 
early years, the shared wisdom was that law was a creature 
of public sentiment, and any legal revision which did not 
derive from an underlying shift in the common mindset had a 
futile career ahead of it.
For most, a budding hope that law would provide them
redress or protection was seriously compromised by the
belief that the vision of law as external authority instead
of as self-government constituted the problem, and that
genuine reform would entail the erosion of government which
sought to coerce human behavior. Feminists identified human
law with the "might makes right" fallacy, as Hannah Tracy
Cutler suggested in a letter to the Una in 1853.
Laws, among men, have been for the most part 
either the enactments of despots who have 
swayed by the physical force they commanded, 
or else the concessions which despots have
16Lilv. vol. 4 no. 5, pp. 39-40 (May 1852) .
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reluctantly yielded to the counterbalancing 
physical force of their unwilling subjects.
Hence it has been the exponent of what force 
would yield to force, rather than the free 
expression of the moral sentiments of a 
people ... the old physical force law ... 
still keeps women from an equal participation 
in its primary relations, even after the 
evangel of equal human rights has been 
proclaimed.11
Women viewed the evolution of society as entailing the 
ascendance of moral and mental over physical might, and the 
consequent withering away of the state as an instrument of 
control. Divorced from law and legal processes as they 
were, and with their understanding of the corrupt nature of 
humanly held power, antebellum feminists were not simply 
seeking inclusion in the revolutionary settlement, or in the 
system as it stood. When it came to law and governance, 
their attitude is best expressed by the text they so 
frequently quoted— "Behold, I make all things new."
Woman's Legal Culture and the Equality Problem
Feminists consistently pitted themselves against what 
they perceived as a distinctly male culture of law and 
politics in developing their critique of male institutions.
l7Una, vol. 1 no. 1, p. 14 (Feb. 1853) . For 
biographical information about particular feminists 
mentioned here see James, Edward T.; James, Janet Wilson; 
and Boyer, Paul S., eds., Notable American Women. 1607-1950: 
A Biographical Dictionary (3 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1971)
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Nevertheless, the idea of a distinctive woman's politics or 
legal culture has not received much play in the scholarship. 
For some women's historians, the glory of the woman suffrage 
movement lies in the assertion of equality, and in the 
"philosophical tenet that women were essentially human and 
only incidentally female" which helped women activists break 
down a sexual differentiation that was tantamount to 
inferiority and confinement.1* For many contemporary 
feminists the acknowledgement or assertion of difference, 
then or now, is deeply illiberal. They can conceive of 
women having full rights only in a system which treats men 
and women as strictly fungible civil and legal 
personalities. Ellen DuBois has raised the quest for 
suffrage and the claim of equality as the standard for the 
nineteenth-century woman's movement as a whole, and 
classifies anything else as a type of "domestic feminism," 
an inferior variety which mounted no challenge to the male 
hierarchy. Surely the claim to the vote was eye-openingly 
radical. But this assessment of the themes of equality and 
difference as they came into play in the movement requires 
dismissing a large part of what women said about their own 
campaign and about themselves. Many who agreed that they
“DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage, p. 36.
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were "essentially human" did not consider themselves to be 
"only incidentally female," and entertained strong beliefs 
in equality, likeness and dissimilarity, and a womanly 
mission, simultaneously .1?
The claim of equality between men and women, a staple 
of woman's rights rhetoric, contradicted deeply entrenched 
social thought on gender roles. Rarely has a society 
postulated such elemental differences between men and women 
as mid-nineteenth- century American society did. Feminists' 
assertion that women had the same souls, same moral duties, 
same intellects and hopes as men opened the way to a more 
fully integrated public sphere than was ever possible 
before: we are still dining out on the capital of that 
ideal. The assertion of equality was a protest lodged 
against discrimination in both law and custom, against 
whatever rules or attitudes restrained women's natural 
energies or kept them in a dwarfed or crippled state. Women 
believed that, "possessing common natures, common rights, 
and a common destiny, society can never be harmoniously 
organized until the individuality and equality of each one
1#Blanche Glassman Heish says of Stanton, Susan B. 
Anthony, and Lucy Stone, "All three combined a belief in 
woman's special moral and domestic responsibilities with a 
vision of her obligations in the broader world." The Slavery 
of Sex: Feminist-Abolitionlsts in America (Urbana, 111., 
1978), p. 80.
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is practically recognized."20
Equality was an ideal with political consequences, and 
feminists used it in an attempt to break down formal 
structures of restraint. In the early years they envisioned 
legal equality entailing the abolition of all laws which 
weighed disproportionately on women. After that, women's 
unobstructed energy would surely bring them into full 
parity. But while the ideal of equality held great meaning 
for women, it did not eradicate their understanding of their 
social and familial roles and their larger interests as 
being distinct from men's. In twentieth century society, 
where civil equality is held up as the highest stage of the 
citizen's development, justice is blind to individual 
characteristics, and the fungibility of the bearers is the 
measure of rights. This kind of equality— ignorant of 
gender, race, role, duty, station— was initially 
incomprehensible to most feminists. Instead, they argued in 
the name of equality for rights that would allow each to 
fulfill her role and attain her highest individual destiny 
decreed by God, whatever it might be. An important degree 
of difference was built into this idea of equality, which
2aLilv. vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850); see also vol.
3 no. 5, p. 36 (May 1851); and "Proceedings of the Woman's 
Rights Convention Held at Syracuse, Sept. 8th, 9th, and 
10th, 1852 (1852) (hereafter cited as "Syracuse"), p. 31.
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did not "mean either identity or likeness ... of the two 
sexes, but equivalence of dignity, necessity, and use; 
admitting all differences and modifications which shall not 
affect a just claim to equal liberty in development and 
action. "21
The apprehension of their own special interests and 
duties which imbued women's politics in the 1850s did create 
some friction in the elaboration of women's political 
empowerment. The popular cultural idealization of woman's 
superhuman goodness, her angelic nature, raised the hackles 
of those who suspected men of packing women off to heaven 
prematurely to limit their influence on earth. Feminists 
rejected the idea that they were "fine porcelain" to be laid 
on the shelf, and insisted on their right to "mingle with 
the rude stone jugs, mugs, and platters of humanized 
crockery."22 One writer even ventured the opinion that, far 
from moral superiority, woman's goodness resulted from a 
lack of opportunity, and that when they had money and power 
they would become competent swindlers and bribe-takers like
21Paulina Wright Davis, "On the Education of Females," 
tract no. 3 in Woman's Rights Commensurate with Her 
Capacities.
22Lilv. vol. 3 no. 6, p. 46 (June 1851) .
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everyone else.”
But although they were prickly and resistant to what 
they considered demeaning characterizations on the part of 
men, women reformers had their own ideas of their goodness 
and what role it would play in a reformed society. It would 
have been extraordinary if they hadn't. Revivalism, liberal 
Protestantism, romanticism, reform— all tended toward an 
identification of femininity with morality, spirituality, 
and self awareness as a potent political force capable of 
containing the male tyranny of corruption and greed. Women 
may have claimed that they were equal to men, but not that 
they were like; and likeness could not be established by 
assertion, but only by a different kind of living together, 
a recognition of "mutual dependence, and separate fountains 
of reciprocal life."24
The utopian dream was the eventual blending of natures, 
so that "there will be but one code of morals, and of taste. 
Women will acquire the energy and self reliance of man, and 
man will emulate the purity and religious sincerity of
”Una, vol. 1 no. 5, p. 72 (June 1853); see also Una, 
vol. 1 no. 1, p. 11 (Feb. 1853); vol. 1 no. 4, p. 72-73 (May 
1853); Lily, vol. 3 no. 6, p. 46 (June 1851).
“"Syracuse," p. 60.
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woman.”25 In their vision of a "better Eden," men and women 
would grow more alike over time, taking on each other's 
qualities, thereby eradicating the oppressive imbalance 
which deformed contemporary government, and making communal 
self-government a reality.2* The result would mean 
narrowing the gap between men and women, allowing their like 
moral natures to eradicate the harmful differences of 
temperament and culture. Women often quoted a stanza of 
Tennyson to that effect: "The woman's cause is man's: they
rise or sink/Together, dwarfed or god-like, bond or free./ 
... The woman is not underdeveloped man/But diverse./Yet in 
the long years, liker they must grow;/The man be more or 
woman, she of man ,.."27
Pleasant as this idyll was, in envisioning a political 
future women saw themselves endowing men with their own 
traits far more often than they saw themselves taking on the 
traits of men. In the years before the Civil War, woman's 
rights activists were inspired by a sense of equality; but
“"Cleveland," p. 52; see also Elizabeth Oakes Smith, 
Woman and Her Needs (1851; reprint, New York, 1974), passim.
2*Hersh, Slavery of Sex, p. 139, suggests that the 
conception of interdependence is a tenet of Universalism.
“"Report of the Woman's Rights Meeting at Mercantile 
Hall, Boston, May 27, 1859" (1859) (hereafter cited as 
"Boston"), p. 9.
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they were also motivated by a discontent with the existing 
order which fell out along gender lines, and emphasized the 
differences, both natural and cultural, between the sexes. 
When arguments for woman's rights came largely from 
abolitionism, equality was a natural focus. But as women, 
unlike slaves, developed their own well articulated 
positions, they began to enumerate their grievances with 
male management.2* The belief in woman's moral mission to 
clean up politics and society was not interjected into the 
woman's movement by the entrance of the Woman's Christian 
Temperance Union into the suffrage movement in the late 
1870s and the 1880s, as Ellen DuBois has suggested.29 
Rather, it was a position to which many women openly or 
tacitly adhered from the movement's beginnings. Difference 
was both the agent of change in this scheme, and the problem 
to be overcome. Woman's rights workers expected the 
integration of masculine and feminine to bring particularly 
beneficial results in the public realm, often picturing
“Barbara L. Epstein in The Politics of Domesticity: 
Women. Evangelism, and Temperance in Nineteenth-Centurv 
America (Middletown, Conn., 1981), sees women's religious 
culture as a vehicle for antagonism between the sexes, 
picturing religion more as a tool to express generalized 
gender antagonism than as a system of belief which 
interpreted and fostered political change.
29"The Radicalism of Woman Suffrage," pp. 68-69.
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themselves in the role of redeemer, as when a correspondent 
to the national convention in Cleveland suggested that "the 
eye of the law is diseased, and women must ... make that eye 
pure and single sighted."30 Even the egalitarian Stanton 
recommended the "feminine element in humanity" to "save man 
from the bondage of his animal nature— the slavery of his 
own low appetites. "3l Women had little doubt that they 
would perform the duties of office better than men, firmly 
opposing poverty, intemperance, and their social roots, and 
promoting "all just and beneficent purposes."32
Nor does the movement's moral consciousness necessarily 
suggest that it was politically immature, insular, or 
domestic in its focus. If anything, it suggests broader 
concerns, a fuller life within the reform community, than 
was true of suffragism after the war, when narrower legal 
and political concerns took precedence. Many of the pacific 
dictates of liberal Christianity— "feminine submissiveness"- 
“were known in another guise as politically oppositional 
stands taken by reformers convinced that problems like
“"Cleveland," p. 8.
31In "The Pleasures of Age: An Address Delivered by 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Her Seventieth Birthday" (1885); 
see also Lilv. vol. 4 no. 5, p. 40 (May 1850); vol. 2 no. 4, 
p. 29 (April 1850).
“"Cleveland," p. 30, p. 91; "Syracuse," p. 63.
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slavery and territorial aggression would diminish under
their rule.33 Calls to non-violence and reason in place of
force were grounded in a Christian tradition, but served in
the antebellum years as a potent charge against the
government which perpetrated such crimes. By adding the
feminine to the masculine element, women were rejecting the
political sphere men were carving out for themselves, one
seemingly cut loose from the constraints of traditional
moral principles of governance. The absence of either
element would bring "results fatal both to justice and
morality. The civil and political departments are fair
illustrations of these results."34 Above all, women
manifested a wish to substitute the principles of
noncoercion, nonviolence, and consensual government for the
Hobbesian arrangements of the day.
Politics and statesmanship, still resting so 
much upon the force of armament, must come 
under the jurisdiction of simple justice, 
give up the employment of physical force, and 
rise to a sphere of mind and feeling fit for 
woman's administration ... the policy of 
government, now so intricate, so dark a 
contexture of fraud and force that the worst'
33Una, vol. 1 no. 3, pp. 37, 41 (April 1853); 
"Cleveland," p. 92.
34"Syracuse," p. 22. See also "Proceedings of the 
Seventh National Woman's Rights Convention Held in New York 
City...Nov. 25th and 26th, 1856" (1856) (hereafter cited as 
"New York"), p. 23.
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men are its best ministers, will be redeemed 
and reformed, so that the acknowledged 
excellence of feminine morality and woman's 
directness and clearness of intellect, will 
be the highest qualification for national 
government.35
Women activists vigorously disputed their critics'
charges that they were being unsexed through their political
activities, and affirmed their own femininity and security
in their roles as wives and mothers. No one rebutted those
charges more effectively than Frances Gage when she
complained,
They (men) cannot get up a picture of a 
woman's rights meeting ... but they must put 
cigars and pipes in our mouths, make us sit 
cross-legged, or hoist our feet above their 
legitimate positions— making us behave as 
nearly as possible as disgustingly and 
unbecomingly as themselves ... They have ... 
so long associated their vulgar thoughts and 
feelings with constitutional rights and 
privileges, that they seem to think them 
inseparable .. .3‘
Gage in her pithy way put her finger on a thread which runs
consistently through women's concerns in this period—
resentment and dislike of male political culture, from which
women were so excluded. Stanton, in a letter to the
Syracuse Convention, castigates men who, "having separated
themselves from women, in the business of life, and thus
”Una, vol. 1 no. 3, p. 41 (April 1853). 
“Lily, vol. 4 no. 2, p. 14 (Feb. 1852).
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made their natures coarse by contact with their own sex 
exclusively, now demand separate pleasures too; and in lieu 
of the cheerful family circle ... they congregate in clubs 
to discuss politics, to gamble, drink, etc . .,"3’ Stanton 
often spoke of a lyceum lecture she longed to write on "The 
Antagonism of the Sexes."3' Male opponents of the woman's 
franchise often argued that polling places were too rough 
for women; feminists deplored this self-confessed pollution 
of civic functions, finding man in his role as political 
animal repugnant, whether as lawyer, judge, voter, or 
clubman.3'
This attitude translated into often made claims that 
male legislators could not represent women adequately, not 
because they would not, but because the difference in their 
natures and interests meant that men were not capable of 
such representation. Ernestine Rose argued cleverly that, 
if man's nature was different, he could not understand 
woman's needs sufficiently to make laws for her; and if the 
same, there was no reason to exclude women from full
J1wSyracuse," p. 32; see also "Cleveland," p. 38.
3>Lilv, vol. 3 no. 11, p. 82 (Nov. 1851); see also 
letters of Sept. 1, 1817, and Dec. 15, 1886, Stanton Papers, 
Douglass College Library, Rutgers University.
“"Syracuse," p. 73.
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political participation.40 Cool argumentation aside, even 
Stanton clearly felt the outrage and slight when she asked, 
"Shall the most sacred relations of life be called up and 
rudely scanned by men who, by their own admission, are so 
coarse that women cannot meet them even at the polls without 
contamination? ... How can man enter into the feelings of
  (a) mother? Shall laws which come from the logical
brains of man take cognizance of the violence done to the 
moral and affectional natures which predominate, as it is 
said, in woman?"41
Antoinette Brown Blackwell tended toward essentialist 
rather than cultural explanations of men's and women's 
differences, but her conclusion was the same: "The law is 
wholly masculine: it is created by our type or class of man 
nature. The framers of all legal compacts are thus 
restricted to the ... thoughts, feelings, biases of men ... 
we can be represented only by our peers."4* The insult of 
being bound by masculine law was compounded by "the 
shamefulness of trying intelligent, educated, well-bred
“"Cleveland," p. 36; see also Lilv, vol. 2 no. 5, p.
38 (May 1850).
“Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Address to the Legislature
of New York, Adopted by the State Woman's Rights Convention,
Held at Albany...Feb.14 and 15, 1854" (Albany, 1854), p. 7.
“"Syracuse," pp. 20-21.
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native born American women by juries of men made up of the 
riffraff from the monarchies of the old world."4* Women 
were sure that if they served on juries they would be very 
lenient with woman defendants, perhaps under the tutelage of 
woman lawyers who would either suggest more liberal 
interpretations of the law, or a whole new code of laws to 
replace those that currently disgraced the statute books.44
It was this dangerous isolation of the masculine from 
the feminine which feminists hoped to remedy, feeling that 
"so long as woman is required to take care of the morals of 
the community and men to take charge of the politics, having 
... separate interests in these two great matters, we shall 
have a strange and incongruous state of things. "4*
Traditional networks of women's influence— local, personal, 
religious networks which operated through churches, 
voluntary organizations, and familial contacts— had b^en 
strong in pre-industrial America. Through these networks 
women had wielded social influence disproportionate to their
4*Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony and Matilda 
Joslyn Gage, 1873, in the Stanton Papers, Douglass College 
Library, Rutgers University. See also Lilv. vol. 2 no. 5, p. 
38 (May 1850).
44Una, vol. 1 no. 4, p. 63 (May 1853); "Syracuse," p.
77.
45Una, vol. 1 no. 1, p. 14 (Feb. 1853).
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formal standing. But the growing cult of electoral 
politics— male politics— and the shifting of power away from 
the local to more centralized levels, undermined women's 
leverage in the community.46 The early feminist agenda is 
remarkable, not because it tried to vault women from the 
private into the public arena leaving the wall intact, as 
scholars have suggested, but because it sought to eradicate 
spheres entirely, and with them the growing and dangerous 
split between public governance and private morality. Such 
a distinction made little sense to women reformers. Rather, 
through the interdependence of the sexes they hoped to 
integrate public with private, legal with moral, in a common 
standard of universal governance. Women's denigration of 
male political life for its insularity and its brutishness 
betrays both resentment and understanding of the dangers 
which the isolation of politics posed for women, a politics 
conducted outside their scope of influence.
460n this general topic, see Judith Wellman, "Women and 
Radical Reform in Upstate New York: A Profile of Grassroots 
Female Abolitionists,” in Clio Was a Woman: Studies in the 
History of American Women, ed. Mabel E. Deutrich and 
Virginia C. Purdy (Ithaca, N.Y., 1980); Nancy Hewitt,
Women's Activism and Social Change: Rochester. New York. 
1822-1872 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); and Paula Baker, "The 
Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political 
Society, 1780-1920," American Historical Review, vol. 89 no. 
3 (1984), pp. 620-647.
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Law. Nature. and Rights
Feminism also evolved an articulate critique of the 
exclusive legal world, criticism informed by moral and 
religious concerns. Distaste for the profession of 
lawyering was rife in larger reform circles, as well; the 
Boston reformer Thomas Wentworth Higginson reported in 
Cheerful Yesterdays that, under the influence of "the 
Newness," there was a Wwave of that desire for a freer and 
more ideal life which made (William Wetmore) Story turn 
aside from his father's profession to sculpture, and made 
(James Russell) Lowell forsake law after his first client." 
Higginson himself abdicated a legal course, emboldened by 
friends who characterized law as a "system of formalized 
injustice" and a branch of "knowledge that cannot be carried 
into any other stage of existence."41 "The Newness" did not 
bring women the immediate privilege of renouncing a career 
in law in favor of one in sculpture. In fact, it was often 
urged at conventions and in periodicals that women take up 
the profession, both to protect their own interests and to 
reform the field. At the same time, the legal system came 
in for a constant barrage of criticism from feminists who 
occasionally took gratuitous swipes at other professions,
47Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Cheerful Yesterdays 
(1899; reprint, 1968), pp. 78, 87.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
but reserved their most biting criticisms for clerics and 
lawyers.
The Lilv. in particular, hosted a string of female 
correspondents with a distinctly gender-based legal 
critique, an editorial policy which drew fire from some.** 
Indeed, at times it seems in reading the Lilv that each of 
its 6,000 subscribers had contributed her mite against the 
"chicken hearted ministers of justice."49 As in most law 
reform movements, corruption was often alleged against 
lawmakers, but it was corruption of a particular kind. 
Bribery was occasionally charged in the Lilv. and the 
economic interests of legislators involved in the sale or 
manufacture of liquor was seen as creating conflict of 
interest problems.” More often, though, women depicted 
lawyers and judges as morally and spiritually corrupt, 
"winebibbers" with "bullet heads and red faces," "vulgar, 
rum-drinking ... tobacco chewing men, thick lipped 
voluptuaries, gourmands and licentiates who disgrace our 
national councils with their grossness and profanity ... 
who, instead of sound reason and strong argument, resort to
4*D.C. Bloomer, Life and Writings of Amelia Bloomer 
(1895; reprint, New York, 1975), p. 155.
49Lily, vol. 1 no. 7, p. 55 (July 1849).
50Lily, vol. 3 no. 4, p. 29 (April 1851).
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fisticuffs and ... duelling."” As they did with the 
church, women reformers castigated law as a human corruption 
of a divine institution. Law, however, represented a 
particularly egregious instance of male corruption. The 
drinking, swearing legislator who would rather resort to 
brute force than „ogic and reason was pictured as a 
throwback to a less advanced stage of civilization, and as 
the opposite of the "Christian Gentleman" who was many 
reformers' and evangelicals' manly ideal.” Wily, dissolute 
lawyers figured prominently in short pieces of fiction which 
also filled the pages of women's papers. Readers could 
hardly fail to see the moral in stories like that about the 
wife of a "half-educated Attorney at Law, a thoroughbred 
contemnor of the laws of God," who brings his family to an 
unhappy and impoverished end.”
Women revealed the level of frustration and outrage 
they felt with male legislators in many ways, proclaiming 
"let man cease to persuade woman by his sophistry and logic, 
or compel her by his cruel and unnatural statutes to act in
”Lilyf vol. 4 no 5, p. 39 (May 1852); see also vol. 2 
no. 2, p. 13 (Feb. 1850).
“See Charles E. Rosenberg, "Sexuality, Class, and Role 
in Nineteenth-Century America," in American Quarterly, vol
25 no. 2, pp. 131-153 (1973).
”Lilv, vol. 2 no. 6, p. 44 (June 1850).
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violation of her will and conscience ... "M Law had placed 
women in an intolerable position and created a catch-22 of 
tragic proportions by refusing the legal right of divorce, 
while refusing at the same time legal protection of maternal 
rights, property, and earnings for wives of drunkards and 
insolvents; "woman cannot obey nature's first law of 
self-preservation without violating man's (laws)," a fact 
which inspired "indignation and hatred of our laws and 
law-makers. "5S Elizabeth Cady Stanton was fond of saying 
that law gave women such protection as "the wolf the lamb, 
or the eagle the dove."56
At least on paper, the Lilv encouraged women in acts of 
self-help like the burning or trashing of their husbands' 
haunts, and congratulated one unusual woman on horsewhipping 
the barkeeper, citing it as a justifiable act of 
self-defense.57 Abolitionists' manifestoes on human rights 
and natural law had laid a strong groundwork for a critique 
of human laws like those enabling slavery and rumselling as
5<L_ily, vol. 4 no. 7, p. 58 (June 1852) .
55Lily, vol. 1 no. 6, p. 46 (June 1849); vol. 2 no. 2,
pp. 13,15 (Feb. 1850).
“Lilv, vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850).
i7Lilv, vol. 4 no. 9, p. 77 (Sept. 1852); vol. 1 no. 8,
pp. 61-62 (July 1849).
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counter to the laws of God and Nature.5' The Lilv's 
correspondents boldly and repeatedly urged women to ignore 
the law's shabby cloak of legitimacy, and act according to 
higher right: "Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God ... 
if the vampyres of the law will continue to suck the life 
blood of their fellow men and spread destruction and death 
all around them, then let women step boldly forward and take 
matters into their own hands.1,59 The question of damage to 
taverns was dismissed with the argument that a tavern 
"ceases to be property when it is employed to destroy the 
people. "SB
Again, in the antebellum years women were brought to 
this pitch not as much by high-minded notions of equality as 
by a vivid apprehension of their wrongs. Here the problem 
of alcohol took on great significance. In licensing the 
liquor trade legislators were acting, not just to withhold 
rights, but to commit clear wrongs, with grave consequences
“For example, William Hosmer, The Higher Law in Its 
Relations to Civil Government (1852; reprint, New York, 
1969); and Elisha P. Hurlbut, Essavs on Human Rights and 
Their Political Guarantees (New York, 1845). Feminists 
reproduced such arguments about the inefficacy of human laws 
against divine ones; see Lilv. vol. 2 no. 4, p. 30 (April 
1850).
“Lily, vol. 4 no. 9, pp. 77-78 (Sept. 1852).
“Lily, vol. 4 no. 7, p. 59 (July 1852).
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for women. Woman's righters were uniformly temperance 
advocates as well, and felt that it was in permitting the 
sale of alcohol that government truly showed itself to be 
morally deformed. They castigated the rumseller, and begged 
him to "stop your unholy work. Tell us not that you have a
license, and certificate of good moral character (from the
legislature) to justify your deeds ... What will your
license avail you against the curse of your God? Is man
greater than his maker? Shall he set the laws of the 
Almighty at defiance? Your license cannot shield you from 
guilt."61
Far guiltier than the rumseller, though, was the law, 
which "threw its arms around him who was causing the ruin 
... (with) legalized poison."” The pages of the Lilv in 
these years entertained a lively debate over the comparative 
guilt of the legislator and the rumseller, who is described 
as the lawmaker's "agent"— a word used here with satanic 
rather than corporate overtones. For the misguided agent, 
some women initially entertained fond hope of reform— "Much 
rather would we take you by the hand, and greet you as
61Lilv. vol. 1 no. 1, p. 5 (Jan. 1849).
*Lilv. vol. 1 no. 7, p. 61 (July 1849).
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friends and brothers, in the great cause of humanity."“
But legislators received no quarter. In the best Protestant 
tradition the humble were guilty, but the "people ... of 
wealth and standing in society" were guiltier still.44 
Women agitated for the repeal of licensing laws, not because 
they believed that any law could make the sale of liquor 
legal— it could not— but because removing that shield would 
publicly brand liquor traders for what they were, "immoral 
law breakers and law defyers."45 Many of these writers felt 
that they should "challenge our legislators to an account of 
their stewardship," and they looked forward, not with 
sorrow, to the day when legislators must appear "at a 
greater tribunal ... where they must answer for many crimes 
committed, for much blood shed, and for many lives 
destroyed."44
Women reformers in this period judged what they 
perceived as male law by a higher standard, and found it 
wanting. They could see little difference between "the 
guilt of killing a man by arsenic or alcohol, or between
“Lily, vol. 1 no. 1, p. 5 (Jan. 1849); vol. 2 no. 1,
p. 4 (Jan. 1850).
“Lily, vol. 1 no. 2, p. 14 (Feb. 1849).
“Lily, vol. 2 no. 6, p. 45 (June 1850).
“"Syracuse," p. 17; Lilv. vol. 1 no. 9, p. 70 (Sept. 
1849) .
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stealing his property by first stealing his reason, or 
breaking into his house at midnight, and carrying it off 
when the owner is in peaceful slumber." As one woman 
declared, "God did not say, 'Thou shalt not kill with a 
pistol.'"67 In the one case, the law would punish the 
slayer; in the other it protected him, at the expense of the 
wives and children of drunkards. A great deal of time and 
energy went into redefining crimes, and comparing various 
statutory crimes to those of the rumseller. Was the 
highwayman who pulled the trigger guiltier than the one who 
held the horses? Were either more guilty than the man who 
sold drink to an alcoholic?**
A deeply Christian conception of moral consequences 
underlay this assessment of man's law. Women saw that with 
liquor, legislators were concerned, not with preventing or 
punishing wrong, but with limiting liability. They felt 
strongly that legal doctrines of causation and the treatment 
of the liquor trade as an issue of economic regulation only 
obscured the nature of the transaction. Moral consequences 
could not be rightly limited by legal doctrine. "We touch
<7Lilv. vol. 2 no. 6, p. 45 (June 1850); vol. 1 no. 11, 
p. 85 (Nov. 1849).
**Lilv, vol. 2 no. 2, p. 15 (Feb. 1850); vol. 1 no. 5, 
pp. 37-38 (May 1849); vol. 2 no. 6, p. 45 (June 1850).
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not a wire but vibrates in eternity ... we see not in this 
life the end of human actions. The influence 
reverberates."*9 This was as true for evil as for good, and 
for the Lilv's writers it was impossible not to see the 
misfortunes of many homeless, abused, hungry women and 
children pouring straight from the rumseller's bottle in a 
chain of accountability which no legal sanction could 
interrupt. For "sin perpetuates itself forever. Like the 
ocean ripple, its influence is beyond all calculation ..."
No amount of legal hair-splitting could excuse men from 
their Christian duty, nor protect them on the day when "God 
will call upon them to answer, 'WHERE IS THY BROTHER?'"70
This sense of woman's wrongs at the hands of the 
intemperate was extremely fertile ground for rights 
consciousness, as women felt an increasing duty to protect 
themselves, each other, and their children from man's 
depredations on their persons and property. Those who 
invoke "rights" usually endow them with transcendental 
qualities, but "rights" itself is not an ahistorical concept 
with constant meaning over time. Rather, it denotes a set 
of values or demands used in a particular political context
"Lily, vol. 1 no. 2, p. 15 (Feb. 1849).
7BLily, vol. 2 no. 7, p. 51 (July 1850); vol. 1 no. 11,
p. 86 (Nov. 1849).
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which gives them meaning. Antebellum feminists seized the 
language of rights and transformed it with their own ideas 
and concerns. This does not mean that women rejected the 
republican ideals of the founding generation. Revolutionary 
rhetoric, the enlightenment vision of inalienable human 
rights, was a critical tool in helping women to envision a 
new status, and express their demands to a male public. But 
the language women spoke among themselves appealed to a 
larger sensibility.
A telling instance of this discrepancy occurred at a 
woman's rights meeting in Ohio which was held in 1850 for 
the purpose of influencing the work of that state's upcoming 
constitutional convention. The official "Memorial" written 
to be presented to the men's convention began, "(W)e believe 
the whole theory of the common law in relation to woman is 
unjust and degrading, tending to reduce her to a level with 
the slave, depriving her of political existence, and forming 
a positive exception to the great doctrine of equality as 
set forth in the Declaration of Independence." Citing the 
need for freedom and equality, for protection of maternal 
interests and property rights by the government, it is a 
businesslike appeal to republican sentiments, in which each 
mention of rights is specifically qualified as "political
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and legal"— protection of property, custodial privileges, 
and the vote. The "Memorial" contains no broad enumeration 
of personal or economic entitlements, and is devoid of any 
hint of rights as divinely derived, or any religious 
language.
By contrast, the corresponding "Address to the Women of 
Ohio" passed by the woman's rights meeting on the same issue 
opens with the sweeping assertion that "How the people be 
made wiser, better, and happier is one of the grand 
inquiries of the present age."71 The "Address" exalts the 
role of God above that of the legislature in the creation 
and definition of rights. Dismissing the "cold sympathy and 
tardy efforts" of the "dough-faced serviles" in the 
legislature, the address is a paean to the "Rights of 
Humanity *.. What is their design? How do we know them?
They are of God ... their design is happiness." In the 
"Memorial" woman's entitlement is predicated on "the great 
doctrine of Equality as set forth in the Declaration of 
Independence," without elaboration. In the "Address" by 
contrast a broad range of rights are cast as directly 
contingent on the discharge of responsibilities, enabling
71Both of these documents are to be found in the 
History of Woman Suffrage* ed. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan
B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, vol. 1 (1881), pp. 
105-110.
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individuals to "attain the end for which God the Father gave 
them existence." Ohio feminists urged women to seek not 
just political rights but education and occupation as well 
— "The full exercise of the heavenly graces ..." The fact 
that the business of women's rights was carried out in two 
distinct languages signifies that women themselves 
identified their values and politics as in some way separate 
from men's.
This adjustment of language to audience crops up 
repeatedly, and illustrates women's complex relationship to 
the American rights tradition. Early documents addressed to 
legislators predictably pleaded in a secular language of 
rights based on equality and the revolutionary settlement, 
commonly citing principles like "no taxation without 
representation." Female lobbyists occasionally invoked 
their duties as mothers in favor of their cause, but by and 
large their arguments were couched in the familiar phrases 
of the revolutionary settlement. Women's writing to women 
proved a far richer admixture, not limited to claims for 
political and legal rights, but seeking a range of economic, 
domestic and personal entitlements and opportunities. 
Religious language and imagery permeates their discourse, 
while arguments from liberal theology undergird their vision 
of total reform.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Feminists stood both within and without the republican 
tradition. While genuine in their appeal to the 
revolutionary heritage, there was also a strong strategic 
element in their choice of words. As opponents of 
despotism, arbitrary power, orthodoxy and hierarchy in 
church and state, they honored the Founders and valued 
dearly the philosophy which had so effectively countered 
those evils. But the revolutionary settlement was 
incomplete and had unjustly excluded both women and slaves. 
Further, mid-century reformers constituted a political 
opposition, and remained highly skeptical that the current 
crop of statesmen and legislators possessed the requisite 
virtue to pursue the goal of liberty in their own 
policies.72 Using the unadorned language of legal and 
political rights, feminists were appealing to a critical 
common tradition, in the language— meaningful both to 
themselves and within larger political circles— they thought 
would best make their case. At the same time, their appeal
72Stanton illustrates this attitude in a letter to 
Anthony of July 4, 1858 (Stanton Papers, Douglass College 
Library, Rutgers University). In it she defends some men as 
admirable against a friend's attack on the sex. "But alas! 
when we read the views of average men, their laws, their 
Bibles,...when we listen to their everyday talk, to their 
decisions in the Courtroom, and to their sermons in the 
pulpit...then we feel that they richly deserve all that she 
says." See also Lily, vol. 2 no. 2, p. 13 (Feb. 1850).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
was not to the actual creations of the Pounding Fathers, but 
to a normative ideal of natural rights to which feminists 
gave unique definition. Most women themselves seemed more 
at home with the spiritualized discourse which is the argot 
of private letters and diaries as well as women's newspapers 
and public proceedings.73
For the ideology of woman's rights, unlike 
revolutionary rhetoric, was shaped in the fervor of 
millennial perfectionism. On closer scrutiny both the form 
and content of rights theories employed by feminists 
differed markedly from the traditional strain of republican 
rhetoric. Rights for women were definitely not conceived in 
the cool, secular dispassion of American constitutionalism. 
The end of the eighteenth century represented a low point in 
religious fervor and activity of all kinds: church 
attendance dropped precipitously; except in the West there 
was little by way of organized religious movement; and in 
the love feast of toleration which attended the church-state 
settlement, religious concerns receded formally and
73Some leaders of the antebellum feminist movement, 
political sophisticates like Stanton and Anthony, subscribed 
to a spiritualized view of the scope of rights and the 
nature of social change, but needed no direct religious 
sanction for political action. Writings in the Lilv suggest 
that perhaps they and others also used religious arguments 
strategically as those most likely to move their audience of 
female political uninitiates.
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informally as a predominant force in the establishment of a 
public order. This tepid public piety did not fuel a 
fervent, God-centered view of natural law or natural rights. 
By the early federal period, natural rights was a concept 
which statesmen sought to contain, because of its volatile 
and potentially explosive reach. The exuberant rights 
language of early political documents was toned down, and 
the enumeration of precise and specific entitlements 
replaced the sweeping claims of the earlier period.1*
Feminists did not tread in this cautious path.15 In 
common with laborers, abolitionists, and other dissident 
groups, women sought to reopen the great constitutional 
questions of inclusion and entitlement, wielding a theory of 
natural rights which went well beyond the meager portion 
allotted in the state constitutions. The onset of the first 
woman's movement came after the Second Great Awakening had 
stirred the country to new heights of millennial passion and 
transformed the public's understanding of socii.1 change.
74Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in 
American Politics Since Independence (New York, 1987) chap. 
2; and Benjamin Wright, American Interpretations of Natural 
Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), pp. 179 ff.
75 On the general question of feminists' use of natural 
rights theory, see Hurlbut, chap. 8; Kraditor, chaps. 3 and 
4; Wright, pp. 176-179; and T.V. Smith, The American 
Philosophy of Equality (Chicago. 1927), chap. 3.
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Nineteenth-century reformers did not share their forebears' 
utilitarian vision of power as something to be balanced and 
shared.76 The emphasis on free will, the belief in the 
possibility of perfection and the newly benevolent designs 
of a ./ell-disposed God— all worked to dispel the fear of 
unchecked liberty which dominated political debate in the 
constitution-making era. Women showed unbounded faith in 
the workings of an inner law: "emancipate from external 
bondage and the internal law written upon every heart makes 
itself audible.1,77 Such protean concepts as natural law and 
natural rights were plastic in the hands of feminists, who 
followed traditional rhetorical forms with conviction while 
giving them new meaning.
One innovation lay in feminists' perception of the 
relation of rights to natural laws. A concept of ancient 
lineage repeatedly refashioned by thinkers both within and 
without the church, natural laws in the revolutionary era 
diminished in importance while natural rights theory grew 
explosively.18 In America, natural rights became a largely 
secularized concept. Its proponents did not derive such
7<Rodgers, chap. 2.
"Elizabeth Oakes Smith, p. 34.
7,Wright, pp. 173 ff.
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rights from a divine source# but looked increasingly to 
human government and constitutional guarantees for their 
provenance, rendering a system of natural laws quaint and 
redundant.
Natural law regained its rule in the philosophy of the 
early woman's rights movement, where all rights were 
immediately derived from a divinely sanctioned order 
governed by the system of natural laws which was a pillar of 
reformers' faith. To claim human government as the source 
of rights was to confuse the cart and the horse— "It is God 
that gives our rights. Government is the offspring of 
righcs, not the parent.Feminists, abolitionists, and 
other disaffected antebellum reformers frequently dismissed 
the Constitution as but another human law to be judged by 
God's standards.10 Women saw rights as springing directly 
from the divinely ordained natural order, proclaiming that 
"the true rights of humanity are founded in the laws of 
nature, and consequently are natural rights."41 Rights
’’"Proceedings of the Woman's Rights Convention Held at 
Akron, Ohio, May 28 and 29, 1851" (1851; reprint, 1973) 
(hereafter cited as "Akron"), p. 41; see also Hurlbut, p. 
27.
“See Hosmer, pp. 46-47 and chap. 14; Hurlbut, p. 33. 
41Lily, vol. 4 no. 2, p. 11 (Feb. 1852) .
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claims for antebellum feminists were not in the nature of 
strict bids for inclusion in a grant of powers and 
protections from human government. Rather, they expressed 
the terms on which individuals could best live out God's 
designs for human happiness. In the years before the Civil 
War the vote itself was repeatedly described by the valise 
theory of suffrage— as a way of obtaining the rights to 
domestic protection, property, education, remunerative work, 
personal autonomy, and all the other entitlements which 
women so desired.12 The specific rights women sought 
heralded not an alteration but a transformation of society. 
"Nature" in early feminist thought became a powerful 
normative force, a measuring stick rather than a descriptive 
tool.” What was "natural"— and this was almost always 
defined by what contributed to the full realization of human 
potential— became the ideal state toward which to strive.
At the same time, nature— spruced up into a civil order by
the Founding Fathers— regained an earthiness in feminist 
thought rooted in the physical functions of life itself.
For feminists and abolitionists both faced the problem of 
elaborating compelling grounds on which full rights should
,2Una, vol. 1 no. 4, p. 59 (May 1853).
MSee Wright, pp. 3, 176-179; T.V. Smith, pp. 106 ff.
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be extended to women and slaves— a difficult task since the 
constitutional guarantees of inalienability, freedom, and 
equality had produced such partial entitlement. Women's 
passionate arguments from moral equality partly filled the 
bill.
But both women and slaves, suffering from a lack of 
education, were commonly stigmatized as mentally deficient 
and without the proper intellect or character to cultivate 
civic habits. In response to their opponents, reformers 
also fashioned arguments from the lowest common denominator 
of physical life— needs common to all. Abolitionist tracts 
elevated "the right to see, or to eat, or to walk" to stand 
beside life and liberty as "conditions of being. We have 
them from God when we have existence, and so long as 
existence remains those rights must remain, unless taken 
away by Him who gave them."14 The pursuit of "happiness," 
always a somewhat vague component of revolutionary 
philosophy, took on a new specificity in claims to food, 
clothing, jobs, education— claims measured by needs and 
wants. "The Creator ... has endowed man with certain innate 
desires, emotions, and faculties, the gratification and 
exercise of which are the means of his happiness. Here is
“Hosmer, pp. 46-47.
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the consummation of man's rights— the right to gratify his 
natural desires; to supply his natural wants; to exercise 
his natural functions, as the means of attaining 
happiness. "“
Such abolitionist writing— particularly Elisha 
Hurlbut's treatise on human rights— proved very influential 
for feminists, who agreed that natural rights "emanated from 
the nature and wants and emotions of m a n k i n d . W o m e n  and 
slaves did not know Latin, but they could know hunger, and 
from the capacity for hunger sprang the entitlement to food- 
-"that is to say, physical existence acknowledges a higher 
law, whether we intellectually and morally acknowledge it or 
not."'7 It was this assertion of the essential, physical 
fact of humanity as granting status that was behind 
Sojourner Truth's cry, "Ain't I a woman?" And the right to
provide for these wants was guaranteed by the God who
created them, for it was a critical aspect of the new,
“Hurlbut, p. 16.
“Lily, vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850); see also vol.
4 no. 2, p. 11 (Feb. 1852); and History of Woman Suffrage, 
pp. 112-113. For references to Hurlbut, see History of Woman 
Suffrage, p. 38; Una, vol. 1 no. 4, p. 59 (May 1853); Lilv. 
vol. 4 no. 7, p. 59 (July 1852); and "Cleveland", p. 57. The 
Lily also printed extracts from Hosmer's work, vol. 3 no. 5, 
p. 35 (May 1851); and from Hurlbut's work, vol. 4 no. 9, p. 
80 (Sept. 1852).
“Hosmer, p. 20.
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benevolent deity that he would impart no hunger, no 
yearning, without granting a means of its satisfaction.'*
This concept of rights as following physical function 
ordained by natural laws is at odds with the idea of 
inalienable rights as settled during the struggle for 
independence. But it provided far greater scope for claims 
to economic and social justice than the revolutionary model, 
which effectively limited feminists to claims to political 
rights.
Feminists' conception of rights can perhaps best be 
contrasted with revolutionary republican tradition by 
comparing the terms •’underlying” and "overarching.” For the 
Founding Fathers, natural rights were pulled down from the 
sky, a set of external restraints to limit the actions of 
human government. In the early reform movement, by 
contrast, much of the focus of natural rights shifted to the 
internal. In a return to an older tradition, natural rights 
were seen as emanating from natural laws discovered, not in 
anterior principles like "no taxation without 
representation" and "one man one vote," but in the ordinary 
patterns of everyday life. Women did not look to outside 
sources or rules to control human behavior, but sought to
"Elizabeth Oakes Smith, pp. 116-118; Hurlbut, pp. 13,
16.
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bring human behavior into harmony with an inner working 
which comprehended material and spiritual forces alike.
The belief that God gave no need and no capacity which 
he did not mean to be fulfilled was expanded on by woman's 
rights advocates, and became what was probably the most 
common argument of that group before the war. Frequently 
the rationale for the dismantling of "woman's sphere" and 
taking up rights and duties in the wide world was put in 
functionalist terms, rather than in the language of 
inalienable human rights. Lucy Stone in one convention 
offered her own definition of "natural": "when God made the 
human soul and gave it certain capacities, he meant that 
those capacities should be exercised. The wing of the bird 
indicates its right to fly; and the fin of the fish the 
right to swim. So in human beings, the existence of a power 
presupposes the right to its use, subject to the law of 
benevolence. It was this functionalism that lay behind 
the recounting of the stories of renowned and competent 
women popular in speeches and tracts. What had been done 
indicated an ability, and where there was an ability lay a 
God-given right to use it. This argument, of course, had
,9"New York", p. 42. This was a sentiment so strongly 
felt that it had already been adopted into the resolutions 
at the Syracuse National Woman's Rights Convention in 1852; 
see "Syracuse", p. 76, and pp. 46, 48, 83.
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certain dangerous implications/ apparent to a few who feared 
a standard of duty or performance as a prerequisite to 
grants of civil or political rights. But early feminists 
exuded confidence in their untested powers and relied 
heavily on this definition of natural rights to break down 
the artificial limitations of sphere. Frances Gage 
described how she lost her woman's sphere, piece by piece: a 
chunk fell off when she learned to plough and was ploughed 
under; another disappeared during a medical emergency/ 
several more while doing her chores around the farm.*0 More 
than in an ideological commitment to political rights, women 
first perceived of rights as originating in the capacities 
and talents handed out by God, which it was their duty as 
well as their pleasure to use fully.
Initially, power and rights were conceived in this 
context of self-development: "for what is power in the sense 
in which it is so often applied to women, but the liberty to 
employ one's facilities in one's own way unobstructed
The emphasis on individual calling, not determined 
by sex but by innate talent, of course meant practically 
that women should enter into whatever activity or profession
“Lily, vol. 3 no. 3, p. 20 (March 1851).
MUna, vol. 1 no. 1, p. 7 (Feb. 1853); Elizabeth Oakes 
Smith, p. 116.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
she felt fitted to. As the Syracuse Convention resolved in 
1852, "that in the great body politic, or in the great 
social body, each one, irrespective of sex, talent, or 
capability for a higher or lower function, fulfill the great 
ends of his or her being."“ In the unfolding of their 
natural talents women saw no limit to their intellectual, 
moral, or social progress, developments which would make the 
woman's sphere obsolete. Indeed, the pulling down of these 
artificial boundaries was among the most articulate of 
women's demands.
Rights arguments were strongly addressed to the 
development of individual capacities in the context of the 
fulfillment of duties in the 1850s. No clear distinction 
was made in this period between rights stemming from 
concerns for family and social justice, and those which 
contributed to civic competence and personal development. 
Most often the two were pictured as mutually reinforcing, 
with woman's increased freedom enhancing her capacity to 
serve herself and others, including her family.93 Stanton 
in a speech to the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1860 
gave voice to a cherished reform belief that "rights never
“"Syracuse", p. 75.
“"Syracuse", pp. 62-63; "Boston", p. 8; "Cleveland",
p. 8.
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clash or interfere, and where no individual in a community 
is denied his rights, the mass are more perfectly protected 
in theirs."” Most feminists subscribed to the thesis that 
"A man has rights in order that he may do right."” The 
frequent pairing of "rights" and "duties" was not 
accidental. Women were sincere when they repeatedly argued 
that it was because of their equal moral accountability to 
God, and the resulting duties to themselves, their families, 
and society, that they deserved and needed rights.”
Since women's duties were so much concerned with 
family, it should not be surprising that there was a 
significant domestic component in the developing ideal of 
woman's rights, and that natural rights were often pictured 
as concrete ways for women to protect or further the 
interests of their families. The Lilv and the Una were 
published, not just for the several hundred pioneers of the
”Elizabeth Cadv Stanton. Susan B. Anthony; 
Correspondence. Writings. Speeches (New York, 1981), Ellen
C. DuBois, ed., p. 78. See also Hurlbut, pp. 25-27, for the 
same argument based on the need to defend individual 
liberties from a tyrannical government.
“Mark Hopkins, cited in Rodgers, Contested Truths.
See also resolutions passed at the first convention, "Seneca 
Falls", pp. 4-5.
“Lily, vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73 (Oct. 1850); Clarina I. 
Howard Nichols, "On the Responsibilities of Woman," tract 
no. 6 in Woman's Rights Commensurate with Her Capacities.
See also "Syracuse", pp. 23, 34, 63.
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movement, but also for many thousands who were still 
puzzling out their positions. Its letters and articles 
chronicle the conversion of many women to politics on the 
ground that it was woman's right and duty to assert her 
claims for protection.” it was a common maxim among 
reformers that the main object of the law was to protect the 
weak from the tyranny of the strong, and in the Lily, one 
can trace the clear evolution of a doctrine of woman's 
rights through the arguments over temperance— "learning 
woman's rights by woman's wrongs."” The archetypal tale is 
of "poverty, desertion, and tyranny on the part of ... 
worthless and drunken husbands ... taking away from their 
wives and children every possible means of support ..." The 
number and intensity of these stories increase with the 
Lily's commitment to political solutions; one enlightened 
girl takes her flighty cousin for a walk through an 
impoverished neighborhood, pointing out women who are 
victims of intemperate husbands, low wages, and a lack of 
legal protection, and demands at last, "Has this woman had 
her rights?"”
"Lily, vol. 1 no. 10, p. 77 (Oct. 1849) .
""New York", pp. 4, 76.
"Lily, vol. 3 no. 5, p. 34 (May 1851); see also vol. 3 
no. 11, p. 86 {Nov. 1851); and "Boston", p. 24.
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Nor was this elaboration of woman's rights confined to 
some conservative wing of the movement; in the antebellum 
years there was considerable harmony of position. Although 
Stanton and Anthony moved from organized temperance to 
woman's rights in the mid-1850s, they and other woman's 
righters remained advocates of the temperance cause, finding 
it a "hard matter to speak of the cruel wrongs inflicted on 
women by the liquor traffic, without at the same time saying 
that her rights have been trampled upon ... (and) difficult 
to depict the woes of the drunkard's wife ... without saying 
that her rights have been recklessly invaded, and wrongfully 
withheld.”100 Many women initially resistant to the 
assertion of rights became enthusiastic converts: their new 
ideals were rooted, not in higher political theory, but in 
concrete concern for the "sacred ties of family relations."
Mothers turned to rights for the sake of their children,
seeking assurance that they would be able to feed and clothe 
them, and keep them nearby.101 Many women sought "equal 
rights for (women) in the family, in order that its highest 
uses and harmonies may be insured."102
100Llly, vol. 4 no. 3, p. 22 (March 1852).
101Lilv# vol. 4 no. 5, p. 35 (May 1852); vol. 4 no. 6,
p. 51 (June 1852); Una, vol. 1 no. 1, pp. 14-15 (Feb. 1853).
1M"Boston", p. 8.
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Nevertheless, th  ̂theoretical harmony between rights 
for the self and duties to others was not to survive the 
Civil War. Even before then the two strains had begun to be 
discernible. The broadest category of rights included "the 
general question of woman's Rights and Relations (which) 
comprehends such as: HER EDUCATION, literary, scientific, 
and artistic— HER AVOCATIONS, Industrial. Commercial, and 
Professional— HER INTERESTS, Pecuniary. Civil, and Political 
in a word, her RIGHTS as an Individual, and her FUNCTIONS as 
a Citizen. "103 Many middle class feminists stressed 
forcefully the incidents which contributed to personal 
freedom and development— the right of sexual autonomy within 
marriage, of education, work outside the home, 
independence— and were content to see economic parity rather 
vaguely as the inevitable consequence of women's personal 
and civil gains.104 Stanton herself emphasized autonomy 
above suffrage, saying "When we talk of woman's rights, is 
not the right to her person, to her happiness, to her life, 
the first on the list? If you go to a southern plantation 
and speak to a slave of his right to property, to the
»3nSyracuse", p. iv.
104"Cleveland," pp. 10, 17, 41, 55-56; Una, vol. 1 no. 
1, p. 10 (Feb. 1853); Lilv. vol. 3 no. 5, p. 35 (May 1851); 
Hersh, p. 189.
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elective franchise, to a thorough education, his response 
will be a vacant stare ... The great idea of his right to 
himself, to his personal dignity, must first take possession 
of his soul."1”
As the movement developed, those activists who weighted 
issues of autonomy and personal development more heavily 
tended increasingly to align themselves behind the vote, 
re-envisioning it, not just as a lever to achieve social 
ends, but as a measure of autonomy and individual freedom in 
itself. A few others, who saw women's impoverishment as the 
paramount issue, urged economic measures over the quest for 
legal or civil entitlement.1” Still, antebellum activists 
understood their rights and duties as a seamless web. Only 
in Stanton's work do we see fully foreshadowed the conflict 
between individual women's rights and the interests of 
family and community which was to split the suffrage 
movement so bitterly in the last years of the century.107
10SLetter to Susan B. Anthony, July 20, 1857, Stanton 
Papers, Douglass College Library, Rutgers University.
10<Historv of Woman Suffrage, p. 233; "Syracuse," p. 9; 
Nichols.
107Even in this early period Stanton is beginning to 
develop her notion of rights as based in the psychological 
needs of the autonomous personality, an individualism far 
more pronounced than the liberal Protestant ideal of 
self-development. Although Stanton scholars have generally
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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To the extent that it is possible to isolate two 
different strands of rights thought here, the question 
arises of whether one is superior to the other, or more 
truly feminist in outlook. Most scholars of women's 
movements have explicitly valued political rights over any 
claim for right to livelihood or protection of the home.
They see the "home values" of later temperance union 
suffragists as a second-class feminism, an expression of 
"woman-oriented moral conservatism."10* Ellen DuBois,
Barbara Epstein, and others have denigrated the suffrage 
campaign of the. Woman's Christian Temperance Union as 
instrumental because it sought the vote with clear public 
policy goals in view which addressed women's welfare as tied 
to the well being of f.he family under the wage labor 
system.109
viewed her late address "Solitude of Self" as representing 
an evolution of her thought, at least one unusual passage 
fully prefigures that address, though written forty years 
earlier; in it she says that woman is her own "self 
supporter, self defender and self protector, compelled to 
stand or fall, to live or die, alone." Lilv. vol. 4 no. 5, 
p. 40 (May 1852). "Solitude of Self" is reprinted in 
Stanton and Anthony: Correspondence. Speeches. Writings, at 
p. 246.
“‘Epstein, p. 6.
10,Even the sympathetic chronicler of the WCTU, Ruth 
Bordin, although she vaunts the Union's effectiveness in 
engaging women in political activity, finds its agenda 
defective in emphasizing the uses and purposes of the
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For DuBois the strength of the demand for suffrage is 
that it bypassed the private sphere altogether to focus on 
equality within the public sphere.110 As a political 
feminist, she sees a relation between woman's oppression and 
her ideological association with the private sphere. By 
this standard, any claim other than the strict one for 
formal equality appears a manifestation of false 
consciousness, even though well intentioned. In fact, many 
of the temperance workers goals were highly repressive.
This should not obscure the fact that the association of 
political power with social ends allows greater possibility 
for social change than viewing the vote as an abstract 
good.111 Political rights, rightly considered, are not ends 
in themselves, but ways of allocating power and resources 
within the community. In a democratic society, at least 
theoretically, they are closely connected to maximizing 
benefits for all.
Even leaving aside contemporary debates, it is unclear
woman's vote above absolute rights. See Woman and 
Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty. 1873-1900 
(Philadelphia, 1981).
110Dubois, "The Radicalism of Woman Suffrage," p. 63.
m I imagine this abstract good as the majestic, 
solitary figure of Elizabeth Cady Stanton sailing through 
the universe with a star in one hand and a ballot in the 
other.
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that this standard can be usefully applied to 
nineteenth-century feminism. For one thing, what could 
"formal equality" mean to women in the absence of any 
federal or state regulatory mechanism to ensure it?112 In 
the 1850s, the possibility of constitutional amendments like 
the fourteenth, fifteenth, or nineteenth, was remote. In 
many ways the woman's movement's political aspirations 
developed reciprocally with the growth of the government's 
capacity to administer equal protection standards. As we 
have seen, most antebellum feminists were initially highly 
skeptical of the power of government to work change by law; 
Hannah Tracy Cutler once declared that she never saw the 
words "law reform" or "revised statutes" without thinking 
happily of a bonfire.113
More important is the question of whether "domestic 
rights." really represented an inferior brand, and what 
consequences the repackaging of women's early broad vision 
into the demand for political rights had for the movement as 
a whole. One critic has charged that "The concept of
112In this I follow Michael Grossberg's line in 
Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth- 
Century America (Chapel Hill, 1985), that "rights" women 
were gaining in family law doctrine were actually privileges 
granted at the discretion of the court.
113Una, vol. 1 no. 3, p. 41 (April 1853) .
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'rights' in general (is) a concept that is inherently static 
and atstracted from social conditions. Rights are by 
definition claims staked within a given order of things.
They are demands for access for oneself, or for 'no 
admittance' for others; but they do not challenge the social 
structure, the social relations of production and 
reproduction."1” While this may accurately diagnose a 
contemporary malaise, antebellum woman's rights claims 
spilled over legal categories: not limited to what 
governments could provide, they were the markers of a state 
of harmony with natural laws which mandated the satisfaction 
of all human wants. Their revolutionary character lay in 
representing, not claims to an established order, but new 
ways of reenvisioning social relations and the relations of 
power.
Nor did feminists see rights as any kind of absolute or 
unlimited entitlement. The linking of rights to 
responsibilities, and their firm placement within a system 
of natural laws, meant that rights were not seen as 
discrete, but as functioning within a larger context as a 
set of reciprocal obligations. Far from granting a power to
^Rosalind P. Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice: 
The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom (Boston,
1984), p. 7.
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be exercised against others, restraint was built in: "the 
great laws of our own beings demand justice to ourselves and 
justice to our neighbors. We cannot infringe either law 
without disorder and pain, and ... the Infinite Creator 
looks benignly upon his creature who thus obeys the laws of 
his own nature, and reverences those appertaining to every 
other."115 Yet such restraints were not galling. Perfect 
freedom still lay not in total autonomy but in acting out 
God's will, so that "the most free are the most bound."116 
Rights were a precious new license for women to employ their 
talents for themselves and others, and women saw them, not 
only as individual entitlements, but as the context for a 
happier and more fulfilled life for all human beings.
Rights were not static entitlements, but the conditions of a 
dynamic new freedom: "rights ... will galvanize women into 
civil liberty: (and) you will find her capable of being in 
it, and sustaining it."111
Conclusion
115Elizabeth Oakes Smith, p. 118.
“‘"Syracuse," p. 81.
“’"Proceedings of the Woman's Rights Convention Held 
at...Rochester, New York, Aug. 2, 1848" (1870; reprint, 
1969), p. 7.
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When the antebellum woman's movement took up the 
concept and language of rights, it was not a case of 
incorporating the meanings and usages of the Founding 
Fathers whole into women's vocabulary. Rights rhetoric 
evoked a political tradition meaningful to women as well as 
men, a set of promises for women as gender blind as the 
assurances of the new God of liberal theology. But the 
genesis of rights, their meaning for women, lay initially in 
Christian-based concepts of social justice, the fulfillment 
of needs, and each person's development according to their 
divinely ordained talents. In the early years the problem 
of power was itself a critical hurdle for women's activism. 
Understanding its corrupting nature, seeing the evidence all 
around them in the political arrangements of men, how could 
women justify their own accession to power? A good deal of 
argument within the broader movement was directed toward the 
idea, not of seizing or sharing power, but of its 
dissolution, on the theory that when men ceased their 
corrupt administration, the problem of power would resolve 
itself into a natural harmonious balance between the sexes. 
Much of the rest of the discussion was taken up by mutual 
assurances that, should women gain their political due, 
their natures would protect them from the misuse of power 
through corruption and greed.
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Despite their hesitance about the assumption of power, 
the antebellum feminist campaign was a time of political 
maturation, overcoming scruples and fears about acting in 
the political world. Women reformers began to prepare 
themselves, not just to speak in the role of 
outcast-prophet, but to take up the tools of government for 
their own ends. In the spring of 1852 the Lilv published 
separate short blurbs side by side on two cases at law 
successfully argued by women. In one, the woman is armed 
with nothing but her knowledge of right and faith in good 
justice; her appeal reaches past the minds and straight into 
the hearts of her listeners, who acknowledge that she has 
shown up their law as irrelevant and grant her the decision. 
In the second, the female advocate is beautifully prepared 
with a wealth of incisive arguments which dumbfound her 
opponents and lead to her uncontested victory on highly 
technical points of legal doctrine.111
These two cases represent a progression: the woman's 
movement in the 1850s is a microcosm of political change, a 
moment of transition in individuals' basic attitudes toward 
government. Despite their initial disaffection with 
government, workers in combined woman's and temperance
u,Lily. vol. 3 no. 6, p. 42 (June 1851).
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movements came to recognize that politics and law were 
increasingly becoming creatures of the central state, and 
were passing out of local control. The potential of 
national government to protect woman's due was only dimly 
realized, but the admission that nwe are in an age when the 
wrongs of society are adjusted at the courts and at the 
ballot oox" dictated a new approach.119 Women saw that 
politics was increasingly a man's game, one played away from 
home. They resented their own exclusion, and distrusted the 
ability of male legislators sitting at a distance to 
represent their interests, and to meet the diverse needs of 
the banker, the housewife, and the drunkard. The 
impartiality and anonymity of legislation in this period was 
seen not as a possible protection, but as a failure of 
government to care for the whole individual. Relying on the 
ancient maxim, "salus populi suprema lex, "1J0 women revealed 
their fears that in the brave new world of politics there
119History of Woman Suffrage, p. 14. The History of 
Woman Suffrage, although an invaluable and bottomless 
source, is not a fully objective account of the early years 
of the movement. Unlike the convention proceedings 
themselves, it was edited and issued thirty years after the 
movement's beginnings by three of the earliest and most 
vehement proponents of women's political activity; it 
consistently emphasizes political themes at the expense of 
spiritual and religious arguments.
U0Lily. vol. 2 no. 6, p. 47 (June 1850).
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was no place for the standard of moral accountability which 
pertained between relatives, friends, and neighbors, and 
that the law was not creating any new ethic whereby the 
bonds of community, loosely worn but still taut in times of 
need, could be maintained. The imperative for women's entry 
into politics became clearer and clearer to feminist 
reformers in the decade before the War.
Theirs was a romantic vision; its romanticism was 
partly redeemed and partly betrayed by the political 
maturation of its proponents, a process that started even 
before the war. In fact, the Lily illustrates that it was 
through the temperance activities of the 1850s that many 
women were brought around to the use of political means, 
including the ballot. The Maine liquor law of 1851 gave 
reformers a heady taste of the .sweeping change which 
legislation could accomplish so much more effectively than 
the painful, uncertain process of personal conversion to 
abstinence which had been the temperance workers' model.
The Maine law was the "philosopher's stone in the pocket," 
capable of effecting spiritual and behavioral regeneration 
instantly, and the Lily followed the progress of similar 
laws with intense interest.121 Under Amelia Bloomer's
m Lily, vol. 5, nos. 1 or 2 (Jan. or Feb. 1850) (page 
and date undecipherable), speech of Antoinette Brown.
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management, editorials, articles, and letters in almost 
every issue starting in 1850 exhorted women to take up 
political tools to accomplish their social ends.12*
Not all those sympathetic to woman's rights were 
converted to political means on the spot. The leaders of 
the woman's movement, the politically sophisticated, the 
speakers, became convinced early on that, rotten or not, 
women had to enter man's political world to effect change. 
For a much larger group of women, sympathetic but unsure how 
far to go, the transformation into political beings was 
piecemeal and slow. Again, the Lilv is valuable in that it 
exposes us not just to the thought of the leaders, but of 
the rank and file as well. For a time, Stanton and Anthony 
served as leaders of the state woman's temperance 
organization in New York, of which the Lily served as the 
unofficial organ. They and like-minded co-workers exercised 
a tremendous influence on the shape of women's reform 
through the newspaper, as well as through the blizzard of 
publications and the exhaustive cross-country lecture 
circuits many undertook. Under their tutelage many women 
came to believe they couid best assure their own chances for
u2See for example Lilv. vol. 2 no. 10, p. 73-74 (Oct. 
1850); vol. 3 no. 10, p. 79 (Sept. 1851); vol. 4 no. 5, p. 
33, 35-36, 39-42 (May 1852); vel. 4 no. 6, p. 53 (June 
1852).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
self-development and thereby help to bring society back into 
a natural order through the means of the vote. Over the 
years of the Lily's publication (1849-1856) readers of all 
persuasions wrote in to attest to their conversion to 
political methods, at least to the combination of legal and 
moral suasion. A growing number found that moral suasion 
alone "will not do," was "worse than useless," and made 
little impression on the legislators who, corrupt or not, 
were calling the shots.123 Citing the inability of mothers 
to protect sons from the liquor "monster," one former 
anti-feminist found that "there came a complete change over 
my feelings on the subject." "A realizing sense of our 
weakness ... (and) that we were warring with harmless 
weapons" brought many reform women to a more assertive 
political challenge to the supremacy of the male liquor 
cartel.124
The new philosophy of women's political power did not 
require women to jettison moral ideals, but it did require a 
transformation of the imagery of morality and power. Most 
importantly, it required the acknowledgement that the 
institutions of government were not inherently opposed to
“3Lily, vol. 4 no. 5, p. 39 (May 1852); vol. 1 no. 8, 
p. 61 (July 1849).
U4Lily, vol. 3 no. 10, p. 77 (Oct. 1851).
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morality, but with the right composition could act to 
improve social conditions. Many women urged the adoption of 
political tactics for the purpose of fulfilling obligations 
to others. One woman, deploring her lack of 
the vote, exhorted, "Arise, sisters, to your duty! Gird on 
the garment of love to your fellow creatures, and form the 
high resolve te crush the enemy which is stabbing them to 
the heart," a formulation which retains the rationale of 
social duty but endorses a different kind of action.125
After the Civil War the rights movement became a 
suffrage movement in earnest, with the ballot's earlier 
focus as a carrier of other rights downplayed. Because of 
the movement's fuller engagement with the political process, 
and the growing involvement of government in mediating and 
enunciating the rights of its citizens, women increasingly 
conceived of rights in legal terms. The emphasis on legal 
rights, narrowly conceived, diminished discussions of 
economic and social entitlement. Feminists like Antoinette 
Brown Blackwell found the movement's agenda narrowed after 
the war, too neglectful of issues like education and work.124 
Although the untested antebellum vision was probably naive,
125Lilv, vol. 1 no. 9, p. 69 (Sept. 1849) .
“‘Elizabeth Cazden, Antoinette Brown Blackwell: A 
Biography (Old Westbury, N.Y., 1983), p. 138.
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and certainly immature, in its conviction that the wellbeing 
of the community lay simply in the perfection of individual 
rights, the shift in focus toward legal remedies represented 
both a gain and a loss. Women gained a basic political 
agenda which could be pursued to ultimate success; and 
limited their claims for transformative social change 
inherent in their early vision.
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Chapter IX - Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery, Contract, 
and the Law of Divorce in Nineteenth-Century America
In the covenant of marriage, (woman) is 
compelled to promise obedience to her 
husband, he becoming, to all intents and 
purposes, her master— the law giving him 
power to deprive her of her liberty, and to 
administer chastisement. He has so framed 
the law of divorce ... as to be wholly 
regardless of the happiness of women— the 
law, in all cases, going upon a false 
supposition of the supremacy of man, and 
giving all power into his hands.1
As early as 1848, in the first public meeting on 
woman's rights, feminists raised the touchy issues of 
women's marital subjugation and divorce. They complained 
that the laws of marriage and divorce were framed for the 
benefit of men, and to entrap women within the oppressive 
institution of marriage. Another controversial claim made 
at Seneca Falls— that to the ballot— went on to become the 
great organizing principle for women's campaigns for legal 
and political reform. But despite the bold beginning, 
divorce remained a complex and divisive issue for feminists 
throughout the century. Although legislatures in most 
states in the mid-nineteenth century were systematically
:Report of the Woman's Rights Convention Held at Seneca 
Falls, New York. July 19 and 20. 1848 (1848; reprint, New 
York, 1969), p. 6. This chapter is forthcoming in the Law 
and History Review. Spring, 1989.
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liberalizing divorce laws, they could not lift the social 
stigma which attached to it.2 Fearful of being branded as 
anti-marriage or anti-family, or believing in the permanency 
of marriage, many feminists spoke of divorce reluctantly, 
and never used their formidable organizing skills to launch 
a full-scale assault on laws restricting the dissolution of 
marriage.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton stood as the great exception to 
this rule. An early and ardent champion of liberal divorce, 
her arguments were highly influential in the development of 
nineteenth-century feminist theory.3 A few feminists 
followed Stanton whole-heartedly, some agreed with her in 
part, still others were shocked at her advocacy of measures
2William O'Neill, Divorce in the Progressive Era (New 
Haven, 1967).
3Stanton's writings on divorce are not collected in any 
one place. The major sources, which contain most of her 
ideas on the subject, are in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan 
B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., History of Woman 
Suffrage. (New York, 1881), vol. 1, pp. 716-722, 738-742, 
860-861; "Address of Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Divorce 
Bill Before the Judiciary Committee of the New York Senate 
... Feb. 8, 1861" (Albany, 1861); "Mrs. Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton's Address at the Decade Meeting on Marriage and 
Divorce," in Paulina Wright Davis, A History of the National 
Woman's Rights Movement for Twenty Years (New York, 1871); 
and "Marriage and Divorce," unpublished manuscript, Stanton 
Papers, Douglass College Library, Rutgers University. Ellen 
DuBois includes relevant selections from Stanton's work as 
well in Elizabeth Cadv Stanton. Susan B. Anthony; 
Correspondence. Writings. Speeches (New York, 1981).
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they felt would jnd toward the disruption of marriage and 
the family. Yet even for those feminists who resisted her 
conclusions, the analysis of marriage she offered— "from 
covenant to contract" could have been her rallying cry— was 
transformative. Despite its mixed reception, Stanton's 
theory of divorce and family relations helped to shape 
nineteenth-century American attitudes toward marriage.
Stanton's theory of divorce became as well a critical 
platform for her maturing theory of rights, which was far 
more in tune with both mainstream feminist and liberal 
thought of her day than were her ideas about divorce. 
Stanton's work, emphasizing the ultimate "right" to free 
oneself from obligations that had become unwanted bonds, 
paved the way for a liberal feminist theory that rested on 
the autonomy of the individual. She helped to promote both 
the growth of a family law based on a contractual theory of 
relations, and a view of politics that deemed the rights of 
individuals paramount. In Stanton's work, persona], autonomy 
began to constitute the individual's citizenship in a way 
that has become a dominant motif in American life.
Stanton's vision of individual rights drew heavily on 
ideas of slavery and freedom, and the debate over their 
definitions that raged in post-Civil War America. Stanton's 
adoption of the radical extremes of freedom and slavery to
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describe the condition of women has left a mixed legacy.
The most brilliant and dynamic feminist theorist of her day, 
she helped forge a language of individual liberty that acted 
as a catalyst for social change.* Nevertheless, the 
adoption of the slavery paradigm to describe marriage 
narrowed Stanton's perceptions of women's condition, and 
dictated an appeal to a specific sort of legal remedy that 
both shaped and limited feminist goals during the nineteenth 
century.
Divorce in the Antebellum Era
In January of 1853, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, acting on 
behalf of the New York State Women's Temperance Society, 
offered a ten dollar prize for the best essay entitled "The 
Duty of the Drunkard's Wife," in the women's temperance 
newspaper Lily. The readers of the Lily, themselves a 
piogressive group, rose to the challenge.5 Well coached, 
all took the position that Stanton and Susan B. Anthony had
4Ellen DuBois has explicated the transformative nature 
of Stanton's rights theory, primarily in Feminism and 
Suffrage; The Emergence of an Independent Woman's Movement 
in America. 1848-1869 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978); and Stanton and 
Anthony: Correspondence. Speeches. Writings.
sThe contest was advertised repeatedly in the Lilv 
starting in January of 1853. The first entry appeared in 
the Lilv ca. Sept. 1853 (date illegible); others in the 
issues for Jan.-March 1854 (vol. 6 nos. 1-3).
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been urging in the Lily's columns in the preceding months: 
that wives of chronic inebriates had a duty to seek a 
separation, to sever the conjugal relationship, so as not to 
be the agent of breeding a drunkard's children. The 
contestants, however, chose in the end to resolve their 
characters' problems through separation, death, or 
desertion; none broached the subject of legal divorce. 
Half-measures never satisfied Stanton, and for her these 
analyses fell short: the Lilv contains no record of the 
prize being awarded.
The liberalization of divorce laws was by no means 
foreordained. Even progressive minds feared the path to 
easy divorce, disagreeing about its significance, its 
desirability, and its consequences. Antebellum reformers 
recognized the need for legal separation or divorce most 
consistently in the case of the chronically drunken husband. 
Under these circumstances, a virtually unanimous consensus 
prevailed that the law must somehow intervene. The Lilv. 
whose subject matter ranged between +■ .e poles of temperance 
and women's rights, rendered in particularly lurid tones the 
plight of the battered mother bound for life to a "moral 
monster— [a] vulgar, gross, imbruted nature."6 Indeed,
sLily 4, no. 10 (Aug. 1852), p. 69.
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feminists who remained deeply committed to the Christian 
ideal of life-long marriage agreed on the need for the 
equivalent of a legal separation/ contingent upon reforms in 
the law of marital property to safeguard women's rights.
Fueled by the broader reform agitation over family law 
in the 1850s, the debate on divorce extended beyond feminist 
circles. In the early 1850s the editor of the New York 
Tribune, Horace Greeley, engaged the anarchist and free 
lover Stephen Pearl Andrews and the Boston Swedenborgian 
Henry James, Sr., in an extended and highly publicized 
debate over the ongoing liberalization of divorce laws. In 
1860 Greeley took up his cudgel again, this time against 
Robert Dale Owen, son of communitarian Robert Owen.7 Not 
just divorce but the function of family law was at stake in 
these debates. Greeley served as the linchpin, or perhaps 
the lightning rod, articulating a strain of thought which 
held that family law existed to coerce "moral" or socially
7The debates between Greeley, Andrews, and Henry James, 
Sr., appeared in the Tribune in 1852 and 1853. They were 
reissued with an introduction by Charles Shively in Love. 
Marriage, and Divorce, and the Sovereignty of the 
Individual (Weston, MA, 1975). James's arguments are rather 
less lucid than Andrews's or Greeley's, and I have omitted 
them. Greeley's 1860 exchange with Robert Dale Owen was 
reprinted in the back of Greeley's autobiography 
Recollections of a Busy Life (1868; reprint, New York, 1970) 
as "Marriage and Divorce." The contest between Greeley and 
Andrews sparked again in Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol. 
3 no. 25 (Nov. 4, 1871), p. 8.
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desirable behavior. He valued the maintenance of the family 
as a social unit well above any measure of personal or 
erotic satisfaction, and delighted in pointing out that the 
law warned people to exercise caution in contracting a 
life-long bond. If they misjudged the case, the pain and 
penalty were theirs. "To the libertine, the egoist, the 
selfish, sensual seeker of personal and present enjoyment at 
whatever cost to others, the indissolubility of marriage is 
an obstacle, a restraint, a terror: and God forbid that it 
should ever cease to be!"' That the indecisive, the 
deluded, the trusting, and the optimistic got caught in this 
trap as well was of little concern to Horace Greeley.
An alternative view, put forth most forcefully by 
Andrews and Owen, argued that family law should enable free 
choice and facilitate human relations in a way that 
approximated the laissez-faire model of economic regulation. 
Stanton sympathized with Owen and Andrews, assailing 
Greeley's view of law as Draconian and old-fashioned.9 For 
all three, the emphasis on human will mandated a new view of
'Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 606.
'Stanton addressed Greeley specifically about the 
matter; see History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 738-742. 
She also says in the Revolution (vol. 3 no. 14 [April 8, 
1869], p. 212, that her views on marriage and divorce 
coincide with Robert Dale Owen's.
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law, one more enabling than coercive. They retained law 
within their social program, but as the servant and not the 
master: "Marriage itself, like the Sabbath, was made for
man; not man for marriage."10 A law that forced the 
continuation of an unhappy relation obstructed its purpose 
of securing happiness, and should be changed. "There is no 
absolute right or wrong about this matter of divorce; but 
that it may properly vary in its details at different stages 
of civilization."11
Early nineteenth-century radicals and communitarians 
such as Robert Owen and Frances Wright had constructed the 
groundwork for such claims well before the meeting at Seneca 
Falls: however controversial and heretical their teachings 
remained, they had received a wide public airing.12 But 
although this radical tradition was at hand, most early 
feminists eschewed it. An emphasis on liberty, on the
10In Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 577.
“in Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 584.
“Sidney Ditzion, Marriage. Morals, and Sex in America: 
A_Historv of Ideas (New York, 1953), esp. chapter 3. See 
also Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism 
and Feminism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1983). 
Robert Owen, the founder of the community at New Harmony, 
Indiana, lectured and published tracts in favor of cheap and 
easy divorce in the 1830s and 1840s. Fanny Wright's 
community, Nashoba, was notorious for its loose sexual 
practices and the liberal terms of its marital arrangements.
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affective nature of the marriage bond, and on the need for 
divorce to ensure the happiness of the individual were 
strikingly absent from the early feminist discourse.
Perhaps with the exception of Stanton— a major exception—  
they did not thrill to the "right" to dissolve the marriage 
bond and seek their romantic fortunes elsewhere. Rather, 
those who first approved divorce saw it as self-defense, a 
measure of last resort to counter physical violence levelled 
at women by drunken and abusive husbands.
Before the Civil War, feminist arguments for divorce 
were not made in terms of an abstract right to individual 
liberty, but in more pragmatic terms, the most fundamental 
being the instinct for self-preservation. Story after story 
in women's papers such as the Lilv and the Una, and in other 
works both fictional and factual, stressed the combined 
burdens of overwork and brutal treatment that could result 
in insanity or death for wives and mothers. Tales of 
marital violence were so frequent and widely known that one 
child— probably the son of reformers— grew up thinking of 
murder as a common contingency of marriage.13
Antebellum feminists most often invoked duties rather 
than rights as justification for divorce, particularly the
“Elizabeth Oakes Smith, The Sanctity of Marriage 
(Syracuse, 1852), pp. 7-8.
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mother's duty to children. Many women initially feared 
crossing the border into the land of absolute
rights-bearers, and even Stanton— whose views were, as
always, more radical— dwelt heavily on maternal obligation 
rather than rights in exhorting women to recognize the need 
for full and free divorce in cases of chronic inebriation.11 
The physical safety of drunkards' children was at issue as 
well as that of their mother; liberal feminists stressed her 
duty to remove them to a safer environment.
The obligation to protect extended beyond living
children to children unborn, and became the basis of 
antebellum feminists' arguments for refusing husbands their 
"rights'1 in the marriage bed. Stanton relied heavily on 
what Linda Gordon has described as a folk wisdom of 
eugenics, preaching widely on the poor genetic harvest of
“Recent historical work has stressed the pragmatic 
nature of much of the mid-century reform of marital women's 
property laws and rules of custody, not as extensions of 
absolute rights but as piecemeal efforts by legislatures to 
protect women in carrying out what were in fact rapidly 
growing roles in household management and domestic finance. 
See, for example, Suzanne Lebsock, The Free Women of 
Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern Town. 1784-1860 
(New York, 1984); Richard Chused, "Married Women's Property 
Law, 1800-1850," Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 71 (1983), pp. 
1359-1425; and Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law 
and_the Family in Nineteenth-Centurv America (Chapel Hill,
1985).
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unwilling unions.” Exploiting the nineteenth-century 
passion for statistics, she calculated that of the nearly 
1300 idiots in Massachusetts, between 1100 and 1200 had been 
born of alcoholic parents, and urged women to sever 
immediately conjugal relations with husbands who drank: "the 
unspeakable misery of looking a laughing idiot in the face 
and calling him 'my son' is known but to the mother's heart 
— the drunkard's wife.1116 Stanton and Anthony's scientific 
Calvinism stressed the heritability of sin, and preached 
that "(No) woman should consent to be the wife of a drunkard 
because she may be the medium of stamping new forms of 
immortality on his gross, carnal nature." At one New York 
Women's State Temperance Convention it was resolved that "it 
is a sin for any woman to consent to entail on innocent 
beings the curse and degradation that are the certain 
heritage of the Drunkard's offspring Recognizing
that abandoning the marriage bed was a painful and audacious 
step, Stanton counseled her readers that God in his 
benevolence never intended such a travesty of human
“Linda Gordon, Woman's Body. Woman's Right: A Social 
History of Birth Control in America (New York, 1976), 
especially Chap. 6, "Social Purity and Eugenics."
“Lily 2, no. 4 (April 1850), p. 31.
17L11v 4, no. 7 (July 1852), p. 57-58.
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happiness as a virtuous woman tied for life to a "loathsome/ 
putrid carcass.nl*
The brutalized wife presented the most vivid and 
compelling case for divorce, but a rather higher-minded 
strain of thought ran through antebellum divorce arguments 
as well. One of the abolitionists' strongest arguments was 
that slavery illegitimately interposed human authority 
between the individual and God, thwarting that person's 
growth and their development according to God's plan. The 
antebellum protest against the usurpation of God's authority 
took on new form in decrying marriage as subsuming the 
individuality of one person to the will of another. For 
liberal Protestants in full revolt against both the theology 
and political implications of Calvinist orthodoxy, the 
binding of the human will was both a crime and a sin, in 
marriage as elsewhere. Stanton and fellow feminist 
Antoinette Brown Blackwell adopted and embroidered This 
argument, using it to challenge the husband's authority.19 
Stanton asked:
(H)ow can (woman) subscribe to a theology 
which makes her the conscious victim of
^Lilv 4, no. 10 (Aug. 1852), p. 69.
19Stanton and Blackwell engaged in a protracted debate 
on divorce at the national woman's rights meeting in 1860. 
See History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 716-735.
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another's will, forever subject to the triple 
bondage of man, priest, and the law ...? How 
can she endure our present marriage relations 
by which woman's life, health, and happiness 
are held so cheap that she herself feels that 
God has given her no charter of rights, no 
individuality of her own?20
Obedience to God was a far easier principle for
mainstream feminists to accept than one of individual
happiness through severing the marital bond. The liberal
Protestant notion of a newly-benevolent God with designs for
each individual's happiness provided Stanton with an
argument in favor of divorce that was more acceptable to
contemporaries in the 1850s. Stanton thus introduced into
the divorce debate— embedded in a theory of divine will and
human duty— the ideas of individual happiness and the
importance of personal growth, concepts that she would later
develop into claims for personal autonomy.
Marriage and Slavery in the Post-War Period
In the post-Civil War period the rhetoric of divorce 
changed dramatically, as the language of rights replaced 
that of duty to God or children. For feminists, caught up 
in the great public debates of the post-war period, the
“Letter of Nov. 24, 1856, Stanton Papers, Douglass 
College Library, Rutgers University.
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wrongs of brutalized wives served as a catalyst for early 
consciousness of individual rights: " (it is) difficult to 
depict the woes of the drunkard's wife ... without saying 
that her rights have been recklessly invaded, and wrongfully 
withheld.1,21 Earlier, divorce had been understood as an act 
of self-defense; now it became an issue of personal liberty. 
The idea of the right to one's body and to one's labor was a 
critica1 tenet of post-war political theory; liberal 
feminists adapted this "rights" definition to their own 
ends.
Slavery was over, but slavery/freedom became the ruling
paradigm through which liberal feminists conceived and
developed their vision of rights within marriage. The
analogy between marriage and slavery was natural and
powerful, the conclusion inescapable:
Did the wives of all drunkards know that they 
have no master but God —  that they are their 
own, and not the property of man —  that 
woman is endowed with the same wants and 
capacities, and entitled to the same rights 
and privileges with him, they would not long 
wear the yoke of slavery ...22
Feminists' reliance on slavery imagery to express the 
plight of women grew naturally from the early ties with the
21L_ily 4, no. 3 (March 1852), p. 22.
22Lily 4, no. 2 (Feb. 1852), p. 13.
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abolitionist movement. The fledgling pre-Civil War woman's 
rights movement was ignited and fueled by women whose 
involvement in the anti-slavery movement had convinced them 
that arguments from natural rights and human dignity applied 
equally to women. Early feminists had labeled their own 
conditions as slavery, referring largely to the civil wrongs 
of coverture and disfranchisement. The direct analogy 
between slavery and marriage appeared less frequently: 
despite criticisms of its legal trappings, the institution 
of marriage itself was accorded great deference.
After the war, though, liberal feminists' use of 
slavery imagery took on a new directness, serving to 
describe the actual physical and emotional relations between 
husband and wife. Slavery imagery gained dominance and new 
meaning, and bondage became the metaphor of choice for 
pro-divorce feminists. Marriage itself had not become 
significantly more oppressive in those few years. Rather, 
the Emancipation Proclamation and the subsequent 
constitutional amendments offered a compelling new model for 
the articulation of grievances, grievances that in the 
slave's case had already been addressed with a suggestive 
array of constitutional rights and remedies. During the 
Civil War, anti-slavery ideology had developed into a 
political force invoking newly powerful models of government
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intervention to redress slavery's wrongs. In many respects 
anti-slavery rhetoric was a more powerful political tool 
after the war precisely because of its new legal status.
For antebellum reformers, slavery had held the status of a 
sin, a widespread corrupt practice that had offended notions 
of natural and divine law. By the late 1860s enslavement 
had essentially become a crime, which human law outlawed and 
whose consequences human law sought to redress. The woman's 
rights movement's reliance on the mechanisms of human law 
grew reciprocally with the government's administration of 
equal protection standards through statutes and 
constitutional amendments. With feminist theory newly 
oriented toward legislative and policy goals, the franchise 
foremost among them, the slavery paradigm took on a new 
value as a language of political opposition.23
In gross terms, middle-class women who compared 
themselves to bondswomen may seem melodramatic and 
self-aggrandizing. But feminists felt themselves in both 
acute physical and spiritual bondage. The slavery/freedom
23The growth of women's political culture is discussed 
by Paula Baker in "The Domestication of Politics: Women and 
American Political Society, 1780-1920," American Historical 
Review 89, no. 3 (June, 1984): 620-647. See also Lori D. 
Ginzberg, "'Moral Suasion is Moral Balderdash': Women, 
Politics, and Social Activism in the 1850s," Journal of 
American,History 73, no. 3 (Dec. 1986): 601-622.
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dichotomy helped articulate common apprehensions of the 
illegitimacy of male and masterly authority, as well as 
women's genuine outrage at a marital servitude that many 
felt keenly was as degrading as actual bondage. In 
describing bad marriages women spoke of being crushed, 
dwarfed, broken, crippled— a language of assaults on the 
body that resonated wildly in the immediate aftermath of the 
slavery contest. Stories abounded of wive.? who pictured 
themselves as "legalized slaves" to "masters" who meted out 
brutal treatment unchecked and unprovoked. An article in 
the Revolution entitled "The Slavery of Woman" offered a 
standard catalog of seductions, rapes, and assaults to which 
women had been subjected. One writer suggested, in the 
absence of anyone to raise a cry of "murder," that "we do it 
for ourselves, by stepping into the footprints of 
Garrison.
For those women who were fortunate enough to escape 
actual violence, codes and customs appeared to create 
manacles no less confining for being based on law, habit, 
and public sentiment. Even the ostensibly autonomous female 
body was encumbered by a scaffolding of hoops, buttons, and 
stays. One mother asked in defense of the Bloomer costume,
“Revolution 1, no. 14 (April 9, 1868), pp. 216-17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
"ought we, my child, to be enslaved by anything that cramps 
the freedom of the soul ...?"” Stanton eloquently declared 
that "Our evolution thus far is but a struggle to stretch 
ourselves while bound hand and foot, to fly with clipped 
wings, to breathe with an anesthetic held to mouth and nose 
... the oneness of man and woman (is) a oneness that makes 
woman a slave."24 Women wrote and read books with titles 
such as Hedged In. Forced Vows, and Fettered for Life, or 
Lord and Master.27
Women's writing also made frequent literary use of the 
escape scene inspired by fugitives from the South.
Diatribes against the laws of parental custody were laden 
with descriptions that drew on the Eliza story from Uncle 
Tom's Cabin, the slave mother escaping with her child, 
hounds baying at her heels. Such mothers, escaping their 
oppressive husbands, asked, "but he will follow me, will 
traduce me, and take my baby away from me, and the law won't
“Revolution 1, no. 16 (April 23, 1868), p. 244-45.
“Stanton, letter to Isabella Beecher Hooker, April 12, 
1871, Stanton Papers,Douglass College Library, Rutgers 
University. Stanton claimed great success for her marriage 
lectures on the circuit.
“Hedged In. E.S. Phelps Ward (Boston, 1870); the other 
two are by Lillie Devereaux Blake, Forced Vows (New York,
1870), and Fettered for Life (New York, 1874).
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give me my freedom, will it?"2'
This sentimentalized presentation of marital 
enslavement and its consequences among all classes of 
society is portrayed vividly in Fettered For Life, or. Lord 
and Master, written in 1874 by the prominent suffragist and 
Stanton-sympathizer Lillie Devereaux Blake. Despite its 
traditional format, the novel's moral was unconventional.
The mortality rate for the novel's female characters is 
improbably high, and the author unsubtly conveys her message 
that "man-marriage," or the common model of male domination, 
takes a toll on women. Marital slavery plays itself out 
differently for each class, however, in a way that shows the 
growing recognition of class distinctions in feminist 
political analysis. Antebellum divorce and anti-marriage 
rhetoric had pictured all women as potential victims of a 
husband's drunken violence without acknowledging hurts or 
rights special to any group. But in Fettered for Life women 
of different classes are at risk in different ways, and 
follow out particular patterns in their marriages.
The novel's working-class female characters— Biddy, 
Rboda, Mrs. Blodgett— are especially vulnerable to physical 
abuse, and have all beeh victimized by overt male brutality:
2>Wo_odhull and Claflin's Weekly. Oct. 29, 1870, p. 10.
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seduced and abandoned like Rhoda, or like Biddy brought to 
death's door by an abusive spouse. Mrs. Blodgett, whose 
marriage to an underworld figure we follow throughout the 
narrative, remains a loving and subservient mate to a 
small-time criminal who finally kicks her to death in a 
drunken frenzy toward the end of the novel.
By contrast, the genteel and middle-class Mrs. Moulder, 
overworked mother of three, suffers a more subtle oppression 
at the hands of a grumpy and domineering newspaper editor, 
who shreds her dreams of a more cultivated life with his 
mundane tyrannies rather than his fists. Violence here is 
displaced onto her pet canary, which Mr. Moulder kills with 
a thoughtless (but significant) blow while trying to return 
it to its cage. Mrs. Moulder, undone by the excitement, 
suffers a miscarriage and sinks into physical decline.
Harsh as these scenarios are, Blake saves the most 
vivid slave imagery for the case of Flora, wealthy daughter 
of a prominent businessman and best friend of the heroine. 
Clearly the gay, innocent, and talented Flora represents for 
Blake the most compelling and sympathetic case, one of 
"pure” enslavement without actual physical violence or 
demand. While relying heavily on images of male violence, 
middle-class feminists admitted that, in their 
understanding, women like themselves experienced less abuse
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than working-class women, for whom marital violence was 
often a way of life.” While including domestic violence as 
an important part of their critique, many liberal feminists 
began to stress the suffering of the spirit above the 
suffering of the body as the true enslavement. The story of 
Flora illustrates how the slavery metaphor took on new 
meaning in their hands, as they focused more and more on the 
stifling of the will, talents, and independence as the most 
serious consequences of women's bondage.
Descriptions of the courtship of Flora and the worldly, 
wealthy rou6 who pursues her are shot through with the 
language of mastery. For months Flora resists LeRoy's 
overtures, fearing to become his "slave for life." Finally 
catching her unawares one night on the veranda, he forces a 
kiss on her, murmuring "my sweet trembling little prisoner, 
you are fairly caught. Give me your promise." In the face 
of his "irresistible will," "forceful eyes," "detaining 
hands," Flora "remained passive, unable to escape." After 
the kiss, "she was no longer free, no longer belonged to 
herself, she had received a master, and been compelled to 
submit to the symbol of his power ... 'I have passed under 
the yoke,' she thought, 'I am a slave.'" Thwarted in her
devolution 6, no. 14 (Oct. 6, 1870), p. 216, "The 
Slave Women of America."
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attempt to escape, Flora continues to struggle weakly 
throughout the marriage ceremony, but "the iron clasp held 
her fast," and the vows were taken.30
Predictably, the marriage is an unhappy one: LeRoy 
forbids Flora to walk alone, see old friends, or follow her 
own pursuits. In defiance she takes up her writing again, 
and out of her anguish produces an extraordinary poem, which 
she secretly sends off for publication. LeRoy's anger at 
her independence precipitates a crisis and Flora's decline. 
On her deathbed she tells him that she can only be well 
again if he will lift his ban on the publication of her 
works; he refuses.31 Her dying words to him are "Remember 
that women, as well as men, need an occupation for their 
energies, and marriage without love is worse than death ... 
There is light above my head— light and freedom!"32 
Fettered for Life is emblematic of much liberal feminist 
thought, illustrating how the problem of wasted talents and
38Fettered for Life, pp. 73, 128, 129, 264.
31This is the first documented instance of the adage, 
"Publish or perish."
“Fettered for Life# p. 351. Another of Blake's 
publications, Woman's Place Today (New York, 1890), contains 
a similar story of the atrophied and wasted talents of a 
beautiful young girl, "now in an alien grave, dead by her 
own hand" (p. 64).
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the quest for professional opportunity— subjects with 
particularly middle-class appeal— became increasingly 
intertwined with the antislavery rhetoric of the marriage 
critique.” The right to hold a job, to pursue a career or 
profession, came to be seen as a critical part of woman's 
emancipation.
Marriage and Freedom of Contract
Slavery's antithesis in nineteenth-century political 
discourse was freedom, and feminists' equation of marriage 
and slavery compelled their audiences to contemplate divorce 
through its obvious analogy, emancipation. The traditional 
marriage was undergoing its own Reconstruction. As Stanton 
declared, the growing number of divorces was not a sign of 
declining morals, but exactly the opposite: "Woman is in a 
transition period from slavery to freedom, and she will not 
accept the conditions of family life that she has heretofore 
meekly observed."34 According to the feminist agenda, what 
did freedom or emancipation entail for the married woman?
“Revolution 1, no. 18 (May 7, 1868), p. 278-79.
“Quoted in Ellen DuBois, "The Limitations of 
Sisterhood: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Division in the 
American Suffrage Movement, 1875-1902," Women and the 
Structure of Society, ed. Barbara J. Harris and JoAnn K. 
McNamara (Durham, N.C., 1984), pp. 166-67.
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In the view of a growing number of liberal feminists led by 
Stanton, its most important tenets were self-ownership 
within marriage and a right to divorce if the marriage 
became degrading.
Linda Gordon and other historians of women have talked 
about "self-ownership" as a form of birth control 
("voluntary motherhood") and as a radical assertion of 
sexual autonomy within marriage, both critical parts of 
nineteenth-century feminists' claims.35 The term itself—  
clearly predicated on slavery and coined to signify its 
literal opposite— drew on both abolitionist and free love 
traditions. As Gordon has pointed out in her chapter on 
"Voluntary Motherhood," despite profound disagreement on 
other scores, a wide range of women activists— including 
free lovers, liberal feminists, and the more conservative 
Christian suffragists of the Woman's Christian Temperance 
Union— concurred that married women were entitled to choose 
or refuse sex at will, according to their own desires and
3SGordon, Chap. 6, "Social Purity and Eugenics." See 
also Daniel Scott Smith, "Family Limitation, Sexual Control, 
and Domestic Feminism in Victorian America," Feminist 
Studies. vol. 1, nos. 3/4 (1973), pp. 40-57, reprinted in 
Clio's_Consciousness Raised: New Perspectives on the History 
of Women, ed. Mary S. Hartman and Lois W. Banner (New York, 
1974); and William Leach, True Love and Perfect Union: The 
Feminist Reform of Sex and Society (New York, 1980), 
especially Chap 4, "Sexual Ownership and the Rationalization 
of Sexual Desire."
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their wish to conceive. Thus, the "right to her own person" 
became a key feminist concept, language with little 
resonance in the earlier period.38 Stantonians claimed that 
next to self-ownership, which should "determine the future 
of the race," suffrage represented only a "simple question 
of political privilege."37
In a larger sense, Stanton and her sympathizers, in 
common with Victoria Woodhull, were attempting to 
restructure the idea of "right" to eliminate "obligation" 
altogether, broadly privileging the right to be free of 
obligation above the right to insist on the performance of a 
legal or contractual duty. They declared that "woman's 
degradation is in man's idea of his sexual rights." Placing 
woman's right to refuse above man's need for sexual
“Gordon, pp. 95-97. Despite their common belief in 
such a right, mainstream feminists disapproved of the free 
love movement. Stanton's views were complicated: she agreed 
with Victoria Woodhull's basic philosophy that women's 
sexual oppression must be ended before civil rights for 
women would be meaningful. The free love movement provided 
critical support for her insistence that the right of 
self-ownership was central, not peripheral, to the cause of 
women. On occasion she openly endorsed the philosophy: see 
Ellen C. DuBois, "On Labor and Free Love: Two Unpublished 
Speeches of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," Signs 1, no. 1 (1975): 
257-268. At the same time, she did not go nearly as far as 
the free lover Victoria Woodhull in urging the positive 
value of erotic pleasure governed only by the lover's 
immediate inclination; she herself maintained a strong 
belief in monogamy.
37Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Sept. 10, 1870, p. 4.
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relations, they denied that there was any male right at all, 
or any corresponding wifely duty.31 Drawing on the romantic 
anti-institutionalism of antebellum reform, liberal 
feminists transposed that language into an endorsement of 
voluntarism and radical personal autonomy. They decried the 
coercion of "marriage as a compulsory bond enforced by law 
and rendered perpetual by that means," and labeled every 
action and every relation that resulted from external 
coercion inherently corrupt.39
Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly took this road further 
than even Stanton and Anthony did. An article with the 
suggestive title "Marriage Versus Freedom," whose author 
claimed Stanton's and Anthony's blessing on her views, 
declared that "Freedom is the only right worth striving for 
... if, indeed, there are any other rights outside of and 
apart from personal freedom." She dismissed critics' 
objections that mutual obligations rendered complete 
personal freedom impossible:
“Theodore Stanton and Harriot Stanton Blatch, eds., 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton As Revealed in her Letters, Diary, 
and Reminiscences (New York, 1922), vol. 2 (Letters). p. 82. 
See also John Cowan, Science of a New Life (1874; reprint 
New York, 1970).
“DuBois, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 265.
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no person has any right to assume, to impose, 
such dependence on another as will make the 
exercise of that other's free will a source 
of unhappiness. Neither single nor mutual 
obligations should extend any further than 
the purest free will prompts; and then they 
are not obligations at all, but favors 
instead ...“
Although the writers for Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly 
went beyond most mainstream feminists in their emphasis on 
individual liberty, Stanton herself was in complete sympathy 
with their claims. She even publicly defended the position 
of mistress over that of wife on the grounds that it was a 
voluntary relationship and not legal bondage.11 This 
inherent privileging of a right to be free of obligations 
over any right to exact obligations impugned not just the 
marital bond, but an older structure which rested on 
reciprocal concepts of rights and duties: rights and 
obligations derived from status, by which the law described 
the roles and relationships of pairs like master-slave, 
husband-wife, parent-child. The rights that liberal 
feminists asserted— the right to vote, to own property, and 
to act as guardians of their own children— worked to destroy 
some of the rights formerly vested in men, but put no one
“Sarah Norton, Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Oct. 22 
1870, p. 7.
“Revolution 2, no. 15 (Oct. 15, 1868), p. 233.
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under any continuing obligation, and engaged no one in any
reciprocal relationship. Liberal feminists repeatedly
expressed their legal strategy as an attempt to lift laws
that restrained and coerced, rather than as a way to
obligate or coerce others. In the grand scheme, they sought
Freedom, freedom from all unnecessary 
entanglements and concessions, freedom from 
binding obligations involving 
impossibilities, freedom to repair mistakes, 
to express the manifoldness of our own 
natures, and to progress on, to advance to 
higher planes of development."
Such radical autonomy left little room for ties. In 
their desire for freedom, in that binary understanding of 
slavery and freedom which construed any customary or legal 
bond as making one unfree, liberal feminists predicated 
their claims on the assertion that "the laws of the 
individual sovereignty of women are more sacred than any 
human tie."43
In this attempt to reconstruct the nature of 
obligation, liberal feminists moved naturally toward legal 
concepts. Seeking to recast the marriage relationship on 
more nearly equal terms, they groped for language that could 
express their vision in ways harmonious with mainstream
"Dubois, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 266.
"Revolution 5, no. 20 (May 19, 1870), p. 309. See 
also Stanton, Letters, p. 82.
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thought. Contract was an obvious choice. The contractual 
ideal was pervasive in nineteenth-century society, so much 
so that to speak of feminists invoking contract as a 
"strategy" is misleading; it was the common coin of 
intellectual life, spreading far beyond its legal bounds to 
influence notions of reciprocity, obligation, and personal 
and business relations. Use of the slavery paradigm brought 
the issue of freedom of contract into play. Effectively the 
condition of slavery had less to do with disenfranchisement 
than with a slave's more immediate inability to sever old 
work ties and form new ones and to bargain for a fair wage 
— powers which acquired almost mystical importance in the 
years around the Civil War. In addition to the more general 
civil status, then, "freedom" took on a narrower definition 
in the ability to make and break agreements at will.44 
Contract provided women both with a theory of equal and 
reciprocal duties within an ongoing relation, and also with 
a model for breaking that relation when the bargain went
440n the place of contract in American legal and social 
life see J. Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom 
in the Nineteenth-Centurv United States (Madison, Wis.,
1956); Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1977), pp. 160-210; Grossberg, esp. pp.
20, 23-24; and Amy Dru Stanley, "Conjugal Bonds and Wage 
Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation," 
Journal of American History, vol. 75 no. 2 (Sept. 1988), pp. 
471-500.
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sour.
In addition to seeking justification for their 
interpretations of the marriage obligation in the law of 
contract/ liberal feminists invoked God in their support as 
the first author of the dissoluble marriage contract.
Stanton repeatedly pointed out in her voluminous writings 
and travels up and down the countryside that any legal bond 
which condemned one party to an unhappy and degraded 
existence violated God's own first plan for human happiness; 
the legal bond of marriage/ then, must give way to God's 
most sacred decree/ reinterpreted by his zealous female 
apostles in America as "what God hath not joined together, 
let man put asunder.According to Stanton, then, God's 
own laws now required of human beings that, rather than a 
sacramental or covenant theory of marriage relations, they 
subscribe to a theory of marital contract, with its inherent 
destructibility. No bond in this new world could be 
irrevocably formed, for "any constitution, compact, or 
covenant between human beings, that failed to promote human 
happiness, could not ... be of any force or authority; and
“Revolution 3, no. 23 <June 10, 1869), p. 362. See 
also the resolutions offered at the 1860 National Woman's 
Rights Convention, reprinted in History of Woman Suffrage, 
vol. 1, pp. 716-717.
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it would be not only a right, but a duty, to abolish it."44
For Stanton, the concept of contract represented 
largely the deregulation of marriage, the non-interference 
of church and state in the private realm. It is true that 
feminists in the 1850s were on the cusp of change: initially 
repudiating human regulation as inimical to self-government, 
women activists were beginning to see law as a tool that 
could be manipulated for their own ends. But it was the 
enabling rather than the enforcing power of law which 
appealed to feminists who sought to reform the marriage 
contract. Their view of the law of contract, although 
oversimplified, held that "all contracts, covenants, 
agreements, and partnerships are left wholly at the 
discretion of the parties."47
Stanton did give some credence to the power of 
government to regulate the initial formation of contracts, 
including marriage. Citing the need for safeguards like 
minimum age, competence, and full disclosure, she encouraged 
legislators to remedy "the absence of form and dignity in 
the marriage contract which is unknown in any other
“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 716.
"Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Address ... on the Divorce 
Bill Before the Judiciary Committee," p. 10. See also 
Revolution 2. no. 17 (Oct. 29, 1868), p. 264.
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civilized nation" with a strict set of prior conditions."
But this list also reads as a set of contractual defenses,
setting out grounds on which she thought divorce should be
more easily granted or marriages annulled. Stanton pointed
out that in other civil contracts, failure to comply with
the conditions of entrance
vitiates the contract, and it is annulled by 
the mutual agreement of both parties. But in 
the marriage contract, which the state allows 
to be formed so thoughtlessly, ignorantly, 
irreverently, the parties have no control 
whatever, though ofttimes in its formation 
and continuance all laws of decency and 
common sense are at defiance ..."
Stanton sought tough entry and easy exit, but felt that 
stricter regulation of the creation of a marriage contract 
would cut down on failed marriages.
The notion of free contract served as a blueprint for 
remodelling the marriage relationship as well as for ending 
it. A part of the liberal project on marriage entailed 
demystifying it by applying to it the everyday terms of 
bargain and exchange which governed arms-length agreements 
for services. Feminists used contractual analogies to 
describe faithful adherence to their marital terms, despite
"Davis, p. 68; History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 
718; Revolution 2, no. 16 <Oct. 22, 1868), pp. 249-50.
"Davis, p. 68.
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men's repeated violations of their own. Many men refused to 
perform their own obligations while insisting that women 
meet theirs, thus moving the agreement from the realm of 
contract into slavery.50 Several different writers for the 
Revolution in particular employed the language of employment 
relations and free labor to urge woman's more equal 
participation in "the marital partnership," lest the common 
imbalance "involve the bank of matrimony in hopeless 
bankruptcy."51 The Revolution's boosting of the free 
labor/free trade positions was not purchased with George 
Francis Train's money, but served as an integral part of a 
system of thought in which external compulsion was 
synonymous with imbalance or disfunction.52
The author of an unattributed four-part series of 
articles entitled "The Husband of Today" seems to have taken 
a leaf from the debate over the ownership of the craftsman's
^Revolution. vol. 1 no 24 (June 18, 1868), p. 381.
“Revolution, vol. 5 no. 6 (Feb. 10, 1870), p. 94.
”ln Revolution vol. 3 no. 15 (April 15, 1869), p. 233, 
for example, Stanton in an article entitled "Free Trade" 
denied that since Train dissociated himself from the 
Revolution it had gone over to "Greeley and the 
Protectionists." "Commerce is ever the pioneer of 
civilization and Christianity, and every barrier in the way 
of exports and imports blocks the wheels of progress and 
retards the moral and intellectual development of all the 
races of man."
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tools when she complains that the wife has "no legal right 
to that home which she is dutifully expected to beautify and 
make pleasant" because man has the "rightful ownership of 
all the goods and chattels of the family," rendering the 
wife little more than a slave. Like any other artisan, 
woman claimed more control of the workplace and of her 
"tools." When houses were designed by men, they misplaced 
the pantries and the sinks, little understanding the uses to 
which such objects were put: "The wife has, doubtless, good 
reason for the hot fire, the open draught, the large wash 
... she doubtless knows {her job) better than her husband," 
whose ignorant "sole management" only puts him in the 
category of "officious intermeddler." Sharply criticizing 
the profit motive which made men unwilling to invest capital 
in the home, the author cites many women who "complained in 
the roundest terms, in the bitterest Saxon, that they were 
the drudges, the household slaves of money-getting husbands, 
who, provided they could lay by year after year money (one 
lady said $3,000) of profits, are either indifferent to, or 
do not appreciate, the cares, sorrows, and overtoil of their 
wives ... with all the heavy claims of maternity, being made 
to work full up to the mark, like the man day-laborer ... a 
dreary slavery in the free states." Women's rights included 
the right "to herself, to the use of all the powers and
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facilities God has given her, and the rights to the profits 
of her labor ...
Visions of the Family
This vision of women's marital enslavement and 
emancipation through the recasting of marriage as a contract 
dissoluble at will— largely Stanton's vision— remained 
highly controversial within feminism itself, as well as 
attracting bitter criticism and attacks from outside. 
Opponents claimed that liberal reformers' programs 
threatened the nuclear family, and in fact these reformers 
did have a distinctive agenda with regard to the family's 
role and function. Within the larger debate, Greeley as 
usual staked out the orthodox position with his contention 
that the family's main function was, as the social agent of 
breeding, to provide for the training and education of 
children. This rationale bolstered his argument that the 
importance of life-long marriage outweighed the happiness of 
the individual parties, because it best served the goals of 
stability and social order.
Liberal feminists emphatically rejected this
“Revolution. "The Hisband of Today," part 1, vol. 3 
no. 18 (May 8, 1869), p. 275; part 2, vol. 3 no. 20 (May 20, 
1869), p. 310; part 3, vol. 3 no. 25 (June 24, 1869), p.
386; part 4, vol. 4 no. 1 (July 8, 1869), p. 3.
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utilitarian view,insisting that motherhood was simply one 
incident of womanhood, not its defining parameter.54 
Reacting against attempts to shame women back into the home 
with stories of neglected children and motherly duty, they 
downgraded the maternal bond from the primary place it held 
in the nineteenth century to stand as only one of many other 
rights and obligations which made up female life, foremost 
among them the right to self. The contract model of marital 
relations could not easily be fitted to the parent-child 
relationship; but in rejecting the covenant model of 
permanent bonds, liberal feminists, with both intellectual 
and emotional conviction, sought to loosen their maternal 
ties by denying the aspect of demand or duty. Stanton's 
hypersensitivity to forced bonds led her to class all bodily 
obligations as feudal in nature; the law of perpetual 
physical union was an ancient horror from Mthose dark 
periods when marriage was held by the greatest doctors and
54For example, Revolution 1, no. 15 (April 16, 1868), 
p. 229. Stanton's own attitude toward domesticity was full 
of ambivalence. The mother of a large family, she styled 
herself a great matriarch and roamed public conveyances 
giving young mothers unsolicited advice from the 
idiosyncratic and advanced maternal theories of which she 
was so proud. As her family grew, though, she acknowledged 
a growing weariness at household tasks that confined her, 
and it was in part resentment at the physical demands of 
women's lives which fueled her own quest for autonomy. See 
in general Elisabeth Griffith, In Her Own Right; The Life of 
Elizabeth Cadv Stanton (New York, 1984).
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priests of the church to be a work of the flesh only."”
Such thoughts contributed to the accurate impression of 
many of the movement's critics that woman's rights, at least 
as Stanton envisioned them, would radically alter the 
marriage relationship. Indeed, that bond in its traditional 
form would have been changed in its essence as interpreted 
through the creed which held that "the moment any act 
expected of a person becomes compulsory, it becomes 
correspondingly irksome."** In his writings Greeley had 
emphasized the social bases of family relations. Stanton, 
Andrews, and Owen, by contrast, sought to establish marriage 
as an affective relationship based on a romantic love that 
was voluntary, ephemeral, spontaneous, and responded poorly 
to legal coercion. "Our laws on marriage are bound up with 
a false assumption, viz, that the affections and judgment 
are subject to the will."
Law could not create love, an argument which radicals 
thought demolished the rationale for laws regulating 
marriage and divorce.57 Marriage was not a legal bond or 
social duty, but an affective relationship of mutual love
”Historv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 716-717.
5*Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Nov. 5, 1870, p. 6. 
^Revolution, vol. 3 no. 8 (Feb. 25, 1869), p. 117.
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and kindness, "intended by God for the greater freedom and 
happiness of both parties."5* Downplaying its physical 
aspect, divorce reformers suggested that "It is not mere 
physical infidelity but that adultery of the heart which 
quenches conjugal love; thus destroying that which, far more 
justly than your cohabitation till death, may be regarded as 
'the essence of marriage.'"5' By this standard, marriage 
"fulfills God's intentions so long as the domestic home is 
the abode of purity, of noble sentiment, of kindness ..."
By this standard, too, a marriage is broken not just by 
catastrophic upheaval, but when it becomes "the daily cause 
of grievous words and heartless deeds— of anger, strife, 
selfishness, cruelty, ruffianism."*9
Clearly a marital relation that existed only through 
the rigor of the law and not the mutual love and ongoing 
consent of the parties was not conducive to the highest 
human development, and the furthering of happiness and human 
growth became the new standard by which social and political 
functions were judged. Utilitarianism combined with the 
developing creed of liberal Protestantism to produce a new
3lHistorv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 860.
5,In Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 585.
*°In Greeley, "Marriage and Divorce," p. 577.
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rationale for institutions from the state down to the 
family. It was to accommodate this new vision of the family 
as constituted by the ongoing consent of the parties rather 
than by legal forms that Stanton sought to recast the 
marriage bond to eliminate any element of irrevocability or 
coercion from outside. She denied that marriage vows were 
anything but a voluntary, temporary mutual agreement for the 
benefit of both. Citing the "weakness and blindness" which 
led human beings to make poor decisions in the choice of 
business partners, legislators, teachers, and other public 
officers, she urged that the far graver matrimonial bond 
should be a "contract— no more perpetual than either or all 
of the former."61 By 1870 Stanton declared that in the 
Protestant world the question was no longer whether marriage 
was a sacrament or a contract, but, as a contract, for what 
reasons it might be dissolved.62
Stanton re-envisioned the family as reforming along the 
lines of the republican state: it would consist henceforth 
of a collection of free and independent individuals, 
voluntarily contracting for a corporate existence during the 
pleasure of the parties, each protected in its own autonomy
“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 717-18.
“Davis, pp. 64-65.
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by inalienable individual rights.43 Many other feminists, 
though, felt the limitations inherent in the wholesale 
adoption of the personal liberty model of social change.
The strict dichotomy between slavery and freedom worked to 
create a scheme of personal rights that could not 
accommodate the genuine physical and emotional dependencies 
of family relations. Stanton's rhetoric often pitted 
woman's right to herself against intimate demands pictured 
only as cloying and confining. For Stanton, "a single life 
of self-reliance, dignity, individual growth and 
development, is more sacred than a relation that subjects 
(woman) body and soul, to the will of another.""
Many feminists and reformers from across the spectrum 
resisted as pernicious Stanton's attempts to apply a 
commercial theory of contract to the marriage relation. 
Opponents of liberal divorce founded their arguments on the 
importance of the ideal, if not always the reality, of 
marriage as a permanent institution. For them, Stanton's 
use of contract theory provided a model of family relations 
that neither worked realistically to redress inequality, nor 
acknowledged the durability and permanence of parental or
"History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, pp. 18-19. 
"Revolution 5, no. 9 (March 3, 1870), p. 136.
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marital ties.
Religious precepts helped to shape these differing 
visions. Feminists like Antoinette Brown Blackwell resisted 
Stanton's contract theory, maintaining instead a covenantal 
view of marriage. Blackwell adopted a Christian ideal of 
marriage, not through an unthinking adherence to scriptural 
commands and injunctions, but through a belief in the 
doctrines of salvation, redemption, perfectionism, and 
atonement. Stanton offered human incompetence and frequent 
errors in choosing business partners, teachers, and other 
important contacts as evidence that the ability to dissolve 
such relations should always exist; and in marriage more so, 
since mistakes were frequent and costly.
Blackwell too acknowledged problems within marriage, 
but her faith in marriage as a relation encompassed the 
"growth and assimilation of the parties" to each other, the 
smoothing out of differences over time, that only the 
permanence of marriage would promote. The nature of moral 
life required that human beings maintain, if not the 
attraction and affection of their salad days, at least the 
"devotion to the good of another, and especially to the good 
of the sinful and guilty, (which) like all 
disinterestedness, must redound to the highest good of its
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
author ... obedient to the highest laws of benevolence.
A husband's irresponsibility provided the opportunity for a
wifely redemptive intervention, for as a Christian she could
"never enjoy peace or rest until (she had) ... thus
reclaimed him and brought him out of his sins ... as (she)
would work to save (her) children, brothers, sister, and the
whole human family."”
Blackwell saw marriage not as a "tie" as Stanton had
suggested, with the inbuilt possibility of untying, but as a
"relation" which once formed can never be destroyed: one can
"untie" but not unrelate.*7 For her it was a critical,
defining element of human nature that individuals could form
a marriage relation through a single act of will that had
permanent consequences. She frequently made analogies
between marriage and biological ties, asking,
can the mother ever destroy the relation 
which exists between herself and the child?
Can the father annul the relation which 
exists between himself and the child? Then, 
can the father and mother annul the relation 
which exists between themselves, the parents 
of the child? It cannot be.**
Like Greeley, Blackwell believed that marriage by its nature
“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 723.
“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 726.
“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 724.
“History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, p. 724.
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continued for the lives of the spouses. But, unlike him, 
she did not base her claim directly in social good, or any 
theory of society, but rather in an imperative for the moral 
development of the individual. For her the extraordinary 
characteristic of human love was the way in which it 
approximated divine love, in that it outlasted the span of 
human life.
By contrast, in Stanton's vision of romantic love, 
individual satisfaction described the nature of the bond.
She derided the concept of Christian love in marriage, 
denying that husband and wife could ever act as saviors to 
each other. While her critics charged that love was a 
compound of "forbearance, patience, forgiveness, endurance 
...," she eschewed these virtues, seeing marriage not as a 
process, a "soul perfecting itself through trial," but as a 
spontaneous emotional reaction. Stanton denied that love 
was an act of will, or that it could be deliberately 
prolonged by the parties once the fragile bloom was gone.69
Blackwell and Stanton differed fundamentally in their 
understanding of the connection generated in marriage. 
Stanton perceived marriage as a tie susceptible to 
dissolution at will. Blackwell described marriage as a
69See Leach, True Love and Perfect Union, pp. 10-11.
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relation whose very formation, although voluntary, entailed
a permanent bond. For feminists such as Jane Croly, who
questioned such "connective" definitions of marriage, the
ties of circumstance and relation were inevitable, the
definition of life itself, without which it would be
impoverished.
We are tied from the moment we enter the 
world, and are probably the better and 
happier for it, though we may rebel against 
it. We are actual slaves to circumstances, 
which preceded our births, which enclosed us 
in a skin, which governed our height, our 
color, our shape, our strength or weakness, 
and over which we had not the least control.
We are tied after birth to certain natural 
laws, which we very imperfectly understand, 
and of which we can only see the results. We 
are tied with cords woven by time itself to 
the habits and traditions which have preceded 
us; and more strongly still are we tied by 
our instincts and desires which, blind and 
unreasoning as they are, we are compelled to 
obey ... We see, then, there is very little 
of the freedom of which we boast so much in 
the matter.70
Denying the theory of radical individual and bodily 
autonomy so important to Stanton, Croly saw interdependence: 
"as parts of one great body, we are all dependent upon and 
owe duties to each other.71 What autonomy does an arm have, 
or a foot? For Croly, a body isolated was a body devalued;
70Jane Croly, For Better of Worse: A Book for Some Men 
and.All Women (Boston, 1875), p. 4.
71Croly, p. 221.
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such a fiction flew in the face of the authentic conditions 
of life. Stanton's refusal to acknowledge any social 
function of the family, or any legitimate church or state 
interest in regulating it, tended toward the complete 
privatization of the family, marking that area off as 
"personal" and impervious to regulation, for better or 
worse.12 The family became an isolated sphere, governed by 
a contractual ideal. Although Stanton's vision of the 
family did not go uncontested by her contemporaries, in fact 
it is largely this view of family law that has prevailed in 
courts and legislatures today.
Protectionism and Liberalism
Despite the resistance to Stanton's stand on divorce 
both from within the movement and without, her influence 
proved far greater than a polling of her opponents might 
suggest. Divorce itself remained controversial; but 
pro-divorce arguments were a critical piece of the far 
broader liberal rights theory of which Stanton was a chief 
architect. Political sawy kept her from openly declaring 
herself a free lover, but a common store of ideas with a
72In this sense, Stanton's .family design looked very 
much like the privatized family Christopher Lasch describes 
in Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged (New 
York, 1977).
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free love stamp became the basis of Stanton's political
creed.73 Indeed, in one sense self-ownership— construed
also as self-respect— came to replace more traditional
"virtue" in the feminist canon as the qualification for
citizenship, through the claim that all wise and virtuous
government rested on the foundation of a citizenry with a
strong sense of individual mastery.74 without these,
political rights were meaningless, for
if you go to a southern plantation and speak 
to a slave of his right to property, to the 
elective franchise, to a thorough education, 
his response will be a vacant stare ... the 
great idea of his right to himself, of his 
personal dignity, must first take possession 
of his soul, and then he will demand equality 
in everything ... I repeat, the center and 
circumference of woman's rights is just what 
the slave's are. Personal freedom is the 
first right to be proclaimed, that does not 
and cannot belong to the relation of wife
75
• • •
The very concept of "right," then, was predicated here on a 
world where those rights were to be exercised free of the 
legal and social restraints imposed by obligation to others. 
Liberal feminists sought to make the absolute right to
73DuBois suggests this in "On Labor and Free Love."
“Revolution 5, no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 147.
75Letter from Stanton to Susan B. Anthony, Nov. 24, 
1856, Stanton papers, Douglass College Library, Rutgers 
University.
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oneself the basis for the exercise of rights within the 
state, and their rhetoric on personal rights and rights 
within the family became the basis of their model for the 
exercise of political rights.7* For Stanton, then, 
questions of family governance were measured by the same 
yardstick as questions about the role of the citizen in 
society and in the state.
In addition to applying the forms of contract to 
marriage, divorce reformers sought to tighten the 
correspondence between rights in the family and the civil 
realm by using constant analogies from other areas of law 
and public policy, which they brought to bear on the law of 
the family, as well. To this end, Stanton, like Andrews and 
Owen, drew on analogies from liberal economic theory, free 
labor and free trade ideology, and the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of conscience and separation of church 
and state to sketch in a new model of family law. Sensing a 
deep intellectual kinship, all three conflated such issues 
as free divorce, free love, free labor, free contract, and
7*Matilda Joslyn Gage, one of Stanton's strongest 
allies, restated this position at the NWSA convention in 
1876, saying "without control of one's person, the 
opportunities of the world, which are the only means of 
development, cannot be used." Quoted in Leach, p. 81.
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free trade.77 Stanton herself confirmed the connection 
between doctrines with the story of a man who refused Graham 
bread, "for he had noticed that if anybody began with bran 
bread, he was sure to end with infidelity"— a somewhat 
eccentric formulation of a great progressive truth.7'
Their opponent Horace Greeley had little trouble 
recognizing these reformers' organic approach. He lumped 
free traders, usurers, tax dodgers, and advocates of easy 
divorce together in one morally bankrupt category, claiming 
that "the free trade sophistry respecting marriage is on 
every libertine's tongue.1,7* Andrews for his part commended 
Greeley, saying "You rightly refer free trade, freedom of 
the finances, freedom from state systw^s of religion and 
education, and freedom of the love relation, to one and the 
same principle, and that principle you recognize as the
77Historv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 19. Theodore 
Dwight Woolsey, foe of divorce, parodied these connections 
as "free rum, free Sundays, free suffrage, and free
divorce." Woman's Journal. Nov. 26, 1870, p. 372.
7'Stanton, "Free Love," p. 268.
7#"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p.36. Greeley's main 
concern was the protection of the working classes rather 
than the emancipation of the spirit: perceiving free trade 
as the enemy of the workingman, Greeley opposed it 
vehemently (p. 54). His enthusiasm for the virtues of 
association ended abruptly at the point at which advocacy of 
personal or sexual liberty seems to threaten social or
economic stability through the deterioration of that stable
economic unit, the family.
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spirit of the age . ..",0 Both sides, then, recognized that 
reformers were working to make the regulation of families of 
a piece with broader principles at work in areas of public 
and private commercial law. At heart, the problem in all 
areas was the same: to secure the removal of an external 
structure of laws to allow natural governing forces to 
assert themselves.
Although his proposals and his understanding of women's 
sexual subordination were radical for his day (and perhaps 
for ours), Andrews' political theory embodied strong liberal 
tendencies through his belief in the resistless power of an 
underlying order, and the need to eliminate all external 
regulation to allow that order to work unimpeded, a 
philosophy to which Stanton subscribed as well. A devoted 
disciple of Fourier, "(who really was about the most 
remarkable genius who has yet lived)," Andrews subscribed 
to Fourier's "grand discovery that Attraction, which Newton 
discovered to be the law and the regulation of the motions 
of material bodies, is equally the law and the God-intended 
regulation of the whole affectional and social sphere in 
human affairs ..."“ When the artificial restraints of law
“"Love, Marriage, and Divorce", p. 43. 
,1"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 9.
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and custom were removed, the powerful force of Attraction 
would insure that human affairs were self-regulating, both 
in the economic and in the more important erotic world. 
Andrews saw the progress toward a fully self-regulating 
world as inevitable: "Freedom in love is the last
attainment of the progressive civilized world. It is the 
culminating point toward which all other reforms tend. The 
system of restriction or arbitrary order in which the world 
was bound for ages is gradually dissolving.
Andrews and Stanton also analogized the growth of 
religious tolerance to liberal (non-regulatory) family laws, 
seeking to extend the established principles of freedom of 
conscience and of theological persuasion to cover unorthodox 
sexual relations as well. Andrews poked fun at one of his 
critics, suggesting that no "doubt ... he, too, is honest in 
his statement of the doctrine of religious freedom, and that 
he would, in practice, recognize my right to live with three 
women, if my conscience approved, as readily and heartily as 
he would contend for the rights to read the Protestant Bible 
at Florence."13 Andrews claimed for himself "no better 
right to determine what is moral or proper for you to DO
“"Love, Marriage, and the Condition of Woman," 
(published with "Love, Marriage, and Divorce").
,3"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 22.
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than ... to determine what it is religious for you to 
BELIEVE," and likened such an attempt to the burnings at 
Smithfield. Any effort to regulate the moral lives of 
others through the mechanism of the state, Andrews 
suggested, would always end in the resort to such 
time-dishonored sanctions as "public odium, the prison, the 
gibbet, the hemlock, or the cross"— sanctions which may 
punish or suppress but which never succeed in creating a 
truly harmonious order.” Stanton heartily concurred that 
the rigid enforcement of the Christian ideal, of lifelong 
monogamous marriage represented undue influence by church 
and state in the private lives of individuals.
Stanton's own repeated advocacy of free labor, free 
trade, and free currency shows that she extended her belief 
in deregulation to the economy; and that there was more than 
a superficial affinity between her views on marriage, her 
philosophy of government, and classic liberal notions of 
laissez faire.15 Indeed, reformers' efforts to meld those 
elements together shows a more complex face of liberalism 
than we usually see. Liberal theory is often portrayed as
”"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 78. Smithfield is 
the site in London where religious martyrs were burned at 
the stake.
,5See Leach on Stanton in True Love and Perfect Union.
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an amalgam of pessimism and human greed; but neither of 
these could account for the grip it took on American 
ideology. Stanton's liberal leanings were based firmly in a 
liberal Protestant creed which celebrated the innate 
goodness of human nature and its ability to find its own 
right course once external regulation was lifted. Despite 
her anticlericalism, Stanton was a child of the Second Great 
Awakening, and subscribed to its tenets on the efficacy of 
human will.'* The Christian perfectionism of the antebellum 
period— perfection of the soul— translated for many in the 
post-war period into a perfection of the life and of the 
work— human happiness. Although their interests were not 
the same, liberal reformers made common cause with business 
interests on the best method of securing change of any sort: 
deregulation. Nineteenth-century liberalism, then, was not 
a single strand, but a complex weave of economic, political, 
and religious philosophies, and much the stronger for it.
The issue of protection had also been at stake in the 
wrangling which went on among Andrews, Owen, and Greeley in 
the decade before the Civil War. As an anarchist, Andrews 
was a strong proponent of self government or self 
sovereignty, the idea that any authority exercised by one
“See Alice Rossi, The Feminist Papers (New York,
1974), part 2.
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human being over another interposed itself illegitimately 
between the individual and God's governance— a belief shared 
by abolitionists and feminists as well. In the context of 
free love, this concept expressed itself most radically in 
terms of the freeing of the body from any obligations 
imposed from without. A chief architect of the free lovers' 
creed of the absolute right of the individual to bodily 
mastery and integrity, that independence became for Andrews 
the single most important measure of social health; while 
the physical subjugation of women in American society was a 
prime indicator of its diseased state. Like Stanton, he saw 
bodily obligations as evidence of an ancient serfdom 
repugnant to enlightened minds. Andrews saw himself as a 
revolutionary fighting against "the defenders of slavery, 
and the fastidious aristocratic classes everywhere," as well 
as against all vestiges of the feudal structure of 
hierarchy, tenures, and paternalism which placed, protected, 
and imprisoned the individual.
Stanton's composite writings and pronouncements tended 
toward the disaggregation of the family as well, an outcome 
she found personally, socially, and politically desirable. 
Her philosophy of marriage emphasized the aspect of 
individual development, and the severing of obligatory ties
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and dependencies contributed to this.17 Socially as well, 
Stanton was convinced that only the removal of all 
restriction on women— domestic, civil, physical— could bring 
them into a position of full equality. Politically, she 
classed the patriarchal family with "despotic governments 
(and) infallible churches ... Every new step in civilization 
tends to individual awareness, dignity, responsibility, 
alike in the church, the state, and the home ..."" Clearly 
the democratic reorganization of the family required that 
each individual be accorded full status and rights: Stanton
denied that the "representative" theory of the family as a 
"unit" was acceptable. Government should deal with 
individuals, not with families, or with certain of its 
members as representatives of others.'9
Inherent in the push for the disaggregation of the 
family was the recognition that, like slavery or the harem, 
the protection offered by family membership was often at the 
price of liberty. For slaves, being "'a part of the 
family'" had "protected" them from the onus of taxation, as 
well as denying them a civil voice; leaving the "family"
"Stanton, Letters, p. 10.
"Revolution, vol. 5 no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 152. 
"Ibid.
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changed both.40 Any physical obligation which owed its 
existence to a code or rule was similarly discredited: just 
as Horace Greeley denounced "the free trade sophistry 
respecting marriage," the liberal feminists equated the 
safety of marriage with the harem, with paternalism and 
slavery, claiming "protection is the leech that preys upon 
the heart of liberty." "Protectors" take on a sarcastic 
significance in Stanton's work as those who rape and seduce 
women.91
In fact, discussions of the marriage question both 
within and without organized feminism also centered on 
another set of issues— economic protection and the 
consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers. In 
1860, Stanton's and Blackwell's optimistic beliefs in the 
potential for the liberated and energetic woman to achieve 
economic parity allowed both to ignore the problem of 
dependence.92 A decade later, some feminists were more 
skeptical. Stanton's brash and public advocacy of divorce 
was an irritant which contributed to the estrangement of the 
New York and Boston feminist groups. Although Lucy Stone
"History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 169; "Address 
in Favor of Universal Suffrage" (Albany, N.Y., 1867).
"Revolution, vol. 2 no. 11 (Sept. 17, 1868), p. 169.
"History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 716-22.
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and Henry B. Blackwell almost certainly agreed with Stanton 
in private, they feared that her public stance would taint 
the quest for the ballot, and lose the suffrage movement 
crucial support. They steadfastly refused to acknowledge 
the link between civil and domestic inequality, naively 
arguing that, once the lack of political rights for women 
had been redressed, relations between the sexes would right 
themselves as a natural consequence.
At the same time, writers for the Woman's Journal, the 
paper of the Boston-based American Woman Suffrage 
Association (AWSA), had another complaint to make: they 
found Stanton's rhetoric naive and disingenuous in its 
assumption that free divorce would primarily benefit women. 
How many mothers, under the circumstances, could afford to 
sweep grandly out and set up housekeeping on their own?
Stone and her followers intimated that "freedom" for a 
divorced mother of six should be known by its other names, 
immiseration and abandonment. For the suffragists of the 
AWSA, divorce was at best an unfortunate necessity in cases 
of chronic spousal abuse; but free divorce in Stanton's 
terms represented "practically, freedom of unworthy men to 
leave their wives and children to starve, while it could not
with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
give similar freedom to mothers to leave their children."” 
Neither wing of the suffrage movement showed any abiding 
sensitivity to the problems of working class women, the AWSA 
less than Stanton's group. The Boston contingent, though, 
grasped that the "right" of divorce must be seen in light of 
prevailing economic conditions, where "a wife with children, 
who has lost the help of her husband, has undertaken a 
contest with fortune against heavy odds."94 The imperative 
of self sovereignty, then, left little room for financial, 
physical, or emotional obligation of any kind. As Andrews 
had earlier announced, "The great lesson for the world is 
that human beings do not need to be taken care of. What 
they do need is such conditions of justice and friendly 
cooperation that they can take care of themselves." Stanton 
concurred that the dangers of protectionism far outweighed 
the problems of poverty.”
Conclusion
The adoption of the slavery metaphor for 
marriage— with its reflexive counter, freedom— had weighty
Roman's Journal. Sept. 12, 1874, p. 294. 
^Woman's Journal. June 4 1870, p. 173. 
”"Love, Marriage, and Divorce," pp. 18-19.
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consequences for the development of feminist thought in 
America. It gave feminists an immediate and powerful 
concept and language of personal independence with resonance 
in the dominant culture. It also carried a transformative 
vision of equality. There were several feminist traditions 
in the nineteenth century; but it is this vision of 
liberation which the woman's movement of the mid-twentieth 
century has drawn on for support and sustenance. The ideal 
of personal freedom has proven durable as a spark to 
political action that addresses women's deepest concerns. 
More than a century later, well after political "equality" 
was established by the Nineteenth intendment, the idea of 
escape from bondage fueled a women's movement that has 
changed the shape of American social life.
At the same time, the process of defining rights, 
occurring both within feminism and in the larger political 
culture, transformed their meaning through the paradigm of 
slavery and freedom. In Stanton's liberal view, shaped by 
her post-Civil war contractual view of marriage, rights 
originated in the private sphere, not within the context of 
social or public life. The Revolution argued that the 
assertion of self ownership for women must become "the 
paramount and controlling influence of her life, for 
individual freedom of choice is the cornerstone of
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individual responsibility, and all virtue and wise 
government must rest on this foundation.” Only then, "when 
responsible alone to God and herself, she shall possess the 
right to life and liberty, she will occupy a position in 
which she will logically be capable of becoming a Beneficent 
Power."96 Departing from the antebellum formulation that 
rights were both the offspring and the agent of performing 
duties, Stanton insisted that rights were paramount and 
antecedent to duties. The earlier notion that the 
perfection of individual rights was the only means of 
protecting the rights of the community gave way to language 
that pitted the individual against the community: Stanton 
concluded that "the best interests of a community can never 
require the sacrifice of one innocent being, of one sacred 
right."97
The elevation of the individual right to a position of 
absolute authority created a philosophical framework in 
which it was easiest to recognize the negative right, the 
right to be free from something; and where the balancing of 
rights through the recognition of binding claims by one 
person on another was made, if not impossible, at least
devolution vol. 5, no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 147; 
see also Cowan, op. cit.
devolution vol. 2, no. 17 (Oct. 29, 1868), p. 265.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
148
conceptually dubious. Sarah Norton/ a contributor to 
Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, spoke for much of 
nineteenth-century feminism— indeed, much of 
nineteenth-century liberalism— when she asked, "wherein, 
then consists the value of a right that cannot be 
appropriated at the option of the individual possessing it? 
or how much of the value or usefulness remains, if it is to 
be subject to the control of some greater right?"”
Liberal feminists, pushing the argument that "we do not 
live by bread alone," were compelled to downgrade the 
importance of financial security in marriage, in order to 
establish it as an affective relationship between equals.” 
This emphasis hindered meaningful discussion among 
Stantonians of another set of issues— economic protection 
and the consequences of easy divorce for wives and mothers. 
Ultimately, despite her quick sympathy with the oppressed of 
all sorts, Stanton's preoccupation with individual freedom 
prevented her from developing a coherent class-based theory 
that invoked systematic legal or institutional remedies to 
women's position in marriage. Stanton throughout her life 
maintained a belief in the primacy of change at the personal
”Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Sept. 3, 1870, p. 7. 
“Revolution vol. 6, no. 1 (July 7, 1870), p. 2.
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level. She judged civil perfection to be the result of the 
perfection of individuals, a belief that after the war was 
translated into a defense of individual rights.
Stanton suggested that women's rise should follow the 
projected path of the slave: "end all this talk of class 
legislation, bury the Negro in the citizen, and claim the 
suffrage for all men and women ..." She rejected any 
argument based on the "rights of races," and accepted as the 
only rationale for reform the slave's "manhood; his 
individual, inalienable right to freedom and equality; and 
thus ... woman's case today."109
Such an idealistic response to the practical problems 
of racism and sexism has left a mixed legacy for 
twentieth-century feminists. Ultimately, Stanton's 
theories, by undermining the bonds between individuals 
within the family and by placing the source of rights in 
this deregulated private sphere, may have made it more 
difficult to assert group rights in the larger social 
setting. The contractual theory of liberal individualism 
has never proven a satisfactory mediator of family 
relations; nor has the extension of that theory into the 
civil sphere created a basis for the assumption by the state
^ Revolution vol. 3, no. 2 (Jan. 14, 1869), p. 25.
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of family obligations— day care, medical care for children, 
parental leaves— that could genuinely have changed the lives 
of all women.
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Chapter III - Self-Ownership and the Political Theory of
Elizabeth Cady Stanton
The emphasis on freedom or enslavement of the body, and 
the issues which sprang from that focus, were feminists' 
contribution to American liberalism, as well as their link 
to radical thought. Elizabeth Cady Stanton had drawn 
arguments from the realm of political liberty and religious 
tolerance to make the case for choice in private life; but 
the vision of individual autonomy in sexual and domestic 
matters served also as the basis for her definition of 
citizenship, and as a paradigm for relations among citizens 
and between citizens and the state. Self ownership was the 
unifying theme which ran through Stanton's political 
development; it described for her the only appropriate 
relationship between any individual and her family, 
community, government, or God.
The nineteenth century saw the transformation of 
liberalism by feminism, and by women's entry into the public 
sphere. Liberal women's claims to liberty,.equality, and 
natural rights employed the language of the Founding 
Fathers, but their content was quite different.1 Women's
^llen DuBois in Feminism and Suffrage: the Emergence 
of an Independent Woman's Movement in America. 1848-1869 
(Ithaca, New York, 1978) and Aileen Kraditor in The Ideas of 
the Woman Suffrage Movement 1890-1920 (New York 1965) both
151
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formulations of their own rights were not echoes of the 
eighteenth century; their definition of liberty was more 
personal than that of the Founders. Support for civil 
rights was strong, but the feminist positions which roused 
the most passion tended to be those claims for bodily 
control which drew from the radical utopian and free love 
agenda even when not explicitly acknowledging the debt. 
Voluntary motherhood, the right to be free of conjugal 
relations, age of consent laws, the right to divorce, the 
availability of writs of habeas corpus for married women 
against their husbands, custodial rights, abolition of the 
double standard and of the husband's privilege to administer 
corporal punishment— all of these issues became incorporated 
into public political debate, and significantly pushed out 
the limits of potential liberal personhood. With the 
exception of divorce, liberal women agreed on these claims, 
and they became a part of the feminist agenda early on.
This is not to say that liberal feminists rejected 
classic liberalism. National Woman Suffrage Association 
<NWSA) members in the post-war period espoused traditional 
liberal positions on free trade, currency, the primacy of 
contract, and freedom of religious thought, and generally
take the tack that feminist claims were essentially 
replications of revolutionary republican rhetoric.
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supported deregulatory positions while emphasizing 
individual liberties.2 The campaign for married women's 
property reform fit easily into the liberal mold as well, 
creating a liberal legal personality who expressed herself 
in the control of and contracting for goods and services, 
turning a "femme covert into a living, breathing woman— a 
wife into a property holder, who can make contracts, buy and 
sell."3 Claims for employment and equal pay, although not 
pursued in the post-war period with the vigor of other 
issues, sprang out of the growing equality rhetoric which 
stressed the right to support oneself as a part of the 
liberal scheme. The franchise itself was the mark of a 
liberal individual.
But feminism's contribution to liberalism was to re­
enforce and greatly expand the individual's zone of privacy; 
to widen the definition of rights past the rights of the 
individual in his civil status to include the rights of the 
individual in her private capacity. The intellectual 
genesis of these positions is most easily traced in the
2A good representative sample of this writing can be 
found in the Revolution in the years Stanton and Anthony 
edited it (1868-1870) .
3Letter from Stanton to Gerrit Smith, Seneca Falls, 
n.d., Stanton Papers, Douglass College.
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writings of Elizabeth Cady Stanton.4
Stanton had always cast the traditional family, the 
church, and the state as the three interrelated structures 
which kept women in the position of bond-servants and 
prevented their growth and development outside stultifying 
traditional roles. The Founding Fathers had taken a 
definite step in the right direction in abolishing the power 
of monarchy in favor of government by the people. But they 
had left intact intermediate structures of authority, the 
hierarchies of family and church, and so "fastened their 
broken chains on all they considered inferior to themselves 
and incapable of resistance."5 Antebellum "government by 
the people" brought self government to representatives of 
groups rather than to individuals; Stanton argued that "to 
build a true republic the church and the home must undergo
4Again, this chapter raises the problem of Stanton's 
representativeness within the movement, mentioned in the 
introduction. I am writing here about Stanton, but have 
tried at the same time to make clear that although her ideas 
were always more developed and usually more radical than her 
co-workers in the NWSA, there were large areas of agreement, 
and Stanton's opinions in their own right were highly 
influential even where there was disagreement. Stanton did 
serve repeatedly as president and officer of the NWSA; her 
views were not so far outside the mainstream as to alienate 
large numbers of the group's voting constituency, at least 
as long as the NWSA remained a separate organization.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, "Self Government" (ca. 1874), 
Stanton Papers, Library of Congress, reel 3.
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the same upheavings we now see in the s t a t e . F o r  Stanton 
the move she made in the 1870s away from political analysis 
and toward exploring inequity in the home and later in the 
church was a move toward understanding and destroying the 
deep structure of political inequality.7
To do so, Stanton set out to undermine traditional 
sources of communal and familial authority. A letter from a 
reader of the Revolution asked if the family didn't need a 
ruling head to prevent anarchy. Stanton's reply lumped 
fathers with kings and popes as despots to be overturned by 
the emerging individual in the full exercise of her rights; 
the representative theory of the family— whereby women were 
to be represented in the public arena by their husbands and 
fathers— worked no better for Stanton than that theory of 
government. She explicitly denied that the family was a 
sub-unit or "governing power" in the state, charging 
governments instead to deal with individuals directly: "The 
law takes cognizance of family relations only as they are
‘Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al, eds., History of Woman 
Suffrage, vol. 2 (New York, 1882), p. 152.
7Within the movement she succeeded to a remarkable 
extent in fusing the issues; the theoretical question was 
often conceived as "Woman in the Home, the Church, and the 
State," an example being a talk given by Laura Cuppy Smith 
through the American Literary Bureau, as advertised in 
Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol. 3 no. 22 (Oct. 14,
1871).
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brought to its notice."* The patriarch was to be stripped 
of his power in the home, and adult individuals returned to 
full autonomy, thereby perfectly fulfilling the promise of 
the American Revolution and bringing personal liberty back 
to the most immediate level.
This agenda created a strong tension between public and 
privare which has dogged the women's movement ever -ince.
As issues of domestic governance moved outside the "privacy" 
of the home— often a euphemism for unchecked abuse of male 
authority*— they necessarily becam.-* ’public" in the broadest 
sense, talked, written, and read about in the dominant 
forums of the day. In the process of women's integration 
into the political realm— a fait accompli well before the 
Nineteenth Amendment— women firmly nailed such formerly 
"private" areas as family law jurisdiction, separation and 
divorce, bodily autonomy, and the abolition of the sexual 
double standard to the platform of liberalism. Not everyone 
who styled themselves "liberal" agreed on the details, but 
there was a growing consensus that such issues were
'Revolution, vol. 5 no. 10 (March 10, 1870), p. 152.
*On receiving complaints that the Revolution was using 
newsgirls to sell their papers to the public, Stanton 
replied that they were better off in the public street than 
in the "sacred privacy of the home" where they were at the 
mercy of any drunken brute (Revolution, vol. 2 no. 3 [July 
23, 1868], p. 37).
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appropriately handled in the realm of politics, rather than 
by private authority.10
“Stanton's sense dating from the antebellum years that 
private authority (church and patriarchy) was responsible 
for the regulation of sexual and family life may have been 
at odds with the history of local governance, although that 
does not make it any less real a force in her own thinking. 
William E. Nelson suggests in The Americanization of the 
Common Law: the Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts 
Society. 1760-1830 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975) that at least in ' 
the North, the discovery and punishment of moral crimes was 
the primary responsibility of the judicial system up until 
the time of the Revolution; then the focus on morality gave 
way to concern for crimes against property. However, the 
close identification in revolutionary New England between 
church and state justifies Stanton's assumptions. Also, 
moral crimes usually involved acts outside marriage; even in 
colonial New England Stanton is correct that intrafamily 
disputes were often left to the discretion of the father, a 
power she sought to have voided, thereby destroying the 
distinction which for purposes of jurisdiction is still very 
important in family law today between the married and the 
unmarried; or between acts done within the context of an 
ongoing family relationship, and acts done outside of or at 
the end of one.
In addition, Stanton was deeply concerned with the 
separation of the two branches of authority, church and 
state, and was committed to describing a neutral central 
authority which could take over from the church.
A second question is whether either patriarchy or the 
church ruled as forcefully by Stanton's day as she suggests; 
or whether she was beating a dead horse. I think she was 
beating a sick horse. Both pure patriarchy and pure 
Calvinism were already well in decline by the mid-nineteenth 
century, with Stanton enthusiastically preparing to pound in 
the coffin nails. (See Michael Grossberg, Governing the 
Hearth; Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 
[Chapel Hill, 1985]; Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: 
The American Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority. 1750- 
1800 [Cambridge, Mass., 1982]; and Ann Douglas, The 
Feminization of American Culture [New York, 1977]. But cf. 
Carol Weisbrod on the continuing vitality of religious 
authority, "Family, Church, and State: An Essay on 
Constitutionalism and Religious Authority," Journal of
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At the same time feminists sought to bring these issues 
to the attention of the public, and within the legal 
jurisdiction of a liberal state, for the explicit purpose of 
asserting that decisions about marital and domestic matters 
were highly personal and subject only to individual 
jurisdiction.11 The Revolution reader was right in marking 
that the father's fall as head of household left a vacuum of 
authority. Stanton's work sought to put the individual into 
the position of ultimate authority, a configuration which
Family Law, vol. 26 [1987-88], pp. 741-770.) Stanton 
certainly understood the dangers and possible costs of 
enhancing judicial or legislative jurisdiction over private 
behavior, even to spite the church; in fact, probably due in 
large part to the weakening of "private" authorities, 
government intervention in the family seemed to be on the 
rise in the nineteenth century, despite the new 
' laracterization of the family as "private," a result 
Stanton would have hated; see Lee Teitelbaum, "Family 
History and Family Law," Wisconsin Law Review 1985, pp. 
1135-81. Thanks to Dirk Hartog for talking this over with 
me.
“I don't mean to suggest that this interpretation—  
individual sovereignty over issues of family governance—  
became the dominant one. Michael Grossberg's Governing the 
Hearth is convincingly devoted to showing the development of 
a "judicial patriarchy" composed of judges who substituted 
their own decisions on family disputes for those of the 
father and clearly felt it their business to do so. Liberal 
feminists themselves were more likely to admit judicial or 
state intervention when the dispute involved the custody of 
children than when it concerned regulating the status 
particularly of married adults; see Stanton, letter to E.L. 
Godkin, Jan. 1, 1898, Stanton Papers, Douglass Colle;ge. The 
tone of this letter is quite uncharacteristic of Stanton, 
though; she softened in her attitude toward the state in the 
last years of her life.
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made it difficult for her to develop any coherent model of 
the state, or any notion of the public interest.
Self-Ownership Within the Family
The right to control one's body was the pre-eminent 
personal and political right for Stanton from a very early 
age. In her autobiographical writings she portrays herself 
as a rebel from birth; and even accounting for the later 
gloss on the facts she would seem to have been a strong- 
willed girl, confident in her own opinions, traits she 
retained all her life.12 Her account of her own childhood 
is one of ongoing resistance to a strictly orthodox 
upbringing designed to intimidate with godly fear; and of 
frequent punishments for tantrums which with hindsight she 
saw "were really justifiable acts of rebellion against the 
tyranny of those in authority. "1J
“As she reports in her autobiography, "I was always 
courageous in saying what I saw to be true, f^r the single 
reason that I never dreamed of opposition. What seemed to 
me to be right I thought must be equally plain to all other 
rational beings.” Stanton, Eiahtv Years and More: 
Reminiscences 1815-1897 (1898: reprint, New York, 1971), p. 
216.
“Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 12. Eighty Years contains 
the most complete autobiographical account; see also 
Elisabeth Griffith, In Her Own Right; The Life of E l i z a b e t h  
Cady Stanton (New York, 1984). On Stanton's rebelliousness 
see also Gail Parker's introduction to Eighty Years, pp. 
xviii-xx.
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Stanton despised the morbid Presbyterian regime under 
which she grew up, whose goal for children was to keep them 
"embalmed as mummies." Her instinctive dislike of 
Calvinism's strict and gloomy passivity was soon bolstered 
by intellectual arguments.1* While at school in her teens 
Stanton sat under the preaching of Charles Finney, and 
temporarily fell prey to the sleeplessness and morbid 
terrors of the fearful unconverted. After a bad bout of 
nerves she was rescued by her brother-in-law, who whisked 
her off to a spa for a spell of reading in liberal theology. 
Its "rational ideas based on scientific facts" helped to set 
her free from "the old bondage of fear of the visible and 
the invisible ... and, no longer subject to absolute 
authority, I rejoiced in the dawn of a new day of freedom in 
thought and action."15 This episode fueled Stanton's 
dislike of religious orthodoxy and impressed on her the need 
to fight enslavement in all of its guises, although despite 
her vehement anti-clericalism she never entirely erased the 
idea of God from her mind.
With seven children, an absentee husband, and sporadic 
household help, Stanton spent a great deal of time being a
“Eighty Years, p. 12. 
“Eighty Years, pp. 44, 45.
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mother. Unlike the evangelical feminists, she made little 
attempt to use motherhood as a platform for political 
participation, but her views on the parent's role and the 
nature of child-raising nonetheless shed light on her notion 
of relations between citizens and the state.
Stanton's carefully constructed character as a mother 
seems a little too large for life.1* As with all she 
undertook Stanton threw herself into domestic life, and at 
least early on took a great deal of pleasure in developing 
her own domestic skills and running her own household.
Pride in her competence and skills moved her to master 
domestic arts not perhaps of much intrinsic interest to her; 
and child-bearing and raising offered a splendid opportunity 
to pit her wits against male professionals. Refusing to 
trust doctors' advice (which she called as "confusing and 
unsatisfactory as the longer and shorter catechisms and the 
Thirty Nine Articles") or the accepted wisdom of the day on 
the care of infants, she substituted her own judgment and 
instituted for her children a regime based on her most 
dearly held principles. Swaddling, bandaging, binding,
“Elisabeth Griffith arrives at this conclusion as well 
in In Her Own Right, pp. xvii and xix. She cites one of 
Stanton's contemporaries who charged that Stanton had 
"secured much immunity by a comfortable look of 
motherliness" (p. 196).
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closed windows, any kind of restrictive practices were out; 
her children were unbound, thrust into the fresh air, 
allowed to eat and sleep as they demanded. "Show me a child 
that is snubbed, cribbed, crippled, thwarted in every way 
and I will show you incapacity, weakness, disease, 
misery."17 Stanton took enormous pride in her self-taught 
expertise, and in later years explained that on her many 
cross-country trips "I was of great use to the travelling 
public." Seizing bundled and crying children from startled 
mothers, Stanton would rip off their wraps and hang them out 
the window, expounding on the virtues of free movement and 
fresh air; many babies, she suggested, were "emancipated" 
through her ministries.1*
At the same time, the role of the mother as idealized 
in the dominant culture, as well as the fact of the loss of 
autonomy which motherhood necessarily entails, were 
troubling to Stanton. Few nineteenth-century American women 
could have been as wonderfully unsentimental as Stanton, and
"Stanton, "Self Government" (1874). So convinced was 
Stanton in her own powers that the lesson she drew from 
child-rearing was to trust "neither men nor books absolutely 
after this, either in regard to the heavens above or the 
earth beneath, but continue(d) to use my 'mother's 
instinct,' if 'reason' is too dignified a term to apply to 
women's thoughts." E l c r h tv  Y e a r s , p .  120.
"Eighty Years, pp. 112 ff; pp. 271-72; Griffith, In 
HenOwn Right, pp. 10-12.
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in quoting Matilda Gage's favorite motto she dismissed in 
one master stroke all the favorite sentimental symbols of 
the day— "There is a word sweeter than Mother, Home, or 
Heaven— that word is Liberty."1* For Stanton, the home was 
not, as it was for evangelical feminists, a sanctuary 
surrounded by protective maternal love; such an image 
confirmed most of the things she hated about the traditional 
family.20 Stanton herself— again unlike many of the 
evangelicals — did not strongly identify with her own 
mother, and in fact seems to have gotten on rather poorly 
with her mother for most of her life.21
Whatever her personal feelings about motherhood— and 
they were almost certainly mixed— maternity presented a
“Eighty Years, pp. 328-29.
20A part of her vehement feeling about cloying family 
life clearly came from her own domestic frustrations. She 
laments that "I pace up and down these 2 chambers of mine 
like a caged lioness, longing to bring to a close nursing 
and housekeeping cares" (Stanton, Elizabeth Cadv Stanton as 
Revealed in Her Letters. Diarv. and Reminiscences. Theodore 
Stanton and Harriot Stanton Blatch, eds. [2 vols., New York, 
1922], vol. 2 [Letters], letter to Susan B. Anthony, June 
10, 1856, p. 66. See also Griffith, In Her Own Right, pp.
79, 88ff.)
21In many ways Stanton was not strongly woman- 
identified, either. Despite membership in suffrage 
organizations, she hated the meetings, much preferring to be 
on her own lecturing in the west. Women in groups smacked 
of the neurotic for her, rather than of the safe and loving; 
see Eighty Years, pp. 41, 197.
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troubling political problem for the women's movement- For 
men and women alike women's capacity for motherhood remained 
the best argument against suffrage, political participation, 
and work outside the home. Stanton saw biological 
determinism— or maternal fatalism— as an off-shoot of the 
Protestant church's teachings on sex roles, and in her 
articles and lectures struggled to convince women that they 
were not doomed to a miserable maternity "through one fatal 
interview in the Garden of Eden."22 Stanton repeatedly 
refuted the "insulting notion that our physical sex 
constitutes our womanhood," casting motherhood as just an 
incident in the life of a woman, whose role as an individual 
with her own conscience and moral faculties was the primary 
one.23
The obsessive, hovering, maternal style in fashion in 
the dominant culture was anathema to Stanton as well; she 
did not equate beneficent authority, or even good care, with 
protectiveness. The ideal childhood should be, as she 
believed her own had been, "one long struggle against 
arbitrary power; one continual protest in favor of self­
22"Religion for Women and Children," Stanton Papers, 
Library of Congress, reel 2.
23See Revolution, vol. 1 no. 15 (April 10, 1868), p. 
229; and vol. 3 no. 10 (March 11, 1869), p. 148.
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government."” Rebellion against authority was the state of 
nature.
Even children at the earliest age are always 
in a chronic condition of rebellion against 
the control of nurses, older brothers and 
sisters, parents and teachers, ever showing a 
decided preference to have tbair own way, in 
other words to govern themselves. Boys in 
schools and colleges find their chief 
happiness in disobeying rules, circumventing 
and defying teachers and professors with 
their youthful pranks; so many declarations 
of independence affording one of the most 
pleasing topics of conversation in after 
life. The general unrest of the people under 
kings, emperors and czars, in secret 
plottings or open defiance against self 
constituted authority, shows the settled 
hatred of all subjects, to any form of 
government to which they have never 
consented.”
Actually even the power to consent to a form of government 
did not satisfy Stanton: she believed it her own, and any
other child's or adult's prerogative, to exercise a line 
item veto over any act of authority which stunted or 
confined.
The fundamental governing principle of the liberal
“ftanton, "Self Government" (1874).
“Stanton, "Self Government the Best Means of Self 
Development," in National Woman Suffrage Association, Report 
of the 16th Annual Washington Convention...1884 (Rochester, 
N.Y., 1884), p. 62. There can be little doubt that Stanton 
practiced what she preached in raising her own children; 
they were infamously ill-behaved and Stanton seemed to get a 
great deal of pleasure out of their scrapes once it became 
apparent that no one had actually been killed.
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household remained that for any one person to rule over any 
other person constituted despotism.” Conservative 
defenders of the family often labeled its gender roles 
"natural" or God-ordained. Echoing the abolitionist 
anarchists from the pre-war period Stanton and others 
labeled such prescriptions a usurpation of God's direct 
authority over the individual, demanding that the "self- 
constituted deputies of God Almighty ... either relinquish 
their claims to divine authority, or ... produce credentials 
from headquarters to that effect."21 God alone could 
dictate the parts men and women played, and he employed no 
intermediaries.2' But how can one distinguish good
”See Chap. I for a fuller discussion of this concept 
in the context of abolitionism, and Chap. II for a 
discussion in the context of marriage and divorce.
27Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly. Sept. 3, 1870/ see 
also Woodhull, "Principles of Social Freedom" (1871), p. 9. 
For similar statements on this subject by Stanton and others 
see Chap. I.
2*For the most part in Stanton's thinking this includes 
Christ as well. While approving of his teachings as 
representing the true and uncorrupted Christianity, she 
never gives any indication that she sees him as a deity, or 
a conduit to God. Unlike the evangelicals, for whom the 
suffering and atonement of Christ played a critical role, 
Stanton seems to reject the idea of Christ as an 
intermediary, and tacitly to subscribe to a Quaker- 
influenced sense of the inner light. (At least she is 
convinced of her own direct connection.) On the other hand, 
one doubts her full appreciation of the Quaker experience on 
reading her account of a meeting of Friends she attended 
with a female doctor: "I was moved to speak, the doctor was
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authority from bad authority in this context, particularly 
for children, where the case for authority of some kind is 
the most compelling? The best regime, for children and 
citizens both, was not absolute authority: no tyranny in the 
home or in the state. Stanton argues that the training 
which is most likely to produce the good citizen— which is 
after all the goal of schooling— is the rule which forces 
the students to rule themselves, which presents both right 
and wrong to the student and "demands an act of judgment, a 
decision between the two." Absolute authority, Stanton 
admits, is more likely to produce order; but order is not 
the goal. Rather, the goal is to teach children, not 
domination over others, but the more difficult mastery over 
themselves; only in a society of self-governing people can 
the principles of individual growth be fully realized.
Stanton and the Liberal Individual
The love of freedom was more than a child's attribute: 
unfolding first in childhood, it persisted as long as life 
itself. As evidenced by her view of childhood, Stanton 
defined liberty as a human being's natural state; to critics 
who attributed a naturally passive role to women she
not, tho I urged her to be" (letter to Susan B. Anthony,
Aug. 20, 1883, Stanton Papers, Douglass College).
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responded bitterly that it had taken centuries of 
persecution, "the whole power of the civil and canon law ... 
under all forms of religious fanaticism, culminating in 
witch-craft" prosecutions to control and subdue women, who 
had nonetheless "shown her love of individual freedom, her 
desire for self-government, while her achievements in 
practical affairs and her courage in the great emergencies 
of life have vindicated her capacity to exercise this 
right. "29
The premium Stanton placed on individual freedom was 
the theme of "Solitude of Self," the address that Stanton 
gave in 1892 before the congressional Judiciary Committee 
and later to the annual suffrage meeting. It is often 
acclaimed as her greatest speech, and its beauty is 
piercing. At the same time, it is a bleak statement of 
social relations, one almost without hope.30 In it Stanton
”The full speech is published as Stanton, "Hearing of 
the Woman Suffrage Association Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 1892" <n.p., n.d.); there is a lightly edited 
version reprinted under its common name,"Solitude of Self," 
in Ellen DuBois's Elizabeth Cadv Stanton. Susan B. Anthony. 
Citations in this chapter are from the "Hearing" text but 
will be cited as "Solitude of Self." This quotation is from 
pp. 62-63.
“DuBois points out that it anticipates "the 
existentialist philosophy associated with the rebirth of 
feminism in our time, and modern feminism's concern with the 
'personal' elements of women's experience." DuBois, Stanton 
and Anthony, p. 246.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
denies the possibility of human contact, human 
communication, in any but the most superficial sense.
Common pleasures are fleeting; "even our friendship and love 
we never fully share with another; there is something of 
every passion in every situation we conceal" (p. 2) . The 
critical moments of each life are those— however brief—  
when isolation is total. During bereavement, imprisonment, 
poverty, war, abandonment, crisis, old age, "alike mid the 
greatest triumphs and darkest tragedies of life we walk 
alone" (p. 2). Stanton denied the possibility of community 
which sparked so many women's groups in their associational 
efforts; the woman who took an interest in questions of 
health and sanitation, foreign policy, education, or other 
social functions, for example, could never knit together 
human beings but could only make her own solitude 
"respectable" and provide work— if futile work— for her 
hands (p. 3).
Even the human Christ never rose above such mortal 
limits. Stanton proclaimed his command, "Bear ye one 
another's burdens," beyond the individual's scope. The idea 
of the atonement, the shifting of weight onto stronger 
shoulders, had never appealed to the individualist in 
Stanton. "In fitting out an army we give each soldier his 
own knapsack, arms, powder, his blanket, cup, knife, fork,
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and spoon. We provide alike for all their individual 
necessities, then each man bears his own burden" (p. 2).
Her summary of Christ's life is selective, a litany of 
failures; neglecting triumphal entries, righteous wrath, and 
even the Resurrection, she concentrates instead on moments 
of abandonment and betrayal. Christ's experience on earth 
is most fully realized, not even in the Crucifixion, but in 
the more bitter moments of despair alone in the garden at 
Gethsemane (p. 4) .
For Stanton, the individual's life did not lack a 
purpose; but its purpose was not to establish any particular 
set of relations among human beings. The social gospel 
movement and the more socially oriented feminists championed 
a kind of counter-Reformation in their rejection of faith 
over works. They thought that in the context of an 
industrializing America, the need for works was great, and 
that it rendered the contemplative life and the dead 
theological intricacies of salvation selfish and outmoded. 
Far from criticizing the Reformation, Stanton invoked it 
constantly, interpreting it as a movement in support of 
"individual rights, individual conscience and judgment ... 
the basic principles of our republican government and
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Protestant religion ..."n Critical as she was of the male- 
dominated church hierarchy and the tyranny of superstition, 
the great Protestant principle of freedom of conscience 
represented for her the core of truth at the heart of a 
rotten institutional body— approximately the same way she 
looked on the principle of liberty in the Constitution.32 
Stanton too had no time for the creeds and codes of the 
church fathers. But the state of the individual soul was 
still paramount for her; although as a thorough-going 
antinomian she consistently denied that any outside 
authority could dictate, judge, or influence the state of 
her soul. As compared to social feminists, Stanton was a 
great spiritualist emphasizing the state of the soui over 
charitable deeds even while moving ever farther away from 
orthodox religion.33
The most compelling metaphor for human life in 
Stanton's vocabulary is that of the "solitary voyage;" fov 
"no matter how much women prefer to lean ... they must make
31"Suffrage a Natural Right" (Chicago, 1894), p. 2.
See also History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 437 for a 
NWSA resolution to that effect.
32Revolution. Nov. 26, 1868, p. 324.
33Aileen Kraditor in Ideas of the Woman Suffrage 
Movement describes "Solitude of Self" as an elegy for "a 
solitary human soul in the Protestant tradition responsible 
for its own destiny" (p. 48).
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the voyage alone, (relying on) their own skill and judgment 
in the hour of danger, and, if not equal to the occasion, 
(man and woman) alike they perish."31 The voyage metaphor 
allows for nothing of the social, nothing of the rooted or 
familial; the "solitary voyager" is not with mess mates but 
"upon the deck of the ship at midnight ... (with a) feeling 
... of utter desolation and loneliness; a little speck of 
life shut in by a tremendous darkness ..."” The voyage is 
not aimless. Stanton carried over from antebellum feminist 
rhetoric the belief in a liberal Protestant mandate for the 
full development of God-given capacities, and insisted that 
woman's goal is the achievement of "the highest development 
of which they are capable."3* For the end of human life is 
the growth of the individual; and the individual has the 
duty to resist whatever restricts her growth.37
The duty to resist often pitted the individual against
“"Solitude of Self," pp. 1-2.
“"Solitude of Self," p. 5.
“Stanton, "Self Government the Best Means of Self 
Development," p. 67. See Chap. I for the influence of 
liberal Protestantism on antebellum rhetoric. In "Solitude 
of Self" Stanton suggests that the rights and duties of 
women are "individual happiness and development" (p. 1).
“Revolution, vol. 1 no. 21 (May 28, 1868), p. 361.
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others.” Particularly toward the end of her life Stanton's 
arguments for woman suffrage take on a foreboding air; women 
will need the ballot in emergencies, as solitary marooned 
voyagers, as a woman trapped in a burning house needs self- 
reliance.” Again, it is tempting to attribute this 
sourness and sense of danger and isolation to old age and 
exclusion from the mainstream of the woman's movement after 
the NWSA's reunion with the more conservative American Woman 
Suffrage Association in 1890; but in an article in the Lily 
of 1852 Stanton fully anticipated her later message that 
woman is her own "self-supporter, self defender, and self 
protector, compelled to stand or fall, live or die, 
alone."4’ Time probably increased her isolation; but her 
fundamental perception that woman is "an imaginary Robinson 
Crusoe with her woman Friday on a solitary island" didn't 
change — and Stanton was often happier to do without 
Friday.41
”One particularly stirring speech on this subject was 
Stanton's on the famous McFarland-Richardson murder trial; 
see DuBois, ed., Stanton and Anthony, pp. 125-130. See also 
Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tvrannv; The Making of Social 
Policy Against Family Violence From Colonial Times to the 
Present (New York, 1987).
5*See "Solitude of Self"; "Self-Government the Best 
Means of Self-Development"; and "Suffrage a Natural Right".
40Lily, vol. 4 no. 5, p. 40 (May 1852) .
41"Solitude of Self," p. 1.
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Throughout her career Stanton, as well as other liberal 
feminists, showed an overriding concern for corporeal 
integrity, and a vivid apprehension of the possibilities of 
violence to the person. Nineteenth-century feminists across 
the ideological spectrum shared a belief in voluntary 
motherhood and sexual choice for women, and condemned in 
particular drunken male aggression against women and 
children. But the evangelicals, despite their focus on 
intemperance, devoted significantly less time to the issue 
of male violence against women, and were far less willing to 
condemn orthodox marriage itself as a breeder of violence. 
Liberals, far more than the evangelicals, dwelt in detail on 
the potential for male violence against women, recounting 
each new horror and indignity almost with relish, as though 
justifying their world view. Their constant litany of 
physical crimes against women both made public an important 
source of "private" oppression, and re-enforced liberal 
feminism's special fearfulness about physical violations and 
infringements.
Human beings' natural state was not only constant 
rebellion against illegitimate authority, but constant 
peril; in her defense of political rights for the individual 
Stanton often pictured the polity as a dangerous place for 
the liberal individual. Suffrage in particular ssrved the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
adult as a weapon of self-defense against abusive authority 
when "youthful pranks" no longer sufficed- In her 1894 
speech "Suffrage a Natural Right," she drove home the 
analogy between the ballot and the bow and arrow with which 
early man "exercised his natural right of self protection." 
Stanton characterized the ballot as the "substicute in 
civilization" for the "rude weapons of savage life," 
proclaiming it tyranny to take away the means by which the 
individual defended person and property. Not impressed by 
any social compact which had made so few provisions for 
women, she declared that in compacting for the establishment 
of government and mutual protection no one gave up a 
"natural right to protect themselves and their property by 
laws of their own making, they simply substituted the ballot 
for the bow and arrow."42
Only individual ownership and individual control gave 
protection in Stanton's world. Protection when provided by 
one for another is always a paternalist trap; no two 
individuals disparate in power can form a protective 
relationship without fatal harm to the liberty of the 
protected, in the same way that no class can legislate for
4*Stanton, "Suffrage a Natural Right," pp. 2-3; NWSA, 
Report of the 16th Annual Washington Convention (n.p.,n.d.), 
p. 64.
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or represent another class. In classic liberal style she 
sees the individual constituted and protected through the 
ownership of property, including rights in that category as 
things owned by the classic possessive liberal individual.43 
Children again illustrate the "natural" human response: 
"whoever touches their playthings without their consent 
arouses their angry resistance, showing the natural desire 
to own property."44 Property is one of the ways in which 
the vulnerable individual protects herself in a cold world; 
like physical assault, "to deny the rights of property (is) 
like cutting off the hands," to disable the body 
completely.45
Feminism. Fourier, and Free Love
Stanton's endorsement of free love philosophy was a 
position which followed naturally from her earlier 
intellectual leanings. The legacy of slavery, as explored 
in Chapter II, helped form Stanton's strong antipathy to 
physical and legal restraints; the metaphor of slavery never
43See fn. 3 supra.
“"Suffrage a Natural Right," p. 7. Rachel Weil points 
out that in pre-Lockeian terminology "childlike" is a 
derogatory epithet; while for Stanton descriptions of 
children's behavior are used as evidence of a natural order.
“"Solitude of Self," p. 2.
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lost its power for her, leaving her hypersensitive to the 
potential for abuse in any human relationship, particularly 
where there was a disparity in the parties' power. Much of 
Stanton's respect for and attention to the laws of nature 
resulted from her discovery that they confirmed her belief 
that humans thrived in freedom and solitude. She often used 
the metaphor of planetary orbits to describe optimal social /
arrangements in which individuals whirled around each other 
at a safe, orderly distance— planets rarely leaving their 
orbits to attach or enslave other planets.4* Stanton 
endorsed Bloomers, physical exercise, and fresh air, and the 
general removal of all physical badges of female servitude, 
stressing the freedom of the body from all burdens and 
entanglements imposed from without. The Revolution in 1869 
even endorsed a health reformer's position that no one 
should regularly sleep with another person, adding that 
there "is a great physical law that all would do well to 
obey. Every man, woman, and child should have a bed to him 
or herself."47
4<See, for example, "Solitude of Self."
^Revolution. vol. 3 no. 24 (June 17, 1869), p. 379. 
Stanton's thought here coincides with the growth of new 
religions— Christian Science, spiritualism, faith healing—  
also centered around physical health and culture; see 
Elizabeth B. Clark, "Women and Religion in America, 1870- 
1920," in John F. Wilson, ed., Church and State in America.
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For Stanton, as for Stephen Pearl Andrews, the physical 
subjugation of women was a prime indicator of America's 
diseased state; the indissoluble marriage relation was a 
carnal horror from "those dark periods when marriage was 
held by the greatest doctors and priests of the church to be 
a work of the flesh only."” Similarly, voluntary 
motherhood and the right to full and free divorce provided 
above all release from an unwanted and often brutal physical 
bondage. The enlightened nineteenth-century attitude toward 
the body sought to release it, particularly women's bodies, 
from the corrosive hold of superiors in "feudal" relations 
of slavery and orthodox Christian marriage.”
It was in this context that Stanton endorsed the 
doctrine of free love— a concept which meant many things to 
many people. Ellen DuBois suggests that her 1870 speech on 
marriage and divorce clearly establishes Stanton as a 
partisan of free love.*0 Certainly the works of radicals
vol. 2 (Westport, Conn., 1987), pp. 375-79.
“Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al., eds., History of Woman 
Suffrage, vol. 1 (New York, 1881), pp. 716-717.
”See William Leach, True Love and Perfect Union; The 
Feminist Reform of Sex and Society (New York, 1980), passim.
S0Ellen DuBois, ed., "On Labor and Free Love: Two 
Unpublished Speeches of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," Signs vol.
1 no. 1 (1975), pp. 257-268, at p. 263. DuBois points out 
Stanton's commitment to monogamy as well.
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like Robert Dale Owen and Frances Wright, and later Victoria 
Woodhull and Annie Besant, influenced her profoundly.*1 She 
agreed with many of their positions, and above all learned 
from them even when she didn't agree; along with George Sand 
and Mme de Stael they were in the small group of nineteenth- 
century figures who could out-radical her, and she admired 
their intelligence and daring.
At the same time, her philosophical agreement with the 
free love position had more to do with setting limits than 
with exploring sensual experience. In a letter of 1880 to 
her cousin and confidante Elizabeth Smith Miller she 
expressed her private view that she could not support free 
love where it was equated with promiscuity, but did support 
it where it meant women's right to "give or withhold her 
body, bear children or not, and be her own absolute 
sovereign.” In the same letter she declared her continuing 
belief in monogamy: for "anything short of this makes a
“For references see Stanton, Letters, p. 61 (on 
reading Thomas Paine and Frances Wright she comments "I am 
quite surprised to find them such rational and beautiful 
writers”); Revolution, vol. 3 no. 14 (April 8, 1869), p. 212 
(agrees with Robert Dale Owen on the marriage question in 
his debate with Horace Greeley); letter to Lucretia Mott, 
April 1, 1872, Stanton Papers, Douglass College (supporting 
Victoria Woodhull); Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 355 (on Annie 
Besant). See also Leach, True Love and Perfect Union: and 
Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism and 
Feminism in the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1983).
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mongrel, sensual, discordant progeny ... soul union should 
precede and exalt physical union."”
Stanton was certainly no prude, and there is evidence 
that she found women's sexual appetites to be as healthy and 
appropriate as men's.” At the same time, she might more 
accurately be described as a partisan of self-ownership than 
of free love in its full erotic sense: her chief expressed 
interest in championing free love was to limit the powers of 
the state to intervene in sexual relations, as in other 
aspects of individuals' lives.” Her belief that "we are 
all free lovers at heart" posited a conviction— one she 
believed many others shared— that in "a good time coming" 
men and women would be "a law unto themselves," and the 
police court, the state legislature, and "Recorder Hackett" 
would no longer interfere in relations of the heart; 
whatever resulted from the liberty to choose would be free
“Letter to E.S.Miller, Aug. 11, 1880, Stanton Papers, 
Douglass College Library.
"Griffith, In Her Own Right, pp. 96-97; DuBois,
Stanton and Anthony, pp. 94-98.
“Other partisans of free love were much more explicit 
in celebrating erotic pleasure; in "A Speech on the Garden 
of Eden: or, Paradise Lost and Found" Victoria Woodhull 
imagines an Eden that would have profoundly shaken Biblical 
scholars (1875). See also Leach, True Love and Perfect 
Union; and Sidney Ditzion, Marriage. Morals, and Sex in 
America: A History of Ideas (New York, 1953).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
181
love.59 Stanton drove home the point that "freedom is one 
and indivisible" whether intellectual, sexual, religious, or 
political. Of course freedom could always be misused, but 
Stanton felt that the misuse of sexual freedom, like a 
misuse of economic freedom such as a bad investment, was 
simply "the unavoidable friction of the machinery. n5‘
Despite her reluctance to see free love as sexual 
license, Stanton was influenced by Victoria Woodhull, and 
was in thorough agreement with her that the question of 
women's political equality was moot without similar gains in 
sexual equality. For both Stanton and Woodhull, social and 
sexual rights, though they might define them differently, 
were the key to women's full empowerment, and that the 
possession of civil rights alone could not challenge women's 
subordination.
Woodhull herself was strongly influenced— some say 
ghost-written— by Stephen Pearl Andrews, who was himself for 
many years immersed in Fourierism and the communitarian 
movement. To describe a chain linking Stanton at one end to 
Fourier at the other would be misleading. At the same time, 
communitarianism was an important source of radical thinking
"Stanton, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 266. 
"Stanton, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 267.
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during Stanton's formative years and was certainly a part of 
the universe of ideas out of which she constructed her own 
theories. What American communitarians culled from Fourier, 
and what feminists picked and chose from communitarian 
thought, is revealing both about the cultural conditions for 
the American reception of Fourier, and about where liberal 
feminists' hearts lay on the spectrum of social reformers.
Charles Fourier's social philosophy rested on a vision 
of gratified desire. At a time when most of the civilized 
world was retreating only slowly from a belief in human 
nature's native state of sin, Fourier's sympathy for the 
depth and mutability of human passions— for work, love, and 
everything in between— produced one of the most bizarre and 
humane utopian blueprints ever committed to paper.
Fourier's critique of existing institutions was damningly 
thorough, as reflected in his list of the 144 permanent 
vices, including slavery, the wage labor system, and 
hurricanes; his solutions were equally detailed, and equally 
grandiose.57 Not a Lockeian liberal, Fourier believed that 
individuals were neither malleable nor rational— no tabula
"Jonathan Beecher, Charles Fourier: The Visionary and 
His World (Berkeley, 1986), p. 197. This is the most 
comprehensive work on Fourier that will ever be written and 
is wonderfully readable. See also Beecher and Richard 
Bienvenu, eds., The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier 
(Boston, 1971).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
rasa— but were moved by fundamental instinctual drives or 
passions.5' He sought to liberate rather than to repress 
the passions, to provide an environment in which each could 
be gratified in its turn.
Fourier at cacked existing institutions on two main 
fronts: work and love. Harshly critical of the tedium of 
the new "wage slavery," his idea of "Attractive Labor" was 
at bottom a repudiation of the work-curse placed on Adam. 
Fourier reasoned that if humankind was given an appetite for 
the fruits of labor, it must have been given an appetite for 
production, as well, and he employed a variety of techniques 
in his phalanx to make labor varied and pleasurable for 
everyone.5*
The other main prong of Fourier's attack, the one which 
most concerns us here, was the assault on the isolated 
nuclear family. Fourier took the enlightened stance that 
"the extension of the privileges of woman is the fundamental 
cause of all social progress.It<0 Since he saw sexual 
passion as a quantity to be let loose rather than 
restrained, Christian marriage seemed a form of "conjugal
5,Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 220.
‘’Redelia Brisbane, Albert Brisbane: A Mental Biography
(Boston, 1893), p.180.
“Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 118.
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slavery," one of the repressive authoritarian forms which 
warped human experience. Marriage laws imposed a false 
constraint and permanency which ran counter to the human 
inclination to spontaneity and diversity; like commerce they 
produced deceitful and inefficient practices.*1 Fourier saw 
women as the primary victims of the existing social system- 
-"a piece of merchandise to be put up for sale to the 
highest bidder." He suggested that only the combination of 
economic and sexual independence— what he called the 
economic and the sexual minimums— which were guaranteed in 
the phalanx would restore women's dignity and status and the 
integrity of sexual relations in general.*2 The isolated 
household proved an indignity in labor terms as well: 
according to the communitarian critique the work of a single 
household sentenced women to domestic drudgery, an 
inefficient, piecemeal approach which could be improved 
through communalizing domestic labor.
In tune with popular economic principles of his day,
“Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 205; and chaps. 11 and
15.
“Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 173. Fourier's 
fascination with the corruption of sexual norms under 
capitalism led him to muse, for example, on the 49 varieties 
in the "Hierarchy of Cuckoldom," which included the "Warlike 
or Swaggering Cuckold," "the Supportive or Straw Man 
Cuckold," and "the Trumpeter Cuckold" (Beecher and 
Bienvenu, Utopian Vision, p. 183-85).
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Fourier believed that energies became distorted and 
destructive when regulated and repressed, but when allowed 
to run their course worked in beneficial harmony for both 
the individual and society; in fact, "the man who devotes 
himself most ardently to pleasure becomes eminently useful 
to the happiness of all."63 Although Fourier shared with 
Adam Smith and others a common belief in the invisible hand 
and the inefficacy of human regulation, his system went far 
beyond economic liberalism toward the creation of a new 
religious philosophy. In reaction against religious 
orthodoxy, Fourier wholly rejected the notion of original 
sin, celebrating a capacity for human happiness and a 
liberation from long-faced Calvinism which owed much to 
Enlightenment thought.” But there was a God in Fourier's 
universe, one who.had created humans with a capacity for joy 
and who had their best interests at heart. It was this 
God's divine plan Fourier saw behind the working social 
harmonies he envisioned. In this way, religion and economic 
liberalism were fused into an optimistic belief in the God- 
given power of individuals to produce, create, desire, and 
enjoy— a much more potent mix in a world still tied to
“Beecher and Bienvenu, Utopian Vision. Introduction. 
“Ibid.
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religious forms than a theory of economic deregulation 
standing on its own.”
In Fourier's utopia, the communaliNation of work and 
love were inextricable, critical elements of human 
liberation; in fact, Fourier at times hinted that the 
question of free love was actually "the most important 
branch of the theory of attraction.American students of 
Fourier, most notably Albert Brisbane his translator, 
largely ignored the call for sexual liberation, 
concentrating instead on the doctrine of Attractive Labor 
and the promise of a revolution in the wage labor system.*7 
Brisbane's patron was Stanton's opponent Horace Greeley, who 
opened the front page of his newspaper to Brisbane for a 
daily column on utopian associationism, and who actively 
rejected Fourier's vision of deregulated marriage. The 
Greeley-Brisbane associationists were bound to traditional 
forms of moral authority within the family. Brisbane
“Beecher, Charles Fourier, pp. 224-25.
“Beecher, Charles Fourier, p. 120.
“Beecher, Charles Fourier. Introduction; p. 297.
Brisbane's writings from the 1840s, the high water mark of 
Fourierism in the United States, dismiss the "social or 
Affective Passions" as too "vast and abstruse" a terrain to 
cover (the Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 2 [Nov. 4, 1843], pp. 25- 
26); he also admits that in speaking publicly he never 
broached Fourier's critique of traditional marriage (Redelia 
Brisbane, Albert Brisbane, p. 210.)
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suggested that while the nuclear household was badly 
organized, marriage itself was an eternal type, for it and 
the family "exist in the moral nature of man."** Marriage, 
like commerce, like religion, would be preserved in its true 
form once institutional distortions were removed, although 
individualized labor and not monogamy itself was the 
distortion in question for both Brisbane and Greeley.
Brisbane, no fan of organized religion, still hungered 
for a spiritual system to replace the one lost, and felt 
that the invisible hand was sure to have a God attached to 
it somewhere. His quest for a comprehensive social system 
was millennial in its belief that "'The Kingdom of Heaven' 
was to come to us in this terrestrial world by the 
establishment of a true Social Order."** A perpetual 
tension between the individual and the group plagued 
American associationists; but in Brisbane's vision it was 
held in check by the idea that selfless Christian 3 eve was
“Albert Brisbane, A Concise Exposition of the Doctrine 
of Association (8th ed., New York, 1844).
“Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 1 (Oct. 5, 1843), pp. 8-9. Some 
reader of the Concise Exposition agreed with Brisbane, and 
left a marginal note in a nineteenth-century hand reading 
"all this can be realized only in the coming Kingdom of God 
same is not of this age over which Satan has a 
Principality..." (Brisbane, Concise Exposition, p. 19 of the 
copy in Firestone Library's rare book room, Princeton 
University.)
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the basis of the spiritual attraction which led to 
association, love which "leads (associationists) to identify 
others' interests with their own— to bear one another's 
burdens— to feel the wrongs of others as their wrongs, and 
to seek the good of others as they seek their own good."70
By contrast Stephen Pearl Andrews, although he was also 
engaged in a search for the underlying harmonious principle, 
refused to look to Christianity as a model. His major 
treatise, The Science of Society, proclaimed itself as 
dealing "in no vague aspirations after 'the good time 
coming' ... (it) will propound definite principles which 
demand to be regarded as having all the validity of 
scientific truths."71 Andrews' theology too renounced the 
Calvinist assumption that human nature is sinful, and 
celebrated free love over monogamy, private property over 
communal ownership, and individualism over groupness, in 
sharp contrast to Brisbane. One commentator calls Andrews' 
theories "The Theology of Man."72
Andrews was torn throughout his life between his
70Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 1 (Oct. 5, 1843), p. 14.
71Stephen Pearl Andrews, The Science of Society (2 
vols., 1851, reprint, Boston, 1888), p. 6.
72Charles Shively, "The Thought of Stephen Pearl 
Andrews (1812-1886)," University of Wisconsin, M.A. thesis, 
1960.
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attraction to Fourier's system and to the more 
individualistic associational principles of Josiah Warren, 
whom one biographer calls "the chief
architect of libertarianism."13 Warren's creed was marked 
by an intense dedication to the rights of the individual. 
Though an associationist— he and Andrews co-founded a 
utopian community, Modern Times, on Long Island— Warren 
believed fervently in private property and in the right of 
the individual to be free of any compulsion whatever.74 
Although Warren saw the principle of association as a way of 
addressing inequalities, the right to dissociate was as 
important to him as the right to associate.75 Warren's 
community was built on the complete separation and autonomy 
of each individual— "each being 'the law unto himself.'"76
Andrews enthusiastically adopted the doctrine of 
individual sovereignty, interpreting the thrust of Fourier's
73Writers on Andrews conflict over whether he made a 
straight-line progression from Fourier's thought to 
Warren's, or wavered back and forth. See Shively, "Thought 
of Stephen Pearl Andrews;" and James Martin, Men Aoainst the 
State (DeKalb, 111, 1953).
74William Reichert, Partisans of Freedom: A Study of 
American Anarchism (Bowling Green, Ohio, 1976), sect. 2, 
chap. 1.
75Martin, Men Aoainst the State, p. 39.
76Josiah Warren, Equitable Commerce (1849), p. 18, 
quoted in Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl Andrews," p. 3. 
Stanton had a strong affinity for this phrase, as well.
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doctrine of the affections as a guarantee that each person 
could choose his own destiny and therefore "'be a law unto 
himself.'1,77 For Andrews, the freedom of the individual is 
the logical result of the three great movements in history: 
the Protestant Reformation, which made the individual 
conscience paramount; the American Revolution, which 
established the individual's political sovereignty; and his 
own movement, "socialism," which would ensure personal 
sovereignty as well.7' In its most extreme formulation, 
Andrews declared, "the essential condition of freedom is 
disconnection— individuation— disintegration of 
interests."7* Ultimately, only the individual can be the 
judge of his or her own actions, in the political as in the 
personal sphere: "I claim individually to be my own nation,
I take this opportunity to declare my National Identity, and 
to notify all other potentates, that they may respect my 
sovereignty. I may have to fight to establish my claim, but
^Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 9-11.
7*See Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl Andrews," pp. 
13-14; Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 9-10. Note 
the similarity to Stanton's thought here, although her 
trinity would probably have been composed of the 
Reformation, the Revolution, and the woman's movement.
7*Quoted in Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl 
Andrews," p. 47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
191
... sooner or later I will come to the recognition of it."10
But here, too, Andrews' vision followed Fourier's. 
Although the individual was the highest unit of social and 
political life, Andrews did not see public life as millions 
of "monads" in conflict, but as monads working together in 
the harmony produced when each obeyed the law of its own 
attractions. "Objects bound together contrary to their 
nature, must and will seek to rectify themselves by breaking 
the bonds which confine them, while those which come 
together by their own affinities remain quiescent and 
content."81 Andrews, then, did not jettison the good of the 
group entirely; he supported "cooperation" rather than 
"combination" or "amalgamation," defining cooperation as 
when "each, in pursuing his own pleasure or benefit, 
contributes incidentally to the pleasure or benefit of 
others. "*2
'“Quoted in Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl
Andrews," p. 44. Andrews was not completely without concern
for consequences; he claimed that each individual was 
sovereign as long as he could assume the consequences of his 
actions— which Andrews labels "costs"— by himself and not 
turn them into moral or economic externalities, the burden 
to be born by others (Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, 
p. 36).
"Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 15, 23; see 
also Reichert, Partisans of Freedom, p. 85.
“Quoted in Shively, "Thought of Stephen Pearl
Andrews," p. 47.
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Andrews admits the paradox of "socialism"— that the 
individual in exercising his own sovereignty may throw the 
burden of his actions on others, and that the attempt to 
function as a community may infringe on the individual as 
well. Sometimes self-sacrifice and the compromise of 
individual rights was necessary; for this reason, 
communities may need governments as an interim measure.”
But still protesting that "dependence and close connections" 
are the roots of despotism, as disconnection is the root of 
freedom, he condemned communities like the Shakers and the 
Rappites as based on "religious submission ... to despotic 
rule." Andrews was ultimately willing to abandon society in 
favor of the individual, on the theory that socialism itself 
can become a form of tyranny; its form, he admitted, might 
be antagonistic to the ends of human freedom.” This 
commitment to individualism raised a thorny internal 
contradiction within Andrew's communitarian scheme, and 
proved a bone of contention between him and more traditional
“Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, p. 7, p. 37.
“Andrews, Science of Society, vol. 1, pp. 37, 11. 
Andrews does distinguish between the "natural" connection 
between the mother and child which is not destructive, and 
the artificial connections of adults, which are (ibid., p. 
37) .
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associationists like Brisbane and Greeley.'*
Yet despite disagreement over the liberating power of 
individualism and sexuality in restructuring human 
relations, Fourier, Warren, Brisbane, and Andrews shared an 
enthusiastic support for woman's rights and a critique of 
the isolated household as a work unit. An article in the 
Phalanx in 1843 included "Domestic Service" in the list of 
"Servitudes to be abolished," labeling it a branch of the 
system of hired labor which created its own class, one 
composed largely of housewives." Thus, these male utopian 
socialists recognized early that the gendered division of 
labor characteristic of industrial society created a sex- 
class— what Brisbane called a "low sphere of action." 
Brisbane in his later writing was increasingly explicit 
about the need to turn households into cooperative 
arrangements, collectivizing domestic labor and child care 
both. These arrangements would leave the monogamous family 
intact and would allow women a large measure of autonomy
"American socialism in the second half of the 
nineteenth century was in general more anarchistic, more 
oriented toward the individual than its European 
counterpart, which tended more toward a state socialism. 
Charles Fourier himself attacked the liberal conception of 
"personal freedom" as it evolved in America as empty and 
formalistic, without the surrounding communitarian structure 
(Martin, Men Against the State, pp. 5-6).
"Phalanx, vol. 1 no. 2 (Nov. 4, 1843), p. 17.
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over their own households; particularly in child-rearing, 
where mothers could exercise as much or as little direct 
supervision as they chose, leaving tne rest to nurses called 
"collective mothers." He believed that only when isolated 
drudgery was abolished— and similar suggestions were made by 
the other associationists— would women be able to elevate 
themselves from a condition of "domestic servitude."*7 In 
the minds of communitarians, conditions of material 
inequality far outstripped conditions of civil equality in 
importance: Andrews states categorically that while "woman 
herself is confiscated," her right to own property or vote 
would be of minimal value.**
Despite associationists' support for woman's rights and 
the fact that they shared a core of reform and feminist 
sympathies with suffragists, many in the woman's movement 
viewed the associationists with suspicion and hostility; 
associationist ideas were only incorporated in feminist 
theory in a partial and roundabout way. Perhaps 
understandably, when so few of the women involved in
*7Albert Brisbane, The Theory of the Functions of the 
Human Passions (New York 1856), pp. 141 ff.
''Stephen Pearl Andrews, "Love, Marriage, and the 
Condition of Woman," published in Love. Marriage, and 
Divorce, and the Sovereignty of the Individual. Charles 
Shively, ed. (Weston, Mass., 1975),p. 11, pp. 34 ff.
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organized suffragism worked at industrial jobs, the issue of 
"attractive labor" did not draw a crowd; to the extent that 
women reformers were concerned in this period with labor 
issues it was with working women, and expressed itself more 
in immediate concern over wages, hours, and working 
conditions. The suffrage literature gave little or no space 
to labor reforms proposed by Brisbane, Warren, or Andrews.
In addition, the utopian community offered women a
mixed bag of restraints and opportunities.” Housework
collectivities and the destruction of gendered work
categories found in communities like Oneida appealed to many
women seeking to escape from the rigid separation of
domestic and public work. The first generation of liberal
feminists did not glorify domestic work as more home-
centered women did, and often complained of the toll such
drudgery took on women's health. Stanton, again in the
forefront, lashed out at the
immense amount of nonsense talked about the 
isolated home ... for a poor farmer with wife 
and child in the solitude of a prairie home, 
a cooperative household with society would be
”Paul Johnson and Sean wilentz, "The Kingdom of 
Matthias: Sex and Salvation in Jacksonian New York." Paper 
delivered at the Charles Warren Center, Harvard University, 
November, 1983; Elizabeth B. Clark, "Women and Religion in 
America, 1780-1870," in John F. Wilson, ed., Church and 
State in America, vol. 1 (Westport, Conn., 1986), pp. 374- 
377.
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inestimable blessing. Woman's work can never 
be properly organized in the isolated home.90
Stanton on several occasions voiced admiration for Fourier's
arrangement of communalized domestic chores.91
But despite the attractions of communalism, most 
feminists still found the idea of running their own families 
too attractive and too much a part of their cultural 
heritage to completely relinquish. The destruction of the 
nuclear household was never an articulated goal of the 
woman's movement (although Stanton occasionally hinted 
darkly that it would be changed beyond recognition), and 
relatively few women in the immediate post-Civil War period 
even broached the subject of household collectives.92 
Feminists well understood the problem of the isolated 
household, but did not accept the communitarian solutions, 
perhaps as giving up too much.93
"Stanton, Letters, p. 346.
91For example, in Eighty Years, p. 147. Reversing the 
worst fears of 1960s parents, Victoria Woodhull suggests 
that sexual freedom will ultimately lead to cooperative 
households ("Tried as By Fire; of the True and the False 
Socially" [1874], p. 44).
920n the general subject of domestic collectivization 
see Dolores Hayden, The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History 
of Feminist Designs for American Homes. Neighborhoods, and 
Cities (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).
”The second generation in the Oneida community saw a 
revolt by women pressing for a return of many functions of 
domestic work and child rearing to the nuclear family, as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
197
In addition, in the minds of many, communitarians were 
tarred with the "free love" brush. Liberalization of 
divorce laws remained controversial in the suffrage movement 
until the next century, in part because of the (realistic) 
fear that association with radical social positions could 
taint the suffrage cause. Free love posed this problem in 
spades; and genuinely shocked many ladies' sensibilities to 
boot. Although careful to distance themselves from the free 
lovers, the NWSA platform reflected a willingness to link 
issues of personal and political freedom together, and a 
commitment to women's autonomy in their personal lives which 
took much— in part through Stanton's mediation— from the 
utopian socialist commitment to bodily autonomy.*4 Self­
way of strengthening their power base. See Louis J. Kern, 
"Ideology and Reality: Sexuality and Women's Status in the 
Oneida Community," Radical History Review, vol. 20 (1979), 
pp. 180-204. Other than her distaste for housework, it's 
not clear that Stanton ever felt any strongly communitarian 
urges; evidence in fact points in the other direction.
*4The disagreement on that score came from the Boston- 
based AWSA, whom Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly accused of 
deliberately ignoring women's social wrongs to pursue the 
limited ends of the ballot and financial equality; as the 
Weekly said, "taxation without representation merely has a 
hollow sound." Woodhull's position as an outlier— and 
reputation as a loose cannon— allowed her to express herself 
more freely on the subject of the "Boston ladies" than 
Stanton was able to do in politic fashion, but it is easy to 
imagine Stanton savoring Woodhull's charge that the Stone- 
Blackwell group heaped scorn on free lovers and others "who 
choose to walk in their own way rather than to be led by the 
immaculate Athenians." The Bostonians, Woodhull suspected,
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ownership was a hard nut for the rank and file of the NWSA 
to crack at first, harder for many than suffrage. By the 
mid-1870s, though, the issues of prostitution and the double 
standard, marital abuse, and voluntary motherhood were
found "all the acts necessary to 
reproduce...constitutionally and inherently 
disgusting.Woodhull (this article is unattributed but I 
believe she wrote it) goes on to suggest helpfully that 
perhaps the Boston ladies do not trust themselves and need 
to have a code of laws "restraining any lustful sheeps-eyes 
glances...toward their friends of the masculine gender."
See Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol. 3 no. 25 (Nov. 4, 
1871), pp. 10 ff.
Woodhull's broadside was perhaps a response to a 
resolution from an earlier meeting of the American Equal 
Rights Association— or at least to the attitude behind it—  
repudiating the free love movement, introduced by Henry 
Blackwell and supported by Mary Livermore and Lucy Stone, 
all key members of the Boston AWSA (see History of Woman 
Suffrage, vol. 2, p. 389). Victoria Woodhull's fitful 
relations with the NWSA are recounted in Johanna Johnston's 
Mrs. Satan (New York, 1967); DuBois, Elizabeth Cady Stanton. 
Susan B. Anthony; and Griffith, In Her Own Right. Woodhull 
was briefly a hero of the movement following her successful 
1871 speech to Congress, and many people adopted the 
strategy she outlined there. When Woodhull's part in the 
Beecher-Tilton scandal became known, however, even her 
partisans felt some pressing need to get in line with the 
rest of the immaculate Athenians, and she was dropped from 
the NWSA roster. Woodhull's presence on the platform never 
signalled any acceptance of her free love views by the rank 
and file; her "new departure" strategy was largely free of 
such rhetoric, although the strategy itself— that women 
already had the vote as a matter of prior right and 
constitutional entitlement through the fourteenth and 
fifteenth amendments— was grounded in the same theory of 
natural rights as her philosophy of sexual freedom; see 
DuBois, Stanton and Anthony, pp. 101-107.
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openly discussed and added to the organization's agenda."
In no small part due to the influence of Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, woman's "natural right" to her body had become a 
pillar of mainstream liberal feminist thought.
The Natural Roots of Natural Rights
In a tract published in 1894 Stanton most clearly
spells out her philosophy of natural rights.
We argue the rights of persons from their 
necessities. To breathe, sleep, walk, eat, 
and drink, are natural rights, necessary to 
physical development. So the right to think, 
express one's opinion, mould public 
sentiment, to choose one's conditions and 
environments, are necessities for psychical 
development ... in the study of human beings, 
we see their wants and needs, their 
capacities and powers and from their 
manifestations, we argue their natural 
rights.9*
Commentators have long pinpointed natural rights as a 
cornerstone of liberal feminist philosophy, using the phrase 
as shorthand for the set of claims and principles adopted by 
the Founding Fathers, equality foremost among them.97 In 
fact— as the quotation from "Suffrage a Natural Right" shows
“DuBois, Stanton and Anthony, p. 97; Leach, True Love 
and Perfect Union, pp. 85 ff.
"Stanton, "Suffrage a Natural Right," pp. 6-7.
97See Kraditor, Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 
and DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage.
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quite clearly— Stanton and other liberal feminists' 
expression of natural rights philosophy, although it employs 
the same vocabulary, departs sharpiy from the male 
eighteenth-century revolutionary tradition. Unlike the 
Founding Fathers, Stanton saw freedom of physical movement, 
autonomy, as the root natural right. Revolutionary 
philosophy did not deny self-ownership; on the contrary, it 
was in many ways a given, since rights were being sought for 
white men of clearly independent position, whose status as 
self-owning was not challenged and not at issue. Because 
there had not been any significant group of unfree white 
laborers, the issue of universal male suffrage in the early 
nineteenth century did not raise the question of self­
ownership in the same way it was raised by later efforts to 
enfranchise women and black Americans.
The philosophy of universal male suffrage laid down few 
requirements for citizenship. Nonetheless, a vestigial 
notion of "citizen” still centered around attributes 
commonly associated with citizenship which in practice most 
women and blacks could not share— autonomy, ownership of 
property, education, participation in the public sphere. In 
fact, across the spectrum of potential voters from the ex­
field slave to the lady Athenians of Boston, their common 
humanity lay in tenanting a human body; and it was around
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this common chord that much of Stanton's natural rights 
argument was built.
From the earliest days of the movement, women stressed 
rights as rooted in physical autonomy. This is shown by a 
comparison of the grievances enumerated in the Declaration 
of Independence and those in the Declaration of Sentiments 
penned at the first woman's rights meeting at Seneca Falls 
and modelled on the earlier document.” Eighteenth-century 
American revolutionaries protested "slavery," but it was not 
the slavery of physical abuse, marital rape, or forced 
labor.” Many of the Declaration's eighteen counts against 
George III complained of the colonists' inability to 
participate in government and public life, or the imposition 
of harsh measures without participation or representation. 
Their natural rights tradition posited an overarching set of 
principles guaranteeing rights which could largely be 
described as civil rights, insuring consent to government on 
issues such as representation and taxation, and protection 
from arbitrary legal and political power. The rights of 
individuals were indeed paramount; but the personality
”Historv of Woman Suffrage, vol. 1, pp. 70-71.
**For the claims of American revolutionaries see 
Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).
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constructed was largely a civil personality, the needs 
largely civil needs.
Rights for Stanton did not originate in some conception 
of the civic individual, but in the inviolate body. The 
Declaration of Sentiments, in which Stanton played the part 
of Thomas Jefferson, laid out eighteen grievances of its 
own; many were directed at the procurement of women's civil 
rights, such as the right to vote and own property. But 
others explicitly attacked men's "absolute tyranny"— which 
made woman the slave of her husband and allowed him to 
imprison and chastise her; which formulated the double 
standard of sexual conduct so denigrating to women; and 
which framed the laws of divorce so as to effectively deny 
women escape from a bad or violent marriage. Yet another 
area of discontent, unthinkable in the eighteenth-century 
original, was that man "has usurped the power of Jehovah 
himself" in assigning woman a sphere of action, deliberately 
stunting her education and full development.
Not content simply to rectify woman's place in the 
public sphere, the founding mothers aimed to reconstruct 
woman's view of herself and her most intimate relations, as 
a necessary preliminary to revamping her public personality. 
From Seneca Falls onward, feminist natural rights theory 
looked to human behavior and needs, the physical patterns of
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life, to determine what "natural" or God-ordained laws 
were.100 It became a commonplace in the movement to refer to 
human rights as based on "natural necessity."101 Early on 
Stanton refuted altogether the positivist school of rights 
thinking when she complained that "Mr. Higginson belongs to 
the Jeremy Bentham school that law makes right. I am a 
discipline of the new philosophy that man's wants make his 
rights."102 Natural rights philosophy as she constructed it 
did indeed spring from and was closely identified with 
physical needs; although it resulted in meaningful claims 
for civil rights as well, civil rights for Stanton served
100The fact that women modeled the Declaration of 
Sentiments so closely on the Declaration of Independence—  
its language is virtually identical except for the specifics 
of the charges themselves— is often cited as evidence that 
women followed closely in the founding traditions.
Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery etc., but to 
indict men in exactly the same terms in which they indicted 
the tyrant George III seems a back-handed compliment, as 
well as an acknowledgment of the power of the argument.
101Belva Lockwood, "The Right of Women to Vote, 
Guaranteed by the Constitution..." (Washington, 1871); 
reprinted in Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly, vol. 2 no. IS 
(Feb. 25, 1871), p. 1. For similar language see also 
Stanton's speech in Proceedings of the First Anniversary of 
the Equal Rights Association (New York, 1867), p. 8 
(suffrage as necessary to protection of person and property 
"as are air and motion to life; women and blacks "not 
outside human laws and necessities.") See also Chap. I for 
the antebellum origins of this line of thought within 
American feminism.
102Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony, July 4, 1858, 
Stanton Papers, Douglass College Library.
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ultimately to protect the individual's safety.103
In Stanton's view, all rights sprang from the fact of 
self-ownership. She was convinced that for both the woman 
and the slave, civil rights such as the rights to vote and 
to own property would be worthless until "the great idea of 
his right to himself, of his personal dignity ... take(s) 
possession of his soul.”104 As Woodhull claimed, "a 
statement of woman's rights which ignores the right of self­
ownership as the first of all rights is insufficient to meet 
the demand."1” "The rights of the individual and the 
citizen have the same origin and their public and private 
interests demand the same protection. Individual freedom 
and self-government, citizenship and suffrage, are 
synonymous."10* Stanton fused the personal and the political 
in a way which expanded the concept and scope of citizenship 
considerably, while at the same time stressing personal 
growth and freedom as the basis and end of those rights.
103Supra, pp. 20-22.
104Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony, July 20, 1857; 
and letter to Lucy Stone, Nov. 24, 1856, Stanton Papers, 
Douglass College Library.
U5This is from Victoria Woodhull's "Principles of 
Social Freedom," p. 5, where she also said that "the woman's 
movement means no less the complete social as well as the 
political enfranchisement of mankind."
106Stanton, "Suffrage a Natural Right," p. 8.
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The Founders would have agreed with her that the rights of 
governments flow from the rights of individuals; but would 
not have gone on to add that the individual has the duty to 
resist whatever restricts his personal growth in preference 
to all "constitutions, creed, and codes."101
At the same time, predicating rights on the most 
elemental needs also posits a kind of equitable allotment, 
or at least heads off substantial inequity. In her address 
to the constitutional convention of New York in 1867 Stanton 
claims for each individual the "right to everything on earth 
and air, on land and sea ... to all that is needful for body 
and soul, and there is no limit to the exercise of your 
rights but in the infringement of the rights of another 
..."10* Here, and throughout her work, Stanton shows the 
influence of liberal thought in her belief that the widest 
scope of freedom to consume, act, enjoy was possible for all 
individuals, and that no conflicts between the needs of 
individuals would arise.10’ "Infringement" in Stanton's 
terms was the classic legal punch in the nose, and could not
167Stanton, Revolution, vol. 1 no. 21 (May 28, 1868), p.
361.
10,Stanton, "Address in Favor of Universal Suffrage" 
(Albany, 1867), p. 13.
10*For example, Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 231; DuBois, 
Stanton and Anthony, p. 129.
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early liberal optimism that unfettered human energy could 
produce limitless amounts, the problem of redistribution, or 
the conflict of rights between individuals, rarely arose in 
Stanton's thinking.
This definition of natural rights as rooted in the
safety and well being of the body makes sense of the idea of
civil rights as defensive weapons. The ballot signified
"bread, education, self-protection, self-reliance, and self-
respect; to the wife it means the control of her own person,
property, and earnings Such a definition also
theoretically does away with the idea of qualified suffrage,
life itself and the instinct of self-preservation being the
only qualification. Isabella Beecher Hooker in a speech to
Congress eloquently claimed her right to vote although
I may have been born with less capacity than 
the least among you, with small chance of 
growing to your mental stature, or reaching 
your standard of moral elevation; but I have 
a perfect right to sit in your midst, pygmy 
that I may be ...111
ll0Resolution passed, recorded in Proceeding.. .Equal 
Rights Association, p. 52.
m Mernorial of Elizabeth Cadv Stanton...to the Congress 
of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1872). Although 
this position represented the moral high ground, in fact 
liberals were a little wishy-washy on suffrage 
qualifications. Women often reiterated the argument, a 
staple of Sumner's theory, that unacceptable qualifications
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Women demanded that nthe qualifications which a state may 
require of electors must be such as can be acquired by all 
persons by the same means."m
The nineteenth-century liberal feminist natural rights 
tradition transfigured its eighteenth-century parent. The 
earlier tradition rooted its theory of natural rights in the 
civil self. By focusing political demands on the right to 
vote, represent, and to legislate— to be independent in the 
political sphere— it automatically defined rights in such a 
way as to exclude women, who did not inhabit that world. In 
feminist eyes, natural rights derived from natural laws, and 
from the physical conditions of life common to pygmies and
could be distinguished by their immutability; i.e., youth 
and insanity could be overcome, but sex and race never could 
be, leaving the door open to some restrictions. In fact, 
Stanton went back and forth on the question of educational 
qualifications for suffrage, and often expressed her 
feelings about ignorant foreign-born rabble by supporting 
such a conditional suffrage; see "Educated Suffrage," The 
Independent. Feb. 14, 1895, Stanton Papers, Library of 
Congress, reel 2. On the basis of Stanton's original claims 
to self-ownership, however, it is difficult to make the 
argument that any sentient being of any age or condition can 
be denied the vote; and in fact the basis of the regulatory 
authority over children and other dependents have sometimes 
proven difficult or impossible for courts to uphold in the 
years since.
luVictoria Woodhull, "A Lecture on Constitutional 
Equality" (New York, 1871), p. 23.
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giants alike.113 Those who could claim to own nothing but 
their souls were rich in natural rights.
The Antinomian State
Elizabeth Cady Stanton's extreme individualist 
orientation made it very difficult for her at any stage in 
her career to develop a substantive theory of the state, or 
a theory of class action within the state. Her religious 
and political antinomianism were inseparable, as expressed 
by one of her favorite phrases, "a law unto herself." Both 
depended on the ideal of the individual consulting his or 
her own conscience in rigorous Protestant, "republican" 
fashion for the final ruling on the law.114 Chapter II 
showed Stanton's hostility to law within the family setting, 
but concern for the individual's privacy was only one part 
of her disaffection with legal means. Stanton felt strongly 
that in any setting, public or private, the imposition of
113The revolutionary natural rights tradition itself 
was a departure from the medieval natural laws tradition as 
taught by Thomas Aquinas and others, which looked to the 
habits of physical life to determine natural laws.
114Stanton used the term "republican" often and 
approvingly; republican as she defined it had nothing to do 
with common good but was synonymous with "self-governing."
As such, she felt she was moving the country in the 
direction of a true republic by endorsing individualism, and 
would have been horrified at the recent academic 
construction of republicanism.
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external norms was doomed to fail, a belief she shared with 
Fourier and his followers.
One commentator, writing in the Revolution about 
marriage, suggests that "the morality which consists in 
doing no harm ... can be enforced by external restraints, 
(but) is essentially different from the morality which 
consists in loving God, and which is acquired by faith and 
prayer alone."us These two categories approximated 
Stanton's division of tasks performed by the state and by 
the individual: the state could be entrusted to do a small 
number of things in a limited way under strict scrutiny, 
usually negative rather than positive action; while all that 
was creative, vital, loving, constructive could only be 
undertaken through the free will of the individual. 
Ultimately the state (as represented in the pedestrian 
bureaucrat, Recorder Hackett) will wither away, and humans 
will be fully self-regulating.11*
Such skepticism about positive law's capacity had 
several sources, and it was particularly acute in liberal 
reform circles. Divine authority still always trumped human 
authority. Conservatives like Greeley were willing to
^ Revolution, vol. 3 no. 8 (Feb. 25, 1869) .
u*Stanton, "On Labor and Free Love," p. 266.
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dishonor human law if it conflicted with the overriding 
authority of God's laws on the permanence of marriage; 
Stanton argued divine jurisdiction to refute the 
legislature's authority to enact restrictive marriage laws.
A variation on this theme was the ease with which reformers/ 
particularly these influenced by abolitionism, interpreted 
the exercise of human authority as illegitimate and 
corrupt.117 Finally, the influence of Fourierism, bolstered 
with arguments from liberal economic theory, combined with 
liberal Protestantism's continuing strong belief in natural 
laws of divine origin to create a widespread confidence in 
an all-encompassing system, not the invention of mankind but 
"deduced from and based upon universal Principles, (which) 
is the application to the social relations of mankind of the 
laws of Order and Unity which govern the Universe.1,110 
Stanton was a true believer in a universal set of laws, 
"immutable in the moral as in the material world" that
117For the antebellum roots of this attitude in 
abolitionism see Lewis Perry, Radical Abolitionism; and 
Chap. I.
U0Brisbane, Concise Exposition, p. 3. See also 
Shively, introduction to Andrews' "Love, Marriage, and 
Divorce;" and Arthur Bestor, "Albert Brisbane: Propagandist 
for Socialism in the 1840s," New York History, vol. 28 no.
2, pp. 128-158. Victoria Woodhull urges faith in the "self­
regulating efficacy of freedom" ("Principles of Social 
Freedom," p. 40).
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governed individuals by themselves and also in their social 
relations; one infringement could "breed disorder and 
confusion in the whole social system.119
One of the most important tenets of the day, with 
implications for public attitudes toward the legal system, 
was that the activation of this self-regulating system 
"proceeded by the liberation of inner resources rather than 
the imposition of external forms."120 In their universal 
belief in a grand social order regulated by natural laws 
lately come from the presence of God, most reformers 
repudiated the idea that human laws, acting from without, 
could mold or coerce human behavior. Andrews spoke for many 
in his assertion that "marriage is a contrivance to regulate 
nature instead of studying her laws," and that "order, 
combining with freedom and ultimately in harmony, is to be 
the work of science, and not of arbitrary legislation and 
criminal codes."121 Stanton stressed that the task was not
U9Stanton, "The Pleasures of Age: An Address Delivered 
by Elizabeth Cady Stanton on her Seventieth Birthday" (n.p., 
n.d.); and "Address in Favor of Universal Suffrage," p. 13. 
Needless to say, Recorder Hackett was not the Author of 
these laws.
^Howard Feinstein, Becoming William James (Ithaca, 
1984), p. 83.
121Andrews, "Love, Marriage, and Divorce," p. 49. Many 
of these attitudes sound more like pre-Civil War anti­
institutionalism of the kind George Frederickson writes
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to rule others, but the much more difficult one of ruling 
oneself; and that it was the duty of women to own and 
control themselves through government, not others.122
Such attitudes toward regulation proved a shifting 
foundation on which to build any theory of the state. In 
their dislike of the state, liberal feminists had many plans 
for hobbling it. Its limited functions were defined 
primarily as the protection of the weak and the protection 
of personal rights; Woodhull was emphatic that any enacted 
law which contradicted those purposes was not binding, and 
unconstitutional as well.123
about in The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the 
Crisis of the Union (New York, 1968) than his description of 
post-war life. The generation of reformers I am concerned 
with here came of intellectual age in antebellum America and 
never lost the turn of mind they acquired then.
122Stanton, "Self Government" (1874), Stanton Papers, 
Library of Congress, reel 3; and the Revolution, vol. 1 no.
5 (Feb. 5, 1868), p. 69.
U3Woodhull, "Principles of Social Freedom," p. 8. See
also Revolution, vol. 2 no. 11 (Sept. 17, 1868), p. 169,
which suggests that the proper role of government is not to 
protect the weak, but to provide them with the means whereby 
they can protect themselves. In 1894, Stanton made a strong 
push for leaving family regulation to the state, so that "we
can judge of the working of different laws under varying
circumstances, and thus learn their comparative merits." 
Actually it was an attempt to stave off a proposed national 
anti-divorce bill then riding a wave of popularity.
Stanton, Eighty Years, p. 228.
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Paradoxically, though, the NWSA had based its agenda on a 
program of national suffrage, rather than on a state by 
state basis. Stanton's fear and dislike of the state were 
greater than most of her colleagues in the NWSA. Perhaps 
the more common attitude toward the state was represented by 
Matilda Gage, who believed that the centralization of 
government in the United States had marked an increase 
rather than a decrease in liberty, and found the idea that 
states had jurisdiction to define the individual's natural 
rights to be dangerous.124 Theory aside, Stanton and Gage 
had a political movement to run, and operated on the 
strategic hope that centralized government cpuld protect 
women's rights. Both women see-sawed between anti-statism 
and hope for a woman suffrage amendment, Stanton coming down 
more often on the anti-statist side.
One area where Stanton fought in a sense to augment the 
jurisdiction of the state was family relations. In 
destroying the basis of private authority, Stanton thrust 
sexual and family matters into the public sphere, one which 
included both men and women. She was emphatic that cases of
124"Arguments on Behalf of...A Sixteenth 
Amendment...1880" (n.p., n.d.), p. 10. Gage suggests here 
that questions such as placement of cemeteries and bridges 
should be left solely to local powers; in such matters women 
"believe in the diffusion of the power of government" and 
seek a return of control to local institutions.
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infanticide and sexual misconduct brought against women 
should be tried by a jury of female peers; and that abuse 
within the family should be brought out from behind the 
shield of the single-family household and into open court. 
Dwelling on the details of one pathetic infanticide— unwed 
pregnancy/ desertion, prolonged puerperal fever— Stanton 
over and over presented the details of women's physical 
lives to public forums, as she also did repeatedly with her 
lyceum lectures on marriage and divorce and on motherhood as 
well.125 Oppression flourished within an atmosphere of 
secrecy, privacy, closed doors; the body itself and all its 
workings must be revealed, and removed from the confining 
influences of the church and family.12*
At the same time, Stanton mapped out the sphere of 
personal life in public only to label it private; and sought 
to enforce privacy rights for individual behavior while 
destroying the privacy of the home. Self-ownership's 
essential characteristic was that the individual served as 
the sole judge of his own needs— "a man's wants make his
125Revolution, vol. 2 no. 23 (Dec. 10, 1868), pp. 358, 
360; vol. 2 no. 25 (Dec. 24, 1868), p. 393.
l2*See Leach, True Love and Perfect Union: and John 
Cowan, Science of a New Life (1874; reprint, New York, 
1970) .
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rights.1,127 Clearly rights based on such a criterion— one 
which exalts the subjective judgment of the wanter over any 
external decision making process— sets a standard which is 
unreviewable by any outsider or institutional authority.12' 
Because so much of politics for Stanton consisted of issues 
of individual autonomy, huge areas of decision making fell 
into the preserve of individual sovereignty. Stanton sought 
to label much behavior "private" or "personal" in a way 
which defined it as outside the regulatory sphere, and only 
within the competence of the individual. Such a subjective 
standard— literally "my body, my right"— is open to 
unilateral change at any time, with no basis for discussion 
or dispute.12'
“7Stanton, letter to Susan B. Anthony, July 14, 1858, 
Stanton Papers, Douglass College.
“'See fn. 35 supra.
12'ln the arguments in front of the Supreme Court in the 
Webster abortion-rights case in April, 1989, the attorney 
for the plaintiffs was quoted as saying "the conclusion...is 
when you have an issue so divisive and so emotional and so 
personal and so intimate, that it must be left as a 
fundamental right to an individual to make that choice" (New 
York Times, April 27, 1989). This conclusion is striking 
both because it is such a complete reversal of eighteenth- 
century thought, where a decision "so emotional and so 
personal" would have been described as "so moral and so 
religious" and exactly for that reason subject to regulation 
of some kind; and because it seems a direct descendent of 
the argument Stanton set up initially, that sexual and 
family matters were "personal" and not moral, and therefore 
impervious to public scrutiny.
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The dualism of radical associationism stuck with 
Stanton all her life— no half measures, one was white or 
black, slave or free, a slave of government or an individual 
sovereign. Because her final question was always whether 
the individual was paramount it was very difficult for 
Stanton to develop any workable theory of a public interest, 
or any positive theory of the state.”0 Stanton may not have 
fully foreseen the consequences of her theory of the dwarf 
state, or adequately considered the question of whether in 
fact a central government was a necessary partner in 
ensuring women's equality.
The vision of citizenship and suffrage Stanton put
forward was as impoverished as her view of the state.
Stanton's articulated definition of the ballot was extremely
narrow, almost never going beyond its protective function.
This is citizenship in a republic. The 
natural right to life, liberty, and happiness 
... the right to protect one's perron and 
property; to govern one's self; to have a 
voice in the law and rulers; to enjoy all the 
advantages and opportunities of which one is 
capable.131
130Stanton calls the idea that the interests of society 
are paramount to those of the individual the "Roman idea, 
the Pagan idea that the individual was made for the state" 
(Eighty Years, p. 231.)
131Stanton, "Women Do Not Wish to Vote," National 
Bulletin, vol. 2 no. 3 (April, 1894), in Stanton Papers, 
Library of Congress, reel 2.
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This position is in many ways a retreat from antebellum 
feminism, which fully subscribed to political rights as 
enhancing the development of the individual, but tied them 
also to the performance of duties and the provision of goods 
and services for all.132 The vote for antebellum feminists 
was tied into a web of relationships often described in the 
phrase "rights and duties." Stanton categorically rejected 
conditioning one's rights on one duties, or on anything but 
self-ownership. She was not without a broader vision of the 
potential for human development; in fact, this was her creed 
and her religion. But her individualistic stance left 
little room for a positive view of government, or its 
potential to act as a force for good in people's lives; or 
for politics as an institution in which people come together 
to govern themselves jointly.
Nor did it allow for any real theory of economic class, 
or class action within the state.133 Far more than her
132See Chap. I.
133Toward the very end of her life, Stanton began to 
come to terms with some of the limitations of her 
philosophy, to appreciate the possibilities of some type of 
socialism, and speak more realistically about the reality of 
class conflict in an industrial society. See for example 
"Suffrage a Natural Right," p. 3-4. In another letter, 
undated but written from Basingstoke, England, sometime in 
the 1890s, she writes in an uncharacteristic moment of 
doubt, "My mind is not yet clear on the subject of paternal 
government, whether we have too much or too little." (Letter
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peers, Stanton understood women as a sex-class, joined in 
oppression, but any real sense of economic class eluded her; 
her sympathy for slaves and workers was always strained.134 
Stanton retained all her life a conviction formed in the 
America of the Second Great Awakening, that civil perfection 
is gained in the perfection of individuals and their rights: 
denying arguments from "the rights of races" she demanded an 
"end to all this talk of class legislation ... bury the 
Negro in the citizen. "13S The identification of common 
interest perhaps necessary for class consciousness was 
lacking in Stanton, who believed that "no mortal has ever 
been, no mortal will ever be like the soul just launched on 
the sea of life.”136 The liberal Protestant notion of the 
individual, the primacy of individual conscience, worked
to Elizabeth Smith Miller, undated, Stanton papers, Douglass 
College).
134Gail Parker in the "Introduction" to Eighty Years 
says "I cannot help but wish that she had manifested a less 
invidious sisterly love for her sex and that her 
championship of the slaves, and later of the working 
classes, had been marked by a genuine feeling of involvement 
with their fate, instead of a vicarious pleasure in being 
able to share in their rebellious feelings. Elizabeth 
Stanton was never going to be caught depending on someone 
else's revolution" (p. xviii).
13SFor the influence of revivalism on Stanton see Alice 
Rossi, The Feminist Papers, introduction to part II; 
Revolution, vol. 3 no. 2 (Jan. 14, 1869).
136"Solitude of Self," p. 2.
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against the possibility of mutual interests as well.
Indeed, class could be an oppressive structure, one that 
blurred the outlines of personhood in the group, or dictated 
wants and needs. Stanton's failure to account for class 
occurred in part because she had no conception of potential 
conflict between the individual and the state; Fourier's 
universal harmonies worked to assure that the highest good 
of society and the individual always lay in same direction; 
that if you "take care of individual rights the nation will 
take care of itself."131 Perhaps in this seeming harmony the 
chance to transform the idea of natural rights as rooted in 
physical being into economic rights was lost.
Nevertheless, Stanton's political philosophy and view 
of natural rights had a great influence on feminism; and 
feminism, as well as women's entry into the public sphere, 
helped to transform liberalism. In the eighteenth century, 
the liberal individual (male) was defined by owning 
property, voting, participating in the‘public sphere. By 
the end of the nineteenth, there was a consensus, if not on 
the details, at least on the fact that the liberal 
individual, male or female, was autonomous in personal life, 
as well; that rights extended to privacy of the body,
137Stanton, "Free Speech," p. 2; DuBois, Stanton and 
Anthony, p. 129; Eighty Years, p. 231.
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freedom from physical coercion.139 Commentators on Stanton 
have suggested that over the span of her career she moved 
away from an early interest in legal and political reform, 
switching in the late 1860s and 1870s to more intimate 
concerns of marriage, sexuality, maternity; and finally in 
her last twenty years to religion and the church.139 
Although her interest in all these questions was lifelong,
13*0f course the causal question, which I have begged 
here, is how much liberalism changed as a result of any of 
the campaigns of organized feminism; or as a result of the 
entry of women into the political sphere, an established 
fact by the later nineteenth century (Stanton, Eighty Years, 
p. 265); or as a result of gendered division of labor 
whereby women needed rights in order to fulfill sole duties 
within the home (see fn. 14, chap. II) (this also seems not 
to explain the emphasis on bodily autonomy); or as a result 
of the other great movement for freedom of the body, anti­
slavery and Reconstruction. Rejecting monocausal history, I 
think all were important, and am not focusing on liberal 
political theory to suggest that other developments were 
not; at the same time I do think, unlike some commentators, 
that organized liberal feminism was highly visible and 
influential in defining the questions in post-Civil War 
America; the tremendous publicity given to them in 
newspapers, their incessant lecture tours, their constant 
stream of publications all helped to redefine the liberal 
individual.
139See Maureen Fitzgerald, "Religion and Feminism," 
chap. 3; DuBois, Stanton and Anthony, p. 94; and Leach, True 
Love and Perfect Union, who also suggests (p. 143) that 
after the Civil War Stanton's preoccupation with 
individualism gave way to an attempt to "combine 
individualism with structure, organization, and 
centralization." She does indicate that she knows these 
possibilities exist in her last years, but I question the 
extent to which she ever effectively moved away from 
individualism in her political theory.
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her focus on sexual and family concerns certainly 
intensified during the 1870s. At the core of her 
transitions, though, is continuity and not change. 
Commentators have claimed that the explicit natural rights 
language of bodily ownership peaked in the 1870s, losing its 
force after the end of Reconstruction.140 But the language 
of autonomy lived on in Stanton's work, and lay at the core 
both of her work on the domestic question and the religion 
question. For the whole of her career from first to last, 
the concept of self-ownership was at the root of Stanton's 
political thought, its protection the ultimate goal of any 
form of government or social arrangement.
140See fn. 139 supra.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter IV - The Woman's Christian Temperance Union
and Moral Governance
In 1875 the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) 
sent a telegram signed by Lucy Stone and Mary Livermore to 
the newly formed Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), 
reading "the AWSA bids your convention godspeed. Soon may 
women, armed with the ballot, help make the laws which 
concern human welfare." By return wire Frances Willard and 
Eliza Thompson politely replied, "the WCTU returns your 
kindly greetings and in Christian faith and charity abides 
God's will awaiting His future providence.1’1 Apparently God 
had suffrage work in store for temperance women; by the 
early 1880's their national organization had endorsed the 
woman's ballot and they were working, if not arm in arm, at 
least side by side with women's suffrage groups for that 
common goal. A focus on that important point of agreement 
obscures a world of difference. A number of scholars have 
explored the WCTU's instrumental vision of the ballot as an 
agent of social reform, comparing it (usually unfavorably) 
to groups like the National Woman Suffrage Association 
(NWSA) and the American Women's Suffrage Association with
Stevenson, Katherine L., A Brief History of the 
Woman's Christian Temperance Union (2d ed.; Evanston, 111., 
1907), p.12.
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their more abstract vision of fundamental rights.2 Unlike 
more liberal groups, which sought to elevate the individual 
woman through civil rights, the WCTU's strategy linked 
woman's welfare inextricably with that of her family, 
seeking both to control the behavior of other members of the 
family (husbands and children) through a series of moral 
regulations, and to shore up the working-class family in 
particular through a series of programs and provisions, 
Christian socialist in flavor, designed to provide a stable 
basis for family life.
The liberal and evangelical programs represented not 
merely different political strategies; they were different 
at the root, from their first assessment of human nature and 
the fundamental relations to their blueprint for a polity.
A similar rift divides feminists today. Likeness and 
difference of male and female, family and self, have been 
the basis of much dispute in the last decade of feminist 
writings. Without trying to collapse time— much has changed 
in women's lives between then and now— the WCTU is an 
interesting study in themes we still debate.
2See in particular Barbara Epstein, The Politics of 
Domesticity: Women. Evangelism, and Temperance in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Middletown, Conn. 1981); and 
Ruth Bordin, Woman and Temperance: The Quest for Power and 
Liberty, 1873-1900 (Philadelphia, 1981).
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Arguments from women's difference, whether they see 
difference as socially constructed or as essential, usually 
center around the experience of child-bearing and -raising, 
and the caring, noncompetitive style which results. For 
temperance women, too, the construction of themselves as 
mothers was central, to their own identities and to their 
politics. The WCTU was clearly a mothers' movement; their 
slogan, "organized mother love," shows their delicate 
perpetual balance between the maternal and the programmatic. 
The WCTU represents the largest and most influential 
mothers' movement in our history, actual practitioners of a 
kind of "connective politics" of which many cultural 
feminists dream today.3 How did they mediate between the 
love and intrusion which constitute personal intimacy and 
social compassion? How does maternalism compare to 
paternalism, or liberalism, or other styles of governance?
The Relational Basis of Temperance Politics
For evangelical suffragists, motherhood was not merely 
a political strategy, as some have suggested, but part of a 
larger world view. Unlike Stanton, unlike other liberals, 
evangelical women did not glorify the absolute freedom of
3Robin West, "Jurisprudence and Gender," Chicago Law 
Review, vol. 55 no. 1 (1988), pp. 1-72.
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the individual from ties and obligations to others, whether 
family or strangers. Far from being their ideal, 
evangelical women pitied the unattached, even condescending 
sympathetically to Stanton's kingly libertarian hero, 
Robinson Crusoe, who "had a sorry time of it, and wasn't so 
useful by half as he might have been under more social 
influences.”4 For Frances Willard, Crusoe's absolute 
liberty was compromised when he saw footprints not his own 
on the shore of his island: "From that moment his personal 
liberty was divided by two; from that moment self-hood ... 
had to take cognizance of otherhood.1,8 Far from being a 
comedown, though, the presence of another was what gave the 
self definition, purpose, rootedness. The idea of bonds, so 
repugnant to many liberals in the aftermath of slavery, 
signified for temperance women their binding, submissive 
relationship to God; as well as the second great 
commandment, love to neighbors. Stanton had never met an 
obligation she liked. But evangelicals found such 
assertions of personal independence misguided and 
unrealistic, and raised obligations to define the highest
4Frances E. Willard, "An Open Letter," scrapbook 4, 
WCTU Series, reel 30.
5Frances E. Willard, Woman and Temperance (Hartford, 
Conn., 1883), p. 491.
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point of humanity and spirituality both. In some very real 
way they took on themselves the identity of a "'bond 
servant' ... and the bondage is— love."* Far from seeing a 
polity as a collection of discrete individuals, it was a
group that "like all creation is bound together by invisible
cords, and through all pulsates a common life ...n1
Family life, love for spouse and children, represented 
the closest, most common manifestation of such bonds. In 
WCTU ideology the family became the paradigm for social 
relations. The Christian ideal of brotherhood was the
foundation of a relational view of community where
"whosoever will do the will of my Father, who is in heaven, 
the same is my mother and sister and brother ... "* Family 
ties between union members were stressed insistently; every 
woman was "sister" to every other, and a title conferred to 
honor a few of the Crusade's leaders was "Mother." Frances 
Willard and others travelled the remotest parts of the 
country ten months a year stressing the essential kinship of 
the union members with each other and with the rest of
*Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 36.
’w.C.T.U. Declaration of Principles, in Stevenson,
Brief History, p. 99.
‘Bessie Lathe Scovell, A Brief History of the Minnesota 
W.C.T.U  1877-1939 (Minneapolis, 1939), p. 55.
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society; her greatest compliment, paid to some audiences, 
was that she felt as much at home with them as with her own 
mother.’ As WCTU members often expressed it, their goal was 
"to -make the whole world kin."10 Self-proclaimed sisters to 
each other, union members saw themselves as mothers to the 
community— a powerful image in a society which had elevated 
"mother" to a uniquely revered position.
In this world, one's rights, duties, even one's self- 
worth were measured by the fulfillment of obligations to 
others. Willard's favorite book, one she constantly 
recommended as embodying the core of the WCTU's philosophy, 
was Frances Power Cobbe's The Duties of Woman.11 Duty 
itself— a concept which liberals held in low esteem— was the 
backbone of evangelical feminism, far more than rights.
Cobbe lights into the subject of duties with relish. Her 
hierarchy of duties has three main categories: Religious, 
Personal, and Social Duties; and she subdivides Social
*Willard, "An Open Letter."
10A typical poem ends, "will not every wife and mother/ 
seek to help some erring brother?/ Will not every loving 
daughter/ seek to lift some fallen father?/ Will not 
sister, wife, and mother/ help a brother, son, or father?" 
Quoted in "The Granite State Outlook," vol, 1 no. 2 (Feb. 
1891) .
“Frances Power Cobbe, The Duties of Woman (Boston,
1881) .
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Duties in four parts. Duties for Cobbe arise out of 
relationships, the most important being the "natural ties of 
proximity in blood— the reciprocal first claims of Parents 
and Children, and then of Brothers, and so on." The second 
are duties arising out of those claims founded on contract, 
among which Cobbe includes marriage. The third category is 
that of prior indebtedness, those who have been benevolent 
to us in the past; and the fourth the claims of "local 
Propinquity." or neighbors.12 Duties, then, were all 
around, both contractual and involuntary, and impossible to 
shake; you could incur a duty to someone simply by living 
near him.
Union members who were housewives had their share of 
home tasks, and like all housewives sometimes found them 
wearying. Indeed, a clear strain in Stanton's brand of 
liberal feminism was an acknowledgement of the dehumanizing 
burden of home and child care, and a plea to women to reject 
the primary identification as domestic workers. Evangelical 
women, though, never expressed such weariness in public.13 
The obligations to family, neighbors, strangers were not the
“Cobbe, Duties, p. 94.
“Except for one wonderful jailed Crusader who, when 
her husband pleaded to be allowed to bail her out for the 
sake of the baby responded "Baby? What baby? I wouldn't be 
got out of here for twenty babies!"
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punitive weights imposed from without# as Stanton pictured 
them# but willingly assumed— "faith which turns as readily 
to works as steam to water."14
Nor is it clear that this difference between liberals 
and evangelicals can be traced to different material 
circumstances: one comparative study of leaders of both 
movements found that in terms of class# education# and 
amount and type of work outside the home# the two groups 
were remarkably alike.” Religion# this study suggests# was 
the break point between the groups. Liberal suffragists 
were far more likely to fall within the "liberal" sphere of 
religion— Congregational# Quaker, Unitarian Universalist—  
while temperance women more likely belonged to the 
evangelical denominations# particularly Methodism. The 
liberal God— offstage most of the time— demanded more in the 
way of individual growth and autonomy# while the 
evangelicals' God— center stage— stressed kinship and care. 
Evangelicals measured their own happiness and self-worth by 
their lovingkindness to family and others; one hoped to have
14Willard, Do Everything, p. 79.
15Janet Zollinger Giele# "Social Change in the Feminine 
Role: A Comparison of Woman's Suffrage and Woman's 
Temperance# 1870-1920," Ph.D. diss., Radcliffe College, 
1961.
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230
Maternal Governance
Glorification of home and family did not mean that 
those institutions could not be improved. Historians have 
been critical of the WCTU for accepting the monogamous 
nuclear family as it stood. In fact, the WCTU early on 
mounted a campaign to transform governance in the home as 
well as the state quite radically. Traditionally labeled 
"conservative" in their religion, they nonetheless shared 
with liberals a common enemy, the twin-headed orthodoxy of 
patriarchalism and Calvinism. The stories nineteenth- 
century women activists tell of their religious experiences 
are varied. But for the first generation of reformers there 
are common themes: all grew up in Charles Finney's America, 
were deeply touched by the Second Great Awakening, and 
wrestled in their own lives with Calvinism's harsh legacy. 
Feminists as different as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Frances 
E. Willard shared the experience of sitting under the 
preaching of Charles Finney, terrorized into insomnia by his 
visions of the hell awaiting the unsaved.
The archetypal woman's story was of a childhood made
“Footnote on deposit in the Widener Library.
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miserable by a harsh, authoritarian Calvinist father, 
buttressed by a threatening (male) minister and a distant, 
unloving (male) God. Fathers in these stories exercised a 
sole, arbitrary authority without consultation or leniency. 
In one of the richest accounts, Mary Livermore's father 
imposed a severe Sunday regime on the family— no cooking, no 
reading but the Bible, incessant prayer meetings harping on 
the frailness of the hope of salvation until "I was 
sometimes shaken to the center of my being, and ... 
frequently felt a bitter regret that I had ever been 
born.”17 Snuffling, creeping sextons, austere ministers, 
cold dark specter-filled churches scared her so as a child, 
Mary Livermore recounts, that she would cling to her father 
for hope and reassurance which he could not give. One 
Sunday, her eighth birthday, she received a beautiful, rare 
gift, a copy of Robinson Crusoe bound in red leather.
Unable to leave the book alone, she was caught reading it 
several times by her father, who finally threw it in the 
fire— an act of gratuitous cruelty Livermore recounts with 
rage in her autobiography over sixty years later.11 Reform
17Mary A. Livermore, The Story of Mv Life, or the 
Sunshine and Shadow of Seventy Years (Hartford, Conn.,
1899), p. 56.
“Livermore, Story, p.59. The story of the attempt to 
break Mary's spiri<: is recounted in detail in Willard, Woman
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women depicted such displays of patriarchal authority as 
common, and as abusive, arbitrary, damaging— the exercise of 
blind, unreasonable, unloving force designed to break the 
spirit of the child. Liberals and evangelicals both 
unanimously rejected this male model of governance through 
fear in home and church both, substituting a loving, 
suffering, feminine Christ for the feared, patriarchal God 
of Calvinist religion. Livermore even substituted "Our 
Jesus" for "Our Father" in her childhood prayers.1*
The idea of a womanly model of domestic and religious 
authority began to assert itself with the feminine Christ, 
and was one which women eagerly developed and applied. "Our 
Mother" became the counter to "Our Father" in temperance 
women's writing, and she exercised a radically different 
style of authority. Mary Livermore as a child was deeply 
concerned with religious things, and despite her hatred of 
abusive authority, was torn for many years by the process of 
working out her stance toward God. She hated the distant, 
frightening ministers, but loved the more jovial ones, and 
longed to preach herself; often as a child she did preach to
and Temperance, p. 427.
"On the feminized nature of Christ in the nineteenth 
century see Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American 
Culture (New York, 1977), chaps. 3 and 4.
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an audience of logs. Occasionally her mother consented to 
sit as one of the congregation (impossible to imagine her 
father there, even in play): when Mrs. Livermore laughed, 
Mary "rebuked" her "severely," telling her that "laughter 
did not become God's house."20
Her deep conflict between the patriarchal and maternal 
models, between her father's influence and her mother's, 
also expressed itself during one visit from her cousins, 
when the children eagerly devoured the "ghastly chronicles" 
in Fox's Book of Martyrs. They were especially taken with 
the story of the burning of Archbishop Cranmer, a tale her 
father used to illustrate the nobility of martyrdom. Later, 
alone, the children decided to reenact the story using 
Mary's best toy, an expensive London wax doll. Like 
Cranmer, the doll perished quite satisfactorily in the 
flames; Mary was immediately overcome with "the remorse of 
matricide," and was for months inconsolable that Christian 
zeal had led her to "sacrifice" her only child— a sacrifice 
which fathers might but mothers would never make.21
Occasionally this conflict over styles of governance 
showed itself in open warfare between mother and father for
“Livermore, Story. p. 70. 
“Livermore, Story. pp. 93-96.
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control of the children. Despite women's deprecation of 
power, the home was clearly a charged environment; they very 
often spoke of it in military terms as their "domain," their 
"kingdom," their "fortress." Conflict could arise between 
individual parents within the home; and clearly despite the 
lip service paid to equality it was not in sorrow that Mary 
Livingston reported that although her mother never argued 
with her father, "no man was ever more completely under the 
control of another."22 A father who flouted mother's 
authority and instincts about.children often brought down 
tragedy, as did John Mason in The Voice of the Home when he 
became a drinking companion to his son, whose appetites he 
could not curb. But mothers engaged in a larger fight as 
well, with the "traps and snares" which the wide male world 
set, particularly for sons but for daughters as well.23 For 
without their children women were without their raison 
d'etre. Frances Raymond, a Civil War widow and mother of an 
only son, looked to her country for help: "if it could not 
provide so tender, yet should it not a larger fatherhood?" 
Yet in her battle against her son's drinking she was scorned 
and challenged by a bartender to provide "superior
“Livermore, Story. p. 40.
“Sarepta Henry, The Voice of the Home (New York,
1882), p. 312.
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attractions" to keep her son at home, a competition in which 
the state sided with the man.2* Often providing "superior 
attractions" in these texts leads to an eroticized mother- 
son relation at the expense of the conjugal. Temperance 
women hoped to be "adored by their sons, depended on by 
their husbands and friends. "2S In one of the best known
cases in which the father used overriding influence, one
woman commended the son, Christ, who "in his hour of mortal
agony did not forget his mother."26
For the child in temperance writings, the home as 
governed by maternal authority was a far more congenial 
place— safer, warmer, more loving. Fathers tended to 
disrupt families. They were bossy; they drank; frequently 
and against mothers' wishes they uprooted families from 
loved homes to seek their fortunes on inhospitable land, 
"like Eve driven from Paradise."27 Frances Willard's father 
committed an act of unthinkable cruelty; when Frances was in
2<Sarepta Henry, Frances Raymond's Investment: Or. the 
Cost of a Bov (Chicago, 1889), p. 36.
2SOne article on the children's page of the Union's 
official organ, the Union Signal, urged boys to "fall in 
love" with their mothers (vol. 9, no. 45 [Nov. 22, 1883]); 
see also Arena, vol. 6 (1892), p. 371 (the definition of a 
clubwoman is given as "her children adore her. Her husband 
and friends rely on her good sense.")
26Willard, Do Everything, p. 163.
27Livermore, Storv, p. 42.
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her early twenties her sister Mary died, and in an effort to 
wipe out her memory Josiah Willard, over the protests of his 
wife and daughter, sold at auction not only their family 
home but all of their personal possessions— the household 
goods of thirty years.2* Critics have portrayed home for 
temperance women as stuffy, stilted, inegalitarian. But the 
motherly home was a haven, not for men but for women; an 
alternative to the harsher, unforgiving love of the 
patriarchal God and father. Mary Livermore recounted a time 
when, as children lost in a storm, parental love had rescued 
them, father bringing them home to the "beloved mother ... 
with dry clothing; a good supper, and the unspeakable 
blessedness of home, love, and welcome." As an adult she 
longed for an equally loving God and a similar resolution to 
problems by the "clear voice of our Father sounding out from 
the gloom, 'Lo, I am here.'"29
The home as governed by mother was even safe from the 
gravest danger— eternal damnation. In another archetypal 
story, the death of the sister {or brother, or lover), the 
father is unable to assure his grieving family that the 
sister has been saved. In Mary Livermore's account, a
“Frances E. Willard, A Great Mother: Sketches of Madam 
Willard (Chicago, 1894), p. 65.
“Livermore, Story. p. 117.
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minister reinforces her doubt and counsels the family to 
"accept the inevitable." Years later, the elderly Mary 
Livermore is still anguished over the death of the young 
girl; "not one intimation that she had entered a larger, 
nobler, and happier life. Flung out of existence into the 
dark, a delicate, white-souled child ... "30 Doubt 
precipitated a crisis; Mary needed reassurance that her 
sister was not lost, which no male figure could give. "My 
mother alone was able to comfort me ... No amount of 
theological disputations removed her from her anchorage ... 
(a) belief that religion is love to God and love to man; 
that it is not possible for God, whose very nature is love, 
to send into life any creature, knowing that eternal torment 
awaits him." Again, the figure Mary Livermore later came to 
call "God the Mother" would not sacrifice even one child to 
the harsh regime of God the Calvinist Father.
Female intuition in WCTU literature is repeatedly posed 
against loveless male disputation; the mother's love and 
experience is privileged over the father's theology. "Men 
preach a creed; women will declare a life. Men deal in 
formulas, women in fact. Men have always tithed mint and 
rue and cumin in their exegesis and their ecclesiasticism,
“Livermore, Storv. p. 135.
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while the world's heart has cried out for compassion,, 
forgiveness, and sympathy ... "3l The evangelical reform 
women were part of a liberal movement within the church that 
rejected Calvinist orthodoxy, Biblical literalism, hair­
splitting disputations. Temperance women would put in their 
place a simpler religion based on the two great 
commandments— love for God and man— interpreted not through 
the intricacies of ancient languages but through love and 
common sense, virtues which mothers held in equal measure 
with fathers. Temperance leader Hannah Whitall Smith's 
popular religious tracts were all based on a "theology ... 
learned in the nursery with my children."32
Many of the first generation of suffragists, liberals 
and evangelicals alike, were formed in their early years by 
struggles against Calvinist patriarchy and its male 
authoritarian model: despite their differences, Stanton 
shared with evangelicals a real dislike of orthodox "creeds 
and codes." The alternative models of governance which both 
liberals and evangelicals advocated shared some features; a 
commitment to a tolerant, liberal, reasoning style (words, 
however, which evangelicals and liberals could interpret
“Frances Willard, Woman in the Pulpit (New York,
1888), p. 47.
“Quoted in Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 199.
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quite differently) which eschewed the use of force or 
coercion. But unlike the liberals, temperance women 
developed a science of maternal government as a prototype 
for the exercise of power in both home and state, a deeply 
gendered model based on women's biosocial role. But 
although it was a style any woman could aspire to, it was 
not instinctive: at times it seemed the WCTU had taken on 
the task, not just of mothering the world, but of first 
teaching women how to be mothers. Huge numbers of tracts, 
pamphlets, books, speeches, and meetings were devoted to 
celebrating good motherhood or developing it in others.33 
Temperance mothers told their stories in first-person 
narrative or lightly disguised as fiction; mothers' meetings 
were at the heart of the Union's program. The mothering 
blitz was directed, not just at the new immigrants or the 
poor, but at the middle and upper classes, the Union's own 
rank and file, past mothers, future mothers— any woman who
33Willard, A Great Mother; Mary Allen West, Childhood: 
its _Care and Culture (Chicago, 1892); Hannah Whitall Smith, 
Educating. Our Mothers, or. Wise Motherhood (London, 1896); 
Sarepta Henry, Studies in Home and Child Life (New York, 
1887). See also leaflets of Union's Mothers' meetings, 
W.C.T.U Archive, Evanston, 111. Occasionally there were 
slip-ups. The Boston temperance ladies accidentally put out 
a cookbook called Massachusetts W.C.T.U. Cuisine (Boston, 
1878) in which several of the recipes were found to be 
"poisoned with wine. It is impossible to testify to the 
sorrow of the committee in charge of the book..." (errata 
slip).
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would listen. For union members identified a variety of 
personal and social evils as resulting from poor mothering 
in the home, and saw improving the quality of mother-child 
relations as fundamental to social change.
The new good mother was in every way the reverse of the 
patriarch. She led, not drove; used smiles and rewards 
rather than stress and punishments; never imposed arbitrary 
judgements on her children but reassured them instead. One 
such mother reinterpreted the biblical rod— man's punitive 
staff— as a mere "symbol," representing not chastisement but 
the care and love of the shepherd.34 The watchword here was 
not coercion but "voluntary compliance." A Minnesota 
temperance worker coined an optimistic slogan which became 
popular: "no labor strikes, no strikes in the family; the 
best-governed children are those who seem to govern 
themselves."” Like the government of God where "no 
coercion is found but absolute liberty," such a home was an 
"ideally practical democracy." The family government was 
approved and rejoiced in by each child. There was equality 
and deference "to parents and children alike, and children's
34Henry, Studies, p. 95. See also Willard, Great 
Mother, pp. 134 ff.; Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p.34.
”Emily H. Miller, quoted in scrapbook 10, WCTU Series, 
reel 31.
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voices were heard in the settlement of difficult questions 
in the counsel of the whole."” Unlike the traditional 
family, mother and father were equal partners sharing both 
power and responsibility equitably.
Mothers secured voluntary compliance with prizes, 
rewards, encouragement as the tools of persuasion. Many 
evangelical suffragists had used such theories in their work 
as teachers as well and had first tested them out as Frances 
Willard did at Northwestern Women's College, where girls who 
routinely obeyed the code of conduct advanced to the "corps 
of the self-governed. "37 "Voluntary" here held a rather 
different meaning for evangelicals than it did for liberals, 
though, and the contrasting uses lay at the core of the 
conflict between the two groups. Despite the emphasis on 
"voluntary" action, the writings of the WCTU overall do not 
manifest the same belief in human choice and free will that 
the liberals often did.” "Free will" for evangelicals 
retained its older sense, not of unlimited human freedom, 
but of choice exercised in the context of God's will: choice 
to do or not to do wrong. With the declining emphasis on
“Henry, Studies, pp. 84 ff.
"Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 26; Livermore,
Story, p. 368.
“See Chap. III.
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sin, the phrase was often used by temperance workers to mean 
"the exercise (of) that free choice of duty wherein virtue 
consists."3* Willard, for example, writes in her later 
years that watching her father sign the Washingtonian 
temperance pledge as a child was her first lesson in 
personal liberty.40 One temperance paper, The Granite State 
Outlook, laid out a three-pronged scheme of family 
governance which encapsulated both the common program of 
evangelicals and liberals, and their splits. "Household 
tyranny" or old-style patriarchy, the common opponent of 
both groups, was one extreme. The other extreme was 
characterized by "Household anarchy," presumably the 
domestic environment which Stanton advocated and fostered.41 
The third option, happily placed in the middle, was a house 
governed through the mechanism of "cheerful, trusting, love- 
inspired confidence in the parent's will."42
Occasionally, of course, some child's (or spouse's) 
cheerful self-government broke down; but writers on 
mothering assured women that praise not blame, the carrot
3*Cobbe, Duties, p. 28.
40Frances Willard, "Address Before the 22nd Annual 
Meeting of the National WCTU...Oct. 18-23, 1895," p. 3.
4ISee Chap. III.
42Granlte State Outlook. June, 1891, p. 2.
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not the stick, was the way to secure "voluntary 
compliance."° Temperance women were hypersensitive to the 
open exercise of power, and to the unsexing that came with 
coercion and the use of force— so much the patriarch's role. 
Sometimes a temperance matriarch would vent righteous anger 
at barkeepers or saloon owners, and took pleasure in 
dressing them down with a kind of brutal maternal authority 
that made grown men quail like small boys.” But usually, 
toward all the world but barkeepers, temperance women 
rejected the confrontational tactics of liberal suffragists, 
adopting as a policy methods of control which drew on 
womanly "influence," like gentle persuasion, coaxing, 
imploring— considered the traditional weapons of the weak. 
Temperance women sought to "suggest without the slightest 
appearance of arbitrary dictation."4* The best power was 
that with fewest outward manifestations, like the message of
43Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p. 34. See also 
Livermore, Storv. p. 41.
"Union Signal, vol. 4 no. 6 (Feb. 8, 1883), p. 3; vol.
9 no. 49 (Dec. 20, 1883), p. 3. Despite their own efforts 
and self image, the WCTU ladies were often perceived as 
confrontational and forceful in the public literature (see 
the cartoon from Grip, next page); alternately they were 
cast as whiney, as on the stone grave marker some wag put on 
the site of a former saloon reading "Died, A Saloon, Nagged 
to Death by a Woman" (Additon, Twenty Years, p. 61).
"Union Signal. 4 January 1883, p. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
;oiXX3X TORONTO, OCTOBER 39th, 1887.
No iB.
VRllfi' <<7v r ttntO* BY-j^DOWWHGuruc,'
V  / ‘‘/ S '
/  i s  /***
-
&
m ..LSB^r. MRS. YEOMANS DRESSES DQWN POSTER;
AUP m Y I HIM JOLLY WILL 1I0HT» TOO, SAY3 Irity iO D Y
— M n.'Yt0KAM i AND P u r, F o m *.—Hon. George Fottn hat 
f£ 2 * working *» w l yean for the exemplary trouncing he got from 
T i S ftfc S lW  A ? iF “ S?. **? .ol.hcf • Upon.tl' invitation of
Thter«wtn»ii( 
>•**«» i J f j U N f p e n e *  the other-day.- Upon It-invitation of 
t̂ e co°Tg°tion. 6l» ipccch « u  the exakpafct?
m aud the bribe of|«ww w m  Miwif uiM* UK OnBB
firom What he oqee waa, a fcarl
ita-etc.- etc. ■ It 1___
™ w  att tnnaformed thia man. _ 
advocate afmoralrefcain, in to !_ I^ 5 L
e t im e s in g  co w m f U ^ . ^ n a n T ^ d U ^  r S g T p T ,  j j  
.V*6' “^phoria^i Uyiog bim*Bvet her ample knee, »heH Paoe-*1..gave him the moat efiective castigation that any nubHc man’ in
Canada tm ever rrrnr-cl. KvrrvC .!•.■ ,-,v- ....’,.7 i : . .:T,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
244
comfort a wife sent to a sick husband miles away which 
simply "by the power of that woman's will" soothed him into 
his first restful sleep in days.4*
This style of persuasion was unconfrontational, 
artificial, and highly gendered. But one of its better 
characteristics was its reluctance to adopt male models of 
force. For one thing, in a society still deeply Christian 
in its ethos, if not wholly in its belief, the victory of 
force over gentleness was not a foregone conclusion; the 
figure of the loving, forebearing, womanly Christ which 
temperance women adopted as their emblem still held a 
powerful charge, though less than in the antebellum period. 
Frances Willard and many others stressed that it was 
Christianity which had raised human society above the level 
of brute force to a plane where women could share the rule 
of brain, heart, conscience, love.41
In addition, noncoercion was a critical part of the 
WCTU's political agenda as well, which in its Department of 
Peace and Arbitration anticipated the special nexus which 
exists today between feminism and the peace movement; As
“Union Signal. 5 November 1885, p. 7. Another letter 
suggests that members sidle up to a drunk, slip their hands 
into his side pocket, and replace the flask with a copy of 
the New Testament {scrapbook 9, reel 31, WCTU Papers.)
47Willard, Woman and Temperance, pp. 392 ff.
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they rejected the brutal, forceful God of the Old Testament 
and of Calvinism, so temperance women rejected 
authoritarianism in the home and in the administration of 
both domestic and foreign politics. Rather, they saw 
themselves as gifted arbitrators, painting Mother as a 
skillful diplomat who "drew up treaties, subdued kingdoms, 
and wrought righteousness" in settlement of disputes within 
her domain.4*
The repudiation of force and of a confrontational 
stance is not the element of the WCTU agenda most at odds 
with a liberal feminism; both broadly rejected as a matter 
of theory and principle violent restructuring measures 
imposed from without. But the WCTU's alternate model of 
maternal care was deeply illiberal in some of its 
presumptions. In rejecting an authoritarian God temperance 
mothers also rejected traditional privileges of the (male) 
Creator as "architect to shape the young immortal according 
to ... (his) preconceived plan." Rather, mothers were 
gardeners, growers, assistants in the natural practice of 
evolution; children were trees not to be pruned or clipped 
but "to grow with sun and soil, dew and shower and growth 
unhindered and untransformed; the work of parent and
"Willard, Great Mother, p. 143.
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instructor being to remove hindrances, to see that no 
deforming influence had power, to feed and stimulate, never 
to repress or abridge its beneficent possibilities."”
This description recalls liberal strictures about the 
value of care, education, and the opportunity for unfettered 
development.50 But the liberal garden held a wild variety- 
-no genus, no species, but each plant once blossomed 
entirely individual and distinct.51 Evangelicals focused 
instead on the process of growth and the teleological forces 
which, if conditions were right, would produce a homogeneous 
field. Within the gentle structure of maternal evolutionary 
thought the child found nurturing and license; but not 
license for the acorn to grow into an elm or a tulip. As 
Hannah Whitall Smith described the sowing, "voluntary 
obedience is a deed which is performed after the right state 
of feeling towards the thing has been induced. Compulsion
is an attempt to manufacture the fruit without planting the
seed."52 In a similar vein, WCTU literature eschewed the
“Willard, Great Mother, p. 138; Henry, Studies, p. 54.
50See Chap. Ill on Stanton's mothering practices.
“The most extreme statement of this comes in Elizabeth
Cady Stanton's speech "The Solitude of Self," printed as 
"Hearing of the ..'oman Suffrage Association Before the 
Committee on the Judiciary...1892" (n.p., n.d.), p. 2.
52Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p. 34.
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open-ended question. But one of the most common formats for 
their material for children and adults both was the 
catechism, or pamphlets consisting of questions and answers, 
to be read chorally, resolving even the most complex moral 
issues and leaving nothing open to doubt.”
Temperance women also drew on evolutionary thought to 
recast the biblical notion of sin, a staple of Christian 
theology which plagued religious liberals throughout the 
nineteenth century. The sin which drew down the lightening 
wrath of God was a relic of orthodoxy, as the physical 
punishment of a child was a relic of patriarchy. Punishment 
became rather a natural operation which resulted 
automatically from the infringement of one of God's natural 
laws, teaching the sorrowful child (or adult) a healthy 
lesson without the need for punitive parental 
intervention.” The WCTU's philosophy took perfectionism to 
new heights in their sunny confidence that sin was not
”Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 401; Sarepta Henry,
A Manual of Evangelical Temperance Work for All WCTUs (New 
York, 1881); "Annual Leaflet of the National WCTU" (Chicago, 
1898).
“Smith, Educating Our Mothers, p. 40; Prances E. 
Willard, "Address Before the Second Biennial Convention of 
the World's Christian Temperance Union...," p. 53 ("the law 
of ethics is the law of cause and effect"); Union Signal. 14 
January 1886, p. 4. See also an article by Henry Wood, "The 
Universality of Law," in Arena, vol. 5 (1892), at p. 201.
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inherent in the human condition but could be permanently 
vanquished. Not for them the anguishing, life-long struggle 
and self-examination of their Calvinist ancestors: the WCTU 
wholeheartedly endorsed the liberal tenet that all were 
saved, as consonant with loving parenthood.
But in protecting children from the dark, mortal 
terrors of their own childhood, the good mothers also 
seemingly denied them something of the autonomy towards 
which liberal religions strove. In the WCTU's philosophy, a 
child, hedged around by God's "natural” laws (a 
comprehensive code) and full maternal guidance, no longer 
had the responsibility of facing God directly, and little 
experience of the ongoing process of self-government through 
daily struggles with moral and ethical questions, learning 
to resolve them on her own rather than through mother's 
guidance. Good mothers tended to make doing right an 
irresistible, even a thoughtless process, believing that 
individual struggles with sin and temptation could be 
circumvented by a loving regime of guidance and care.
”The Home Going Forth Into the World”
The WCTU in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
relied heavily on motherhood as the source and model of its 
power. But in order to expand its program outward from the
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home, it was important not to base women's authority 
strictly on essentialist arguments, thereby limiting it to 
relations between biological mothers and tlieir children. 
Rather, Union literature showed the qualities of motherhood 
as common, even to women who had never borne children; 
Sarepta Henry thought it possible for a woman to actually 
bear a child without even knowing "one throb of genuine 
motherhood," while a virgin aunt could be the sweetest 
mother of all.” Hannah Whitall Smith cast her argument as 
a spiritual, rather than a biological essentialism, and felt 
that there were very few women in whom the elements of 
"spiritual motherhood" could not develop "unless they be 
utterly abnormal."5*
The Union's "science of motherhood" and maternal 
training and education programs conveyed the message "any 
woman can." Another common story is of temperance woman 
whose skills were not innate, whose clothes were spotted, 
whose biscuits were not light and whose floors were not
“Henry, Studies, p. 23. See also the poem for Mother 
Stewart in scrapbook 10, WCTU Series, reel 31 ("Our physical 
law makes that grand word [mother}/ A natural consequence/
But when 'tis born of spirit/ And unselfish love " then
mother becomes like George Washington); and the poem for 
Frances Willard in Lucia F. Additon, Twenty Eventful Years 
of the Oregon WCTU. 1880-1900 (Portland, 1904) .
“Smith, Educating Our Mothers, pp. 12-13.
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clean. Mary Livermore was one who represented herself as 
lacking intuitive domestic skills, and feared that through 
an angry household god she had been "elected to ... (a) 
desolate future of shiftlessness and celibacy." But, using 
the means and agency so celebrated by Finney, upon marriage 
she "put myself under instruction as I had done when I 
wished to know a language, and found the domestic arts not 
difficult to acquire."87 Detaching motherhood from actual 
childbirth and making it an art which virtually all women 
could learn laid the groundwork for the exercise of 
mothering as a social and political skill.81
Another strong appeal to women to extend their mission 
outside the home came from the Union's mandate to work for 
other mothers' children as well as one's own.8* Mrs. A.E. 
Hall undertook a municipal post to purify the streets of 
Chicago as "a work of salvation for other mothers' little
"Livermore, Story, p. 90. But see also Mrs. A.M.M. 
Payne, "One of Them," in the Union signal. 12 November 1885, 
where a suffragist earns respect for her ideas through her 
beautiful housekeeping. Livermore's language is reminiscent 
of the language of means to salvation which Charles Finney 
made common during the Second Great Awakening.
”ln contrast to the story of non-intuitive domestic 
skills, Frances Willard's political skills came to her in a 
revelation after a marathon prayer session.
“Frances E. Willard, "The Daughter of the Republic," 
in Scrapbook 3, WCTU series, reel 30; Union Signal. 15 
November 1883, p. 2.
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children” after her only child died of diphtheria.” Such 
potential for public good through maternal care could be 
multiplied until with "ten thousand local unions, everybody 
in this country has ten times ten thousand mothers willing 
to look after him and help him to the good."61
Such arguments were especially appealing tc mothers 
whose sons and daughters were beyond their command, caught 
up in the swirl of distant big-city life. The mother in her 
small home was no match for a big world, for the saloon, the 
vice dens, the "cunning avaricious monopolists" out to 
seduce and ruin her child.” But through motherly 
surrogates in Unions in other cities she could perhaps 
exercise a proxy control, as in Sarepta Henry's popular 
novel Voice of the Home. There Roy Mason begins a downhill 
slide into fast company and drink when the railroad comes to 
town; he is eventually forced to leave, with no word of his 
whereabouts to his heartbroken mother Mary. Mary pours out
“Frances E. Willard, Occupations for Women (New York, 
1897), p. 360.
“Willard, Do Everything, p. 155. The exchange was not 
quite one for one; a midwestern town had an ordinance 
allowing any parent or guardian, or any three respectable 
citizens, to commit a wayward juvenile to a home. Union 
Signal. 26 November 1885, p.4. The idea of "ten times ten 
thousand mothers" sounds like a Woody Allen nightmare.
“Sarepta Henry, Frances Raymond's Investment, p. 39.
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her maternal love and good works on another troubled young 
alcoholic, a Masonville bartender named Frank Barton— whose 
own mother, it turns out, is nursing Roy in the town where 
Frank grew up."
The Union's philosophy of connection stressed a theme 
common to the broader culture of the late nineteenth century 
as well, in everything from religious tracts to beer-hall 
songs: though men and women alike may abandon or be wrenched 
from their birth-family ties in an increasingly anonymous 
world, "every girl is someone's daughter" (a parson's 
daughter?), every boy is someone's son." The abandoned, 
the dispossessed, are only temporarily outside the network 
of relations, and deserve to be treated and valued— not as 
the liberal individual— but by the loving family ties they 
once had, and in an effort to restore them, to redeem the 
loss of one mother by "ten times ten thousand mothers."65
"Sarepta Henry, The Voice of the Home (New York,
1882).
"The Temperance Songbook. edited by Emmet G. Coleman 
(Canada, 1971) is full of songs with titles like "The 
Prodigal Girl" (p. 8); "Oh Johnny Come Back To the Farm" (p. 
12); "Breaking Mother's Heart" (p. 27) (with a chorus 
"She'll break the heart of her old gray-haired mother/She'11 
break it, yes, break it tonight (tonight"); "The Orphan 
Girl" (p. 30); "Somebody's Boy" (p. 52); as well as the 
famous "Father, Dear Father, Come Home With Me Now" (p. 60).
"Willard, Do Everything, p. 40.
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For the hand that rocked the cradle the reach out into 
the world was easier when its object was extended mothering. 
Nor did evangelicals feel that they were breaking a barrier; 
they emphatically rejected the classic liberal formulation 
which split the world in two. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and 
other liberal feminists in this period urgently pressed a 
split between public and private, promoting a home insulated 
from external and regulating influence. Liberal feminists 
sought to break dor' 'he boundaries of women's sphere while 
leaving the division between public and private intact;
Ellen DuBois has commended as liberal suffragism's greatest 
strength its bypassing the domestic sphere entirely to seek 
equality in the public sphere.“
Evangelicals sought to deconstruct the two barriers 
simultaneously, understanding them in fact as 
interdependent, common borders of one problem. The idea 
that public and private could be separated was repugnant to 
their fundamental belief in accountability under a single 
Christian law and moral code, which was the measure of all 
actions. God's stricture, "inasmuch as ye have done unto 
the least of these thy brethren, ye have done unto me,"
“Ellen Carol DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: The 
Emergence of An Independent Women's Movement in America. 
1848-1969 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978).
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precluded a double standard for male and female, rich and 
poor, officeholder and housewife, family and stranger. The 
evangelical model for relations between social spheres was 
not bifurcation but concentric circles; the rings extended 
outward from the human heart to encompass the home, the 
church, and then society; and finally government, "a circle 
that includes all hearts, all homes, all churches, all 
societies. "*7
The circle theory acted as a radical counter to 
bifurcation. Through a theory of reverberation it set up a 
standard of accountability based on a cause-and-effect 
process that worked like ripples in a pond. "There is a 
theory ... that anything once started never ceases its 
actions; the sound, once wakened, goes on and on in endless 
vibrations, as if it were a chain, whose ever-added links 
went on to infinity. If this is true in the natural world,
something quite like it is true in the moral world __ "
where ever widening circles of influence agitate "to the 
remotest bounds" first the home, then society and the 
nation.4* The home here is not a rival kingdom to the state
"Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 46, p. 29; Henry, 
Studies, p. 51. This metaphor was commonplace in temperance 
circles.
“Jane Stebbins, Fifty Years: History of the Temperance 
Cause (Hartford, Conn., 1876), p. 183. Such language is
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but incorporated into it. The concentric model, each ring 
nestled into the next and affecting it and all the others, 
laid the groundwork for evangelical feministsf efforts to 
make the outer rings— corporations, industry, government—  
accountable by standards of social justice derived from the 
governance of the middle-class home. A mother realizes that 
"the safety of the cradle is dependent on the purity of the 
executive mansion; and the father sees that the nation is 
served by every pair of baby shoes he buys, and that 
international justice is linked with the sweetness of his 
own fireside."”
The march of the WCTU was "the home going forth into 
the world," both symbolically and literally.70 Many 
historians of the WCTU have noted its reformist agenda for a 
maternal politics, its emphasis on the special womanly 
qualities of moral vision and integrity.71 The WCTU 
subscribed fully and unhesitatingly to a women's agenda, 
casting themselves as coming to a sleazy world of male
very reminiscent of ante-bellum feminist rhetoric as 
explored in Chapter 1.
”Scrapbook 10, WCTU series, reel 31.
70Frances E. Willard, Glimpses of Fifty Years (Chicago, 
1889), p. 471.
71See in particular Epstein, The Politics of 
Domesticity; and Bordin, Woman and Temperance.
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politics as they would to a bachelor's hall, armed with 
brooms and dustpans, to clean and ventilate the place.72 On 
a material plane, WCTU women were "homemakers" in the most 
literal and persistent sense. Following their goal of 
making "the world more homelike" they made homes in unlikely 
places— jails, churches, halls, rented rooms. WCTU meetings 
were famous for their domestic decor, replacing the dusty 
halls of early nineteenth-century reform meetings—  
eccentrics on hard benches— with auditoria adorned with 
bunting, curtains, cushions, plants, pictures, furniture—  
anything to create a homelike atmosphere. Local, state, and 
national Unions were constantly opening "homes"— not 
institutions or asylums— where the wayward, the orphaned, 
the lost, the needy, the drunken could heal in an atmosphere 
which recreated the discipline and love of the ideal birth 
family.
The agenda of many local WCTUs was ambitious. "Rest 
cottages" at resorts and state fairs provided temperance 
refreshments in a cozy atmosphere.73 Perhaps the most
72Willard, Glimpses, p. 594. Note that liberal 
feminists used this language sometimes as well.
73Addition, Twen y Years, p. 70; Harriet Van Meter,
First Quarter Century of the WCTU of Salem. N.J. (n.p., 
1909), p. 60; Monroe Countv WCTU Annual Report (New York, 
1888), pp. 27 ff. The ladies of Monroe felt that such 
efforts "may save us from a horrible revolution in our
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common mission local unions undertook was to provide "noon 
rest" rooms for local working women. One Oregon worker 
called their apartment a "headquarters for industrial 
womanhood" and suggested that the work emanated from "the 
study of the ethical side of the great labor question."
That room was actually open all day for "rest, advice, and 
loans to working girls 1 The local WCTU in charge planned 
eventually to broaden their agenda to encompass much of what 
was included in "settlement work." Unions in Portland, 
Oregon opened in quick succession the "Baby Home," which in 
1888 took in 132 babies, and the "Industrial Home," later 
called the "Refuge Home," for working women needing 
shelter.74 The WCTU attributed many of the ills of the 
residents to being "left motherless in childhood ... (they) 
have been allowed to roan the streets and form such 
acquaintances as their restless fancies dictated ... Some 
have mothers living, and have been ungrateful and 
disobedient, and some poor girls have not had good homes or
social fabric." Their booth at the State Fair was soon 
wrecked, seemingly by vandals.
74This kind of work was typical of local unions across 
the country, although typically also from my reading the 
projects didn't last more that several years, seemingly from 
lack of organization rather than from lack of success, 
although the WCTU's own records and local histories 
obviously don't tell the whole story.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
258
careful mothers." The workers hoped that the "organized 
mother love" they provided would help heal their charges.7* 
Nor was politics immune from the Union's domestic 
labors. The Littleton, New Hampshire Union, for example, 
served lunch at town meetings, seeking to create a pacific 
environment. On one occasion they actually interrupted a 
brewing fight by bursting into song; "the voters had no more 
trouble that day."7*
Another common tactic was carried out enthusiastically 
on an election day in Iowa when prohibition was on the 
ballot. In towns around Iowa the night before the vote 
women decorated polling places with pictures, evergreens, 
flowers, and mottos like "the father's constituency is his 
family." On election day in Marion the WCTU opened a homey, 
decorative lunchroom right across from city hall with a 
banner saying "WCTU Free Lunch for All," where they wooed 
male voters with meat, pie, and good coffee. At the 
instigation of the WCTU, ministers and small children roamed 
the streets with songs and flowers, pressing themselves 
imploringly on potential voters; more than one succumbed and
75Additon, Twenty Years, pp. 50, 70-72.
7*Historical Sketch of the WCTU of Littleton. N.H..
1881-1896 (Littleton. N.H., 1897), p. 10.
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cast the ballot "for Sallie and the children.1,77 The WCTU 
here countered the male brand of electoral politics with its 
own slightly more dignified street theater, answering the 
bartender's challenge to Frances Raymond to keep her men at 
home with "superior attractions." Nor were Union members 
under any illusion about the nature of the contest; as 
Frances Willard said of a similar successful election 
strategy, "hundreds of voters were fed and won."78 The 
evangelical image of the home was sentimental, sweet and 
cloying. At the same time it represented a clear critique 
of male politics— the smoke-filled hall, the vote-buying 
candidates, the sodden, corrupt electorate. The WCTU did 
their best to bring their counter image, the well-run 
rational home, into the public sphere.
How can we evaluate the WCTU's efforts at a 
"connective" politics, or mothering the world? Their reform 
of household discipline— the replacement of punitive, 
Calvinist-based patriarchy by a more rational, affective, 
mother-centered household— seems all to the good; it was 
this part of their agenda that they shared with liberal 
feminists. In addition, most Union members were motivated
77Willard, Woman and Temperance, pp. 404 ff., p. 416.
78Willard, Woman and Temperance. ; p. 360-361.
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at least in part by a genuine desire to improve the lives of 
those around them out of their own plenty. In addition to 
"rest" rooms and refuges, local unions, with complete 
autonomy over their own programs, worked variously on 
nutritional programs, kindergartens, prison reforms 
(largely, it is true, supplying them with Bibles and 
temperance literature), campaigns for an eight-hour day and 
a living wage— all out of a sense of obligation to others 
which did not motivate Stanton or many of the liberals. 
Evangelical feminists shared a strong sense, based in their 
understanding of the Christian ethic, of taking and giving 
back; "To the large number of saleswomen who so graciously 
wait on us at the stores," Lucia Additon wrote, "we ask the 
privilege of also being gracious to them, by supplying them 
with a comfortable convenient place to rest . . . Willard 
in particular strove to extend the claims of "local 
propinquity" widely, particularly toward the needy.
On the inevitable other hand, the class and racial 
assumptions of the WCTU workers— some relatively benign, 
many malignant— were never far below the surface. The 
suggested regime for "wayward" girls in the "Hope and Help 
Rooms," for.example, is described in a leaflet put out by
’’Addition, Twenty Years, p. 51.
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the National Union's Social Purity Department and sent to 
all interested locals. The regulations admonish the girls 
to "conform strictly to the rules, be neat and industrious, 
and listen attentively to such advice as may be given them 
by the ladies in charge." The girls must submit to being 
thoroughly searched on entering for liquor, firearms, or 
"objectionable literature;" letters written and received 
must be read by the Matron; and all "inmates" must learn 
general housekeeping skills. The leaflet dictated that the 
discipline of the home should be "strictly parental," 
including "family" worship in the morning and the evening.*0 
Perhaps this was an effort by Union workers to recreate what 
they believed to be the atmosphere of the birth home their 
"inmates" had grown up in; most likely they did not search 
their own daughters for firearms when they came home.
Clearly the Union was out not just to "help" but to 
reform. An early history of the temperance movement, Joseph 
Gusfield's Symbolic Crusade, made much of the panic which 
Protestant, Anglo-Saxon Americans felt at the influx of 
disorderly foreigners and the consequent decline of their
,0"Rules and Regulations for Hope and help Rooms," 
Social Purity Department, WCTU (n.p.,n.d.).
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own status and culture.11 The "social control" 
interpretation has been rightly viewed with suspicion by 
subsequent historians,12 in part as caricaturing the 
motives of reformers; and certainly temperance women had 
every good reason to fear the effects of male.alcoholism on 
the family, a concern they shared with all other feminists.
Class concerns were a real issue for temperance women, 
though. They did fear the changing nature of Protestant 
culture as it became more heterogeneous; diversity 
threatened the commonality that marked the evangelical 
feminists' view of society. More important, perhaps, were 
the fears they had for their own children. "Class," not as 
a concrete assignment to a category but as an experience of 
social relations, constituted a set of expectations, in this 
case expectations mothers had for children. In the changing
“Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status. Politics, 
and the American Temperance Movement (Urbana, 111., 1966).
“Starting with Lois Banner, "Religious Benevolence as 
Social Control: A Critique of an Interpretation," (Journal 
of.American History, vol. 60 no. 1 (1973), pp. 23-41) social 
historians have enthusiastically insulted the social control 
theory of reformer-reformee relations in addition because it 
posits a lifeless and passive lower order who sat around 
waiting to be reformed. Recently Linda Gordon's book on 
family violence, Heroes of their Own Lives: The Politics and 
History of Family Violence. Boston. 1880-1960 (New York, 
1988), also treats with sympathy and understanding the 
middle level caseworkers in social service agencies.
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work settings of the late nineteenth century, and with the 
wholesale departures of sons and daughters both for the 
city, "class'1 expectations were confused. Who they would 
be, where they would work, who their friends would be, what 
they would do with leisure time, how well they would live—  
answers to these questions were vaguer than in the pre­
industrial world, and left mothers fearful. In seeking to 
reform the "wayward" sort according to their own lights, 
mothers tried to establish a middle-class milieu for their 
children as they knew it, and eliminate dangerous 
alternatives. Often this was done at the expense of their 
"clientele."
On occasion, class concerns emerged in an even more 
self-interested way, as with the Salem, New Jersey's, local 
Kitchen and Garden Dept., which functioned openly as a 
training school for household help, rescuing girls from a 
looming "shiftless, indolent womanhood" and maintaining "its 
reputation for efficient table servants." The work was 
supported one year by a public exhibition, to which 400 
tickets were sold to watch pupils set tables, "accompanying 
their work with songs and recitations."”
The maternal politics of the WCTU presented
"Harriet Van Meter, First Quarter Century of the WCTU 
of Salem, New Jersey (n.p., 1909), pp. 42-52.
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particularly acute problems in a country with the large 
racial and ethnic minorities of the United States, and 
raises questions about what kind of society a "connective 
politics" could flourish in.'4 £ ?t-ernal relationship is
loving; but it is not a relationship of equals, and is not 
the obvious appropriate paradigm for the relationship 
between citizens within the state. A conversation between 
parent and child, or people who have taken on those roles, 
differs greatly from a conversation between adults: There is 
an overlay of obligation, judgment, perhaps guilt or fear, 
that sets it off from a conversation between rational 
strangers at arm's length. Further, the tendency of the 
mother, properly in the early period of life, is to 
infantilize the child by caring for it, making decisions for 
it, tending to its needs. But the goal of good parenthood 
is to have your children leave home; and while the WCTU had 
a strong sense of charity, they also envisioned a kind of 
permanent dependence, of children and the working class 
both.
Consciously or not, the Union's "maternalism"
,4In her article Gender and Jurisprudence Robin West 
does not go far toward defining what a "connective politics" 
would actually mean when translated into a political system; 
nor is it clear exactly how a feminist "connective" politics 
would differ from a socialist politics.
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particularly toward racial and ethnic minorities was 
extremely offensive and condescending. This attitude was 
manifest in frequent parodies of heavily accented speech, 
transcribing it cutely as they would baby talk. One 
particularly awful pamphlet, "A Temperance Picnic" by Mrs. 
Nellie H. Bradley, was an original temperance musical based 
on the story of the old woman in the shoe, updated to give 
her a large adopted brood of mixed heritage. The speech of 
each group— represented by Fat Fritz, Lean Pat, Hop Sing 
Choo, and Saucy Sambo— was caricatured relentlessly by "von 
laty mit leetle vite ribbons." Fat Fritz— and Germans in 
general as the chief beer guzzlers— were the main targets; 
one story showed the low type of humanity who insisted on 
his "rights" to drink or sell liquor by parodying a German 
saloon keeper who, when closed down by the law, rushed off 
"to see mein gounsel when I no got some right to mein own 
proberty."M
Stories like these were of a piece with the WCTU's 
attitude towards other ethnic practices; their ruthless 
campaign against the German family beer hall showed how 
little tolerance they had for customs that outraged their 
own sensibilities. Intolerance is not confined to mothers;
,sNellie H. Bradley, A Temperance Picnic (New York 
1888); Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 70.
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but the license which WCTU women felt that a "maternal" 
politics gave them seems to have exacerbated the perception 
of dependency and the distance between themselves and the 
people they were trying to influence, and to re-enforce the 
inegalitarian nature of the relationship. Perhaps in 
another time and a more homogeneous society, a "maternal" 
politics would come out looking quite different. But at 
least in nineteenth-century America, with the heavy 
ideological baggage already attached to the maternal role, 
and the deep class and race divisions, maternal politics 
had to work against heavy odds to be truly democratic. The 
paradox of maternal governance, in the home as in the state, 
lies in the tension between care and coercion; the WCTU 
seemed to have mastered both.
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Chapter V - "Organized Mother Love" 
and the Maternal State
Under the curse, man has mapped out the state 
as his largest sphere, and the home as 
woman's largest; under the blessing, man and 
woman shall map out home as the one true 
state, and she who, during centuries of 
training, has learned how to govern there, 
shall help man make the great, cold, 
heartless state a warm, kind, and protecting 
home ... The White Ribbon women would invade 
the masculine ... hierarchy of church and 
state; and ring out in clear but gentle 
voices the oft-repeated declaration of the 
Master whom they serve: "Behold, I make all 
things new.”1
With these words Frances Willard, the president of the 
Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), revealed a 
cherished goal of the temperance movement: the 
transformation of national, state, and local governments 
into agents of moral reform. Its achievement required a 
revolutionary reinterpretation of the relations between 
church and state, and the creation of a maternalist 
government with Christ as its acknowledged head, caring for 
the needs and regulating the moral behavior of its citizens.
Dissatisfaction with social conditions led temperance 
women initially to imagine a more perfect state. The
Frances E. Willard, WCTU presidential address of 1887, 
quoted in Nancy Hardesty, Women Called to Witness: 
Evangelical Feminism in the 19th Century (Nashville, 1984), 
p. 154.
267
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
regulation of gender relations was clearly an element of 
temperance, in allowing women to regulate male drinking 
habits, an important part of male culture and the source of 
much conflict within the home. But the Union's political 
theory went well beyond sexual antagonism and repression.1 
Seeking an expanded role for women in defining and securing 
government redress for domestic wrongs and the brutal 
conditions of wage labor, temperance women necessarily 
reenvisioned government. As they articulated new welfare 
obligations and capacities in the state, they also pictured 
government in their own image— the feminization of the 
state. The watchword here was not paternalism but 
maternalism, or "organized mother love," and a healthy 
extension of domestic values into the canons of government. 
By seeking to make "politics a home question" temperance 
women were asserting more than their right to participate: 
their entry into the political arena coincided with the 
transformation of government from "a coarse and clumsy 
instrument by which military and police forces are dictated" 
to "the flexible, changing, and delicately adjusted 
instrument of many and varied educative, charitable, and
2This is the interpretation for much of the woman's 
temperance movement suggested by Barbara Epstein in The 
Politics of Domesticity: Women. Evangelism, and Temperance 
in Nineteenth-Centurv America (Middletown, Conn., 1981).
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supervisory functions”.3 As Willard pictured it, women 
would help men to make ”the great, cold, heartless state a 
warm, kind, and protecting home ..."4
A state so construed needed the services of women 
"wherever the state touches the personal life of the infant, 
the child, the youth, or the aged, helpless, defective in 
mind, body, or moral nature ...” Stressing government's 
increasingly "maternal" or welfare functions, women asserted 
the need for their services in a government which, whenever 
it undertook such work, entered into "the area of 
distinctive feminine training and power" in pursuit of the 
ends of "justice" and "fraternity".3 Frances Willard said 
"reform and philanthropic movements are but associated 
efforts to make the world more homelike. Society and 
government have long been fathered, but they have not been
sWillard, Glimpses of Fifty Years (Chicago, II., 1889), 
p. 593; Anna Garlin Spencer, "Fitness of Women to Become 
Citizens," in The History of Woman Suffrage. Stanton, 
Elizabeth Cady, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, 
et al., eds., (6 vols., New York, 1881-1922), vol. 4, pp. 
308-9; Frances E. Willard, "The Coming Brotherhood," Arena 
vol. 6 (1892), p. 320.
4Frances E. Willard, Presidential address, WCTU annual 
meeting, 1887 (see Minutes of Annual Meetings, WCTU 
microfilm series).
*Spencer, "Fitness of Women."
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mothered enough to make them normal."*
This vision of the maternal state was rooted in a 
Christian ideal which sought to extrapolate the individual 
obligation to charity to bind the state/ so that "the 
manifestation of love to one's neighbor is the duty of the 
state as a public community."7
For evangelicals, the ties between citizens were analogous 
to the ties between family members, as binding and as 
permanent.
The contrast with liberal feminists was clear. 
Antebellum liberals had relied heavily on the language of 
slavery to describe their legal position under coverture; 
disenfranchised, unable to hold property or keep their 
earnings. After the war, Stanton in particular, influenced 
by free-love thought, extended the paradigm of slavery and 
freedom to describe the physical relations of unhappy 
husbands and wives as well as their property relations, 
advocating "divorce at will" as a remedy analogous to 
emancipation. In her writings on divorce Stanton pictured 
the essence of slavery as the slave's inability to change 
employers at will and bargain for the terms of service, as
*Willard, Do Everything: a Handhnnlc for the World's 
White_Ribboners (Chicago, 1895), p. 165.
7Willard, Do Everything, p. 30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
271
she sought to recast marriage as a consensual relationship, 
entered into voluntarily by the parties, and dissoluble when 
either of the parties wished to end the contract. In 
Stanton's view the bonds which bound family members should 
no more be permanent than those which constituted employer- 
employee relations or a business partnership, to be 
dissolved, not without thought, but certainly for cause: 
otherwise mistakes were too costly.1
The WCTU never came to espouse divorce in this period. 
It recognized that wives of drunkards needed legal 
separation with provisions for maternal custody and 
financial support; but for most evangelical feminists, as 
indeed for many of Stanton's own supporters, the concept of 
dissoluble marriage was too troubling. They rejected the 
analogy to slavery and the call to women's "emancipation” as 
having "associations and ... history ... not to our 
advantage."9
Further, evangelical feminists rejected notions of free 
contract as a model of family relations. Such language for 
many feminists undercut the depth, the gravity, the
*See Chap. II for Stanton's views on marriage and 
divorce.
Frances E. Willard, "Address Before the Second 
Biennial Convention of the World's WCTU ... 1893" (London, 
1893), p.. 35.
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permanence of the marriage and maternal bond. They 
accepted, though sometimes ruefully, that "we are tied from 
the moment we enter the world, and are probably the better 
and happier for it, though we may rebel against it ..."l0 
Rather than the freely willed, voluntary contractual 
agreement, the freedom to untie a bad marriage and try 
again, they stressed the mutual obligations of the ongoing 
relationship, a particular version of the obligations each 
owed all human beings.
For most liberal and evangelical feminists, their views 
of the structure of family obligations extended outward to 
shape their views of the obligations of the state.
Stanton's notion of individual self-ownership and radical 
bodily autonomy became the basis of her view of citizenship. 
"Protection" for Stanton was a word out of the feudal past, 
which smacked of slavery and the harem, as well as the 
traditional family.
Evangelical feminists, by contrast, extrapolated what 
they saw as the duties of family out into the civil sphere 
to create the maternal state, where the ideal of the 
obligations of each to each other was mediated through a 
benevolent welfare state. Willard openly espoused
“Jane Croly, For Better or Worse; A Book for Some Men 
and All Women (Boston, 1875), p. 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
273
"protection" as the state's highest duty, deriving the 
Union's suffrage slogan "Home Protection" from the language 
of tariff.11 Willard's use of the term "wage slavery" 
recognized the powerlessness and dependence of the worker, 
but she did not see the contractual model as the remedy for 
inequality in the state, either. By the 1880's and 90's, 
free labor ideology as a way of restructuring the labor 
market had lost its appeal particularly for evangelicals, 
with their social outlook and critique of industrial 
capitalism.
Further, the obligations of citizens to each other were 
not so fragile as contractual ties. As in the family, duty 
to others was a divinely imposed, life-long relationship, 
not revocable by human will. This idea of non-voluntary 
obligations as the foundation and the measure of what the 
state owed its citizens put evangelical feminists outside an 
important ongoing dialogue in the broader society on 
individual rights based on the language of slavery and on 
notions of free contract, a dialogue into which Stanton fit 
quite well.12 At the same time, by continuing in part in
“Willard, Glimpses, p. 401.
“See Amy Dru Stanley, "Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: 
Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation," Journal of 
American History, vol. 75 no. 2 (Sept. 1988), pp. 471-500.
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the explicitly religious tradition of antebellum feminists, 
in which rights were sought to enable an individual to 
perform duties to the whole, evangelicals could more 
effectively hold government and industry to a standard of 
legitimacy based, not on its dealings vis-^-vis any 
individual, but on its performance within the whole social 
context; the Union sought to set up a strict standard for 
"legitimate industry," for example, which was "that every 
other industry is benefited and helped by it."13
The brand of gospel socialism which Willard and the 
WCTU espoused in the last quarter of the century was 
informed in important ways by their religious outlook. 
Evangelical feminists' Christian statism depended on a 
corporate rather than a pluralistic community, and to this 
end Union literature repeatedly rejected any kind of 
sectarianism or denominationalism in favor of common goals 
and drawing together as wide a circle as possible. Such 
tolerance obviously furthered the Union's recruitment power, 
without being strained too far: the overwhelming majority of 
members were white Protestant women.
But Willard's theory of the state necessarily implied a 
homogeneous society as well, and both the Union's rhetoric
“Willard, "The Coming Brotherhood," Arena, vol. 6 
(1892), pp. 317-324.
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and active agenda stressed, not just missionary outreach, 
but transcending barriers between races, classes, ethnic 
groups, and sexes.1* Willard even campaigned to heal the 
split between still-estranged Northerners and Southerners, 
returning from extensive travel in the South to tell her 
flock that Southerners were "just our sort of folks."15 As 
Willard's aspirations moved from a national to an 
international temperance movement she became increasingly 
liberal in her religious views, stressing ethics "found in 
the Bible and questioned by no sane mind whether Jew, 
Gentile, Catholic, or Protestant."1* Eventually her 
tolerance grew to the point where "nothing good seems 
secular to me."17
This commonality, the ability to make ethical 
generalizations across class, race, religious, and sexual 
divisions, served as a critical prop of the feminized 
Christian corporate state. For Stanton, the state's 
reaching to "touch the personal lives" of its citizens was
“The language used here is often the language of the 
mother reconciling siblings.
“Willard, Glimpses, p. 372.
“Willard, Glimpses, p. 463.
“Frances E. Willard, "Address Before the 22nd Annual 
Meeting of the National WCTU ..." (see Minutes, Annual 
Meeting, WCTU microfilm series), pp. 7-8.
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tantamount to assault; in her radical individualist world 
the state could never touch each citizen according to each 
one's different needs, and its "protection” was only 
universal degradation: better to keep the state away. 
Evangelicals, by contrast, subscribed to the Golden Rule as 
the first principle of governance, a rule far more potent 
for its assumption that you could know how to treat others, 
because in fact they were like you. The implication was 
that you could know and love your neighbor in some deep way 
not possible in Stanton's world. This knowledge allowed an 
empathy which served as the compelling basis of charitable 
obligation, so that "eventually we shall conceive of society 
as a unity which has such relation to every fraction thereof 
that there could be no rest while any lacked food, clothing, 
or shelter, or while any were so shackled by the grim 
circumstances of life that they were unable to develop the 
best that was in them both body and mind."1*
At the same time, this commonality served as the basis 
of the regulatory impulse; what Stanton saw as officious and 
coercive, temperance women saw as encouraging or enforcing 
the behavior which would naturally prevail in each 
individual in the absence of sin or the depredations of
l,Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention," p.
52.
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poverty. Willard often pictured teetotalism as the 
foundation, prohibition as merely the legal superstructure 
which must rest on a base of public sentiment, and she 
sought to create the conditions for uniform behavior. For 
evangelicals, unlike liberal individualists, free will still 
did not lie in the ability to do anything, but in the 
ability to do good; as the first of the WCTU's Declarations ' 
of Principle stated, "we believe in the coming of His 
kingdom whose service is perfect freedom ...1,18
The theory of the liberal individual looked to the 
growth of the self through individuation and 
differentiation; maturation for evangelicals consisted of 
the voluntary fulfillment of divine and natural laws created 
for the health and happiness of human beings. By the 1880's 
and 90's the language of the WCTU in its war against liquor 
had changed; most of it did not support restrictive or penal 
measures against drunkenness and other offenses because they 
were sinful or individual transgressions, but because they 
harmed society, robbing it of the individual's contribution, 
as well as being offenses against the family and the self.26
19Willard, "Address ... 22nd Annual Meeting," pp. 1, 3.
“Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention," p.
31. See also Stevenson, Katherine L. A Brief History of 
the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (2d ed.; Evanston,
111., 1907), p. 99.
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This broad vision of public accountability to the community 
of those like you included vices as well as crimes because 
they were antisocial and detrimental to the common good, 
where "each man's habits of life should be an example safe 
and beneficent to every other man."21
The Evangelical Theory of Rights
The concept of private rights, private assets— of 
privacy itself— meant much less in such a world. In a 
single body— the corporate state— where "injury to a part is 
injury to a whole" no part is free to act alone; each must 
give up the "abstract right of unrestricted behavior."22 
Nor can any member enforce privacy as against other members 
of the same body, for where a single normative standard 
applies privacy has little value, and usually signifies 
deviation.
The WCTU understood "private" as describing, not the 
home, but the plethora of male institutions closed to women, 
from the saloon and smoking car to the voting booth; the 
secrecy of those places nurtured behavior harmful to the 
family and community. Members of the WCTU worked for
“Willard, Do Everything, p. 1.
“Stevenson, Brief History, p. 99; Willard, Frances E. 
Woman_and Temperance {Hartford, Conn., 1883), p. 491.
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complete openness within communities, so that each 
individual's behavior could be scrutinized by all. One 
resolution urged prohibition of painted or frosted windows 
or doors in saloons and bars, so that all could have a 
"distinct view" of the goings-on inside; another stressed 
municipal installations of street lamps to prevent evildoers 
from doing their evil— "And God said 'let there be 
light.'"23 Union members understood that the advances of 
science would aid the quest for transparency, happily 
quoting Thomas Edison's belief that "in a few years the 
world will be just like one big ear; it will be unsafe to 
speak in a house until one has examined the walls and 
furniture for concealed phonographs." In the world of 
benign authority imagined by the WCTU, this civil 
libertarian's nightmare held out instead the fantastic hope 
of "a cessation of gossip in the earth, and then the 
millennium. God speed the photograph!"24 Here we have the 
encephalitic corporate body swollen with outsized eyes and 
ears, and those clearly female.
In refusing to romanticize Robinson Crusoe,25 Frances
“Union Signal. 18 January 1883, p. 12; 24 October 
1889, p. 1.
“Union Signal. Jan. 16, 1884, p. 9.
25See Chap. IV, p. 3.
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Willard rejected the state of nature, or as she defined it 
•'the solitary state," as any kind of Golden Age, and as 
completely incompatible with the ideal of Christian 
community. For Willard the "solitary state" was an 
artificial construct rendered invalid because it failed to 
account for one of humankind's two natural instincts— the 
primal instinct of self-preservation and "another far more 
high and sacred— I mean the instinct of a mother's love" (a 
civilized, Christianized version, perhaps, of the species' 
instinct to propagate) ,2‘ The "solitude" of the state of 
nature, then, was compromised from the beginning by the 
maternal relationship. Crusoe himself, lordly in his prime, 
would still have perished a helpless infant without maternal 
care.
In addition, using solitude as a measure of an ideal 
life was the merest delusion; who, Willard asked quite 
sensibly, knew anyone living on a desert island? And the 
translation of solitary practices to the "crowded realm of 
civilization" would be catastrophic. "Out on his island, 
Robinson could reach forth his nimble fingers and gather 
whatever seemed to him good for food ... but suppose him 
transferred to this capital city of Iowa, and practicing the
2*Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 453.
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same light-fingered method in your grocery store, good 
citizen, or at your pantry shelf, dear lady!" where all 
live cheek by jowl, freedom is "but a drawing of the circuit 
of one person's liberty just so large around and far across 
as is consistent with the number of circles to be drawn 
within a given space."21
Liberals and evangelicals alike agreed on the circle 
that separated one's fist from another's nose. Other 
circles proved harder to draw. Despite Willard's claim to 
be able to delineate the spheres of rights with 
"mathematical precision" the two sides disagreed vehemently 
over the definition and boundaries of the individual's 
"personal liberty."a# Liberals prized it; and used it as a 
shield against a variety of regulatory assaults, including 
prohibition measures. Evangelicals were enraged by what 
they saw as the irresponsible and antisocial use of 
"personal liberty," and crusaded to discredit the term and 
reveal the selfishness and malice concealed by its noble 
ring. They put the phrase into the mouths of the supposedly 
disreputable; the black father who won't interfere with his 
children's personal liberty and so lets them rob chicken
27Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 491.
2,Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 491.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
282
coops; the drunk who believes in "human rights— the right to 
think/as one pleases, on issues of the day/in the fullest 
the right to drink the master who claims the right to
enslave.” Willard warned of the dangers in store for a 
society which worshiped liberty excessively, 
melodramatically quoting Mme Roland on her way to the Paris 
scaffold— "Oh Liberty! What crimes are committed in thy 
sacred name! "30
"Personal liberty" was an anachronism for Frances 
Willard, soon to be superceded, because it pretended to a 
false scope of action. The law, as it should, protected 
noses, and denied a "personal liberty" to break them. But 
the law, too, was a blunt instrument: it accorded to 
bartenders "the right" to pour the equally harmful drink, 
and to factory owners the right to keep workers laboring in 
killing conditions for little pay. Willard's view, for its 
flaws, tried to comprehend the broader scope of harm in 
human relations, the injustices not compassed under existing 
tort or contract law. In "love thy neighbor" vein Willard 
insisted that personal liberty in Christian civilization 
required a citizen to give up certain "rights," to
”Union Signal# 4 January 1883, p. 2; Granite State 
Outlook# vol. 1 no. 7 {July 1891), p. 2.
30Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 495.
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understand that "otherhood must be fully recognized in 
preference to selfhood. "31
Injunctions against overt harm were inadequate: each 
citizen had a responsibility to know how his or her behavior 
affected others indirectly as well, perhaps even an 
affirmative duty to help them. Implicit and sometimes 
explicit in this reasoning was a critique of legal doctrines ' 
of causation, which limited culpability to certain 
restricted fact situations. In Willard's broad assessment 
of responsibility, even a vote could be culpable: a vote for 
license made a "ballot ... a link in the chain of causation, 
which shall lengthen itself out into every misery and every 
sin."32 Several states actually made bartenders liable in 
civil suits brought by drunkards' impoverished families, and 
the WCTU enthusiastically aided the bringing of such 
actions, the closest they came to establishing the legal 
culpability they felt should naturally flow from the moral 
guilt.33
“Frances E. Willard, speech, in scrapbook 7, WCTU 
series, reel 30; Frances E. Willard, address (1894), 
scrapbook 11, WCTU series, reel 31.
“Frances E. Willard, in Werner's Recitations and 
Readings (New York, 1898), p. 24. This is the same language 
used by antebellum feminists and cited in Chap. I.
33Stebbins, Jane. Fifty Years: History of the 
Temperance Cause (Hartford, Conn., 1876), p. 296; Willard,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
284
Liberty, then, was a relative and not an absolute 
value; and "personal" an inapt modifier for a power which 
could only be properly used in reciprocity with others. In 
1883 Hannah Whitall Smith gave a "Hobby Party" with a theme 
of personal liberty, and each guest was to come representing 
his or her definition. The Union Signal reported that, 
while some went for the "German idea" of unfettered freedom, 
most thought it a "relative" term; the definitions included 
"liberty to do right," and one which credited the greatest 
personal liberty to those who "most unconsciously obey ... 
most laws"— laws as the larger principle laid down by God 
for the happiness of all.34
While they negated the concept, or at least the scope, 
of the liberal conception of personal liberty, evangelical 
women put forth their own definitions. Rights necessarily 
occupied a different place in a relational than in a 
liberal, individualist scheme, although they were not 
nonexistent there as some have claimed. Temperance women 
did not completely eschew individual rights; in fact they
Do Everything, p. 150; Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 70, 
p. 83; Samuel Unger, A History of the National Woman's 
Christian Temperance Union (Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State 
University, 1933), p. 12.
34Union Signal. 11 January 1883, p. 9. The article does 
not attempt to describe the costume.
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endorsed the individual rights argument for the woman's 
ballot as self-evident. But the extension of suffrage was 
an easy case which represented an enlargement/ not a 
reapportionment or conflict of rights; no one's vote was 
directly threatened or withheld by enlarging the voter pool 
to include women.
Individual rights which fell at the intersection of 
others' interests became a more complex case for Willard, 
without the easy trump quality which liberal proponents 
claimed for them. In large measure this was because for 
evangelical women the purpose of rights was not to promote 
the individual, but to reconstitute the family and the 
community. WCTU women's claims that their work as mothers 
to the community entitled them to vote was not a ruse, or 
even necessarily proof of a second-class feminist agenda. 
Since they defined themselves relationally and not 
individually, rights were most meaningful in a context; most 
useful when used for others; most earned by the work which 
put "otherhood ... in preference to selfhood"— again, a 
Christian ideal.”
Rights represented in large part a remedial measure to 
compensate for the defects of families, who through death,
“Frances E. Willard, speech, scrapbook 7, WCTU series, 
reel 30; Woman and Temperance, p. 454.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
286
dissolution, or incapacity could not protect the physical 
and emotional well-being of their members— a growing class 
in industrializing urban America. The ballot's value was in 
caring for "the impoverished, disgraced, widowed, orphaned, 
crazed, and idiotized through strong drink ... as the wards 
of the stranger."3* Just as a connected individual had a 
stronger identity than the isolated individual, so suffrage 
had more meaning as a right earned by women's work for 
others than as a trump to be used for one's own ends against 
the world at large.
By the same token, evangelicals understood that, in 
their relational scheme, rights were necessarily curtailed 
as well as enhanced by a connection to others— the more 
familiar, repressive face of the WCTU's program. But again, 
the restriction of rights— say the "right" to drink— was not 
cast as a merely punitive measure taken because drinking was 
a sin, but because the results of the individual's asserting 
his right to drink were terrible harm to the family, and to 
the community, which lost the drinker's labor and had to 
pick up the pieces of his domestic responsibilities. In a 
relational world, there is a social right— a right of 
"others"— which balances the individual right; "the right of
3*Union Signal, vol. 15 no. 43, 24 October 1889, p. 7.
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the individual ceases where the rights of his family, his 
neighbors, and his country begin."37 Even the drinker 
without family ties was committing a wrong; against his 
community, which had an interest in all its members' well­
being; but more especially against God the Father who had 
created and loved him, and agonized over his degradation. 
"Christ's Golden Rule," Frances Willard said, mandated her 
abstinence for her own sake and the sakes of those around 
her, as well as "because of my purpose, by God's grace, to 
invest my life in hastening the day when all men's weal 
shall be each man's care."3*
Union members in the last quarter of the century 
increasingly drew on natural rights language, especially to 
justify suffrage arguments. Willard suggested that it went 
without saying that women had a natural right to the 
ballot.3* She was sincere— but like most evangelical 
feminists probably relieved that such rights were a given, 
and did not merit full discussion. Evangelical feminists
37Union Signal. 25 September 1884, p.4.
“Frances E. Willard, Do Everything, p. 36.
“Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 355; Frances E. 
Willard, "Questions to Specialists," Our Dav: A Record and 
Review of Current Reform, vol. 1 (1888), p. 169; Ruth 
Bordin, Frances Willard. A Biography (Chapel Hill, 1986), p. 
100.
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were not fully comfortable with the free-standing notion of 
"rights": any right, including the ballot, was far more 
meaningful when seen as a part of the web of talents, 
powers, and responsibilities which bound all together.40 
Although the union between rights and responsibilities was 
sacred in antebellum feminism, liberal feminists in the 
later nineteenth century had tried to uncouple rights and 
duties. The temperance women continued to insist that "we 
are responsible to humanity in exact proportion to the power 
of which we are custodians," and acted accordingly.41
Evangelical feminists shared with liberals a sense of 
the "natural" or physical laws which governed human life, as 
well, using them as a standard by which to judge the human. 
The WCTU did not develop this standard into a full-blown or 
precise set of anterior claims as revolutionary Americans 
did; nor did claims to civil rights define its content. 
Rather, temperance women invoked the broad, perfectionist
40Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 454; Stevenson,
Brief History, p. 15. Such an interpretation obviously 
raises questions debated within contemporary feminism— does 
it signify an immaturity, insecurity, lack of autonomy? an 
ethos of care? Is it progressive? Regressive? An element 
unfamiliar to us but critical to evangelical belief is the 
sense of divinely imposed affirmative duty to others— an 
idea with more starch in it than the psychologically based 
"ethos of care," and one which mandated political action.
41Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention," p.
33.
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principles of antebellum feminism before they focused on 
legal remedies.
The early woman's movement derived much of its program 
from a newly liberal interpretation of God's designs, most 
explicitly set out by outlying denominations like the 
Unitarians and Universalists, and by ministers like Theodore 
Parker and the Channings. That vision recast the scowling 
Calvinist God casually damning his children into a 
benevolent deity whose ultimate goal was the perfection and 
happiness of each individual human life, and the full 
development and use of its talents. For liberals in the 
post-war period God's new concern for human welfare became a 
mandate for self-development.
Although evangelical feminists did not stress 
individual development with the same enthusiasm as liberals, 
evangelical and liberal feminists alike acknowledged the 
"natural" laws of human health as conducive to woman's full 
development, and showed a dedication to the naturalistic 
health movements of the nineteenth century aimed at 
releasing women from the unhealthy prison of their confining 
clothes and inactive lifestyles. Willard even spoke of the 
WCTU as an exponent of "the reign of a religion of the 
body," where a body healthy through abstinence becomes "the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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temple of the Holy Ghost."42
Unlike liberals, evangelicals went on to interpret 
freedom from alcohol as a critical condition of physical as 
well as moral and financial health, and so established an 
anterior principle by which many laws failed; "No 
legislation can bargain away the public health or public 
morals."43 Holiness deriving from physical wholeness 
translated not just into self culture, but into platforms 
and programs which encompassed welfare obligations as well 
as more structural reforms like support for the living wage, 
on the grounds that physical well being was necessary for 
the individual's full growth. From our vantage point it is 
easy to underestimate the power of the religious critique; 
but in a time when Christian forms were deeply embedded in 
the public consciousness, and Christian language still 
resonated in the public as well as the private ear, such a 
critique sprang from a common ethos external to the realm of 
law and politics through which to formulate criticism and 
reforms. Religion provided the lay public in this period 
with a route of powerful and legitimate criticism not
42Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 42; see also Leach, 
William, True Love and Perfect Union: The Feminist Reform of 
Sex and Society (New York, 1980), passim.
43Frances Willard, in Werner's Recitations, p. 72 
("Home Protection").
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available today.
In addition to their focus on rights as a route to self 
culture, evangelical feminists distrusted liberals' abstract 
talk of rights for another reason: they saw them as only an 
intermediate step in achieving just governance, not as the 
final and most important protection for the individual. 
Ultimately, "rights" was a stage to be superceded. In her 
annual address to the convention of 1892, Willard laid out 
her theory of rights as an evolution in three stages. The 
first was "set up in the camp of the savage," and consisted 
of a primitive theory of "personal rights" to "life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." (Seemingly she 
would consign much of traditional American political 
philosophy to this camp.)
The second, more advanced state recognized "meum and 
teum," in the ability to say "thou shalt, and thou shalt 
not"— the prohibitory power, or the recognition of communal 
over individual rights, representing the present age. But 
this stage too was deficient.
The highest evolutionary stage was to be achieved in 
the Christian state where "government by law is exchanged 
for that mightiest of all government— public sentiment. The 
moral tone of society declared by resistless common consent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
292
what the law demanded by fines and penalties."41 Here 
Willard pictured the withering away of the state in favor of 
citizens' advancement to "the corps of the self-governed" 
living under the Golden Rule.45 Rights in a liberal scheme 
served to protect individuals from each other and from the 
government. In a true moral community/ where standards were 
consensual, where all were "sisters" and "brothers," and 
where government was the "organ of social consciousness," 
there is no need for "rights."44
But Willard also acknowledged that Gilded Age society 
fell short of a real moral community, and worked to impress 
on the public a hierarchy of rights not congruent with that 
of the liberals. As shown by the prohibition of social 
offenses less than crimes (drunkenness, for example), the 
right of society superceded the individual when the two came 
into conflict. Willard and other union members often spoke
"Frances E. Willard, annual address, WCTU Convention
1892. (See Minutes of Annual Meeting, WCTU Microfilm 
Series.)
45Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 26.
44Spencer, "Fitness of Women;" Willard, Woman and 
Temperance, p. 20; Stevenson, Brief History, pp. 102-103; 
Plan of Work and Circular Letter of the WCTU (n.p., n.d.), 
p. 2. Willard's vision resembles Stanton's in anticipating 
the demise of a system of laws, but substitutes an ongoing 
moral community as the ordering force instead of Stanton's
self governing individual.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
293
of the "equally self-evident social right" which balanced 
the rights of individuals. Towards the end of her life, as 
Willard's interests and dedication to socialist principles 
grew, she increasingly pursued the social over the 
individual good.47 But from early on it was a utilitarian 
tenet of the movement that "the public good far transcends 
private interest and convenience. The law is for the 
greatest good of the greatest number, and therefore it is 
for the individual to yield when his plans would subvert the 
broader foundations. "4*
The assertion of "social rights" ultimately undergirded 
what became after Willard's death an increasingly regressive 
campaign against human pleasures, and a theocratic agenda 
which included not just prohibition but curfews, media 
censorship, school prayer and Bible reading, and a host of 
ether moral regulations. But in the heady period of the 
1880's and 90's, the WCTU, though it had its own agenda, 
worked in harmony with the burgeoning labor movement, 
particularly the Knights of Labor; Christian socialists;
47Union Signal# 25 September 1884, p. 7; Willard, Woman 
and Temperance, p. 493; Frances E. Willard, "Address"
(1894), Scrapbook 11, WCTU microfilm series, reel 31.
4,Stebbins, Fifty Years, p. 285. See also Daniel T. 
Rodgers, "Why Was There No Utilitarianism in Nineteenth- 
Century America?", paper delivered at the Davis Seminar, 
Princeton University, Oct. 17, 1986.
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ethical economists like Richard Ely; and progressive and 
populist political movements. Particularly in this 
political context, the idea of social right took on a more 
positive content as well.
Far more than the idea of "individual" rights could (a 
concept which does not work well in our legal system for 
those without titles or deeds), the idea of "social right" 
or public good expanded to claims for economic justice.
Coming at the problem not from the standpoint of "what do I
✓
own" but "how can society's needs best be met," the WCTU 
developed a standard of redistributive justice based on 
God's design for human happiness, and for the sanctity and 
full development of each mind, soul, and body. As one Union 
member said in support of the living wage, a cause the Union 
fully subscribed to, "To hinder one of the least of our 
brethren from properly fulfilling his appointed place in the 
great whole, is to disturb the equilibrium of the entire 
moral and social structure ... and to interfere with the 
plan of the Great Architect."49
49Stevenson, Brief History, p. 104. See also Union 
Signal, vol. 15, no. 40 (Oct. 3, 1889), p. 2. This language 
is also reminiscent of antebellum formulations of rights; 
see Chap. I.
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Local Governance
Unlike the "liberal" state, whose citizens were always 
looking over their shoulders, fearful of intrusion, the 
benevolent maternal state which "touches the personal life" 
of its constituency, presented little threat to its 
constituents. Although they drew on antebellum feminism, 
the evangelical feminists of the later nineteenth century 
differed in their enthusiastic recourse to the state, 
reminiscent of the theocratic Christian nationalism George 
Frederickson finds in male thinkers of the war and postwar 
period.50 Their growing fidelity to the institution of 
government was only possible, though, because temperance 
women saw government as the most effective means of 
administering protective measures.
More importantly, the state was not a separate or alien 
being, not the public realm to any private: in common form 
it was simply the largest of the concentric circles moving 
outward from the heart, or "the great, kind, farsighted 
human family as a corporate firm of We, Us, and Co .
S0George M. Frederickson, The Inner Civil War: Northern 
Intellectuals and the Crisis of the Union (New York, 1968), 
chapter 9.
“Frances E. Willard, "Address . . .  (to the) Woman's 
National Council of the United States at Its First Triennial 
Meeting ... 1891" (Indianapolis, 1891), p. 20.
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Edward Bellamy's utopian novel "Looking Backward" came 
out in 1887, and by late that year Frances Willard was 
corresponding with Bellamy, and an enthusiastic supporter of 
the Nationalism Movement touched off by his tract. Bellamy 
seems to have brought to life many of the Union's dreams 
with breathtaking sweep in his design of a benevolent state 
which would step in to care for every aspect of its 
citizens' lives, very like the maternal state envisioned by 
temperance women. A number of writers have pointed out the 
contradictions, overlooked by Willard, between the 
democratic, egalitarian bent of feminism, and potential for 
anti-individualism in even a "benign" all-powerful state.” 
Certainly Bellamy's state had much to offer women, whom 
Leach rightly portrayed as less fearful of appealing to a 
strong state than men.”
But to speak of "state" in the monolithic is deceptive 
in a time when the functions of government were beginning to 
differentiate into the complex organism of today's state. 
Unlike Stanton and Matilda Gage, Willard and her followers 
dreamily underestimated the malignant and coercive potential
“William Leach, "Looking Forward Together: Feminists 
and Edward Bellamy," Democracy. January, 1982, pp. 120-134; 
Bordin, Frances Willard, pp. 145 ff.
“Leach, "Looking Forward," p. 129.
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of the strong state, in part a result of the religious lens 
through which they saw state power. But their creed also 
mandated a level of grass-roots power and activity in the 
WCTU's theory and practice, both which compromised the 
growing power of the centralized, monolithic state in this 
period. While contributing to a theory of the strong state, 
they also helped create a counter ethic of local action, 
incongruous with centralization.
The idea of a single great state was irresistible to 
temperance women. Their corporatism and socialism were 
Christian corporatism and socialism, and despite other 
progressives' secular language the advent of a perfectly 
caring and moral government represented for them the coming 
of the Kingdom of God, and the establishment of the kind of 
Christian state which they knew would prevail after the 
millennium.5* Evangelical women did not fear government, 
in part because the omnipotent state was God in some real 
way. In this light, no groups needed to fear discrimination 
or coercion; denominations, political parties, race, gender, 
and all other artificial barriers— results of "destructive 
criticism of the incomplete masculine mind"— would be
5<Ida Treatault Miller, "Frances E. Willard: Religious 
Leader and Social Reformer," (Ph.D. thesis, Boston 
University, 1978); on millennialism see especially pp. 177 
ff.
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brought down.” Late-nineteenth-century liberals and 
evangelicals engaged each other in an intense struggle over 
the nature of governance in a post-Calvinist world. 
Evangelicals for their part pushed a theocratic vision of a 
strong Christian state; to be suspicious of such power would 
be to scrutinize God.
But in the meantime, while working toward the 
millennium, a strong current of localism ran in the Union. 
The Gilded Age mania for association into clubs and leagues, 
fraternities and'orders, unions and granges, and other types 
of nationally organized societies had its counterpoint in 
the continual breakdown of these organizations into groups 
that were smaller, purer, more narrowly defined. The WCTU 
brilliantly institutionalized the tension between national 
and local within its own structure by organizing Unions at 
local, county, state, and national levels. Each larger unit 
encompassed the smaller in its jurisdiction, but neither was 
preeminent; "the organization ... is a system of links, 
every part of which is essential to the makeup of the whole 
since if one link is missing the chain is broken and
“Willard, "Address ... at the First Triennial 
Meeting... 1891," p. 34; see also Union Signal, vol. 4 no. 7 
(15 Feb. 1883), p. 11.
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rendered incapable of doing full service."5* Local and 
state meetings could rely on the national as much or as 
little as they chose, but had full autonomy at their own 
levels to accept or reject national positions.57
Just as no individual was without significance in the 
Christian scheme, individual effort was paramount to the 
Union's philosophy. Such an emphasis might seem to 
contradict the anti-individualism of the evangelical's 
outlook, but it did not. Although each individual woman had 
to put forth her best work both for herself and for the 
success of the initiative, victory was gained, never through 
the efforts of an individual, but only through the combined 
work of the group. Temperance women often described 
themselves as worker bees in "the great hive of true and 
loving Christian women," or spiders spinning huge, complex 
silken webs. As one WCTU member busily transforming the 
world exclaimed, "Why I feel just like a ray of light 
through a prism!"51
5<WCTU Handbook (2nd ed., Chicago, 1890), p. 8.
57In the southern states, for example, few Unions 
endorsed suffrage, labor issues, or the more adventurous 
social outreach work.
s,Ann Elmore, A Mother's Story (Newark, N.J., 1879), p. 
2; Granite State Outlook, vol. 1 no. 9 (Sept., 1891), p. 4; 
Willard, Do Everything, p. 77.
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Such images are coy, and may reveal a lack of 
confidence in women's ability to change their political 
environment. But Willard and others were stressing 
interdependence and group skills. In direct opposition to 
Stanton's sense of the uniqueness and irreplaceability of 
the individual, here no individual was omnicompetent, and 
all were expendable: if one left, more would rush in to fill 
the vacancy.39 But the pride of the movement was in each 
giving from their own store of power, and at least in theory 
the speech writer at the temperance gathering and the Irish 
serving girl who stood in the rain to prop her mistress gave 
equal shares.90 This theory of contribution was exactly the 
strength of the early mission movement, or "mite societies" 
among women; the idea that many humble donations could spark 
a mighty work helped mobilize the energies and loyalties of 
a wide range of women.91
By this accretion theory, progress is made "a stitch at 
a time, a prayer at a time, a sacrifice here and a supreme
59Frances Willard, "Address Before the 2nd Biennial 
Convention," p. 29.
90Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 143..
91Patricia Hill, The World Their Household: The 
American Woman's Foreign Mission Movement and Cultural 
Transformation. 1870-1920 (Ann Arbor, 1985).
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effort there ..."** This "holy call of individual 
responsibility and systematically united effort" was the key 
to political success; when women and workmen each combined, 
Frances Willard suggested, "the war-dragon shall be slain, 
the poverty viper shall be exterminated, the gold bug 
transfixed by a silver pin ... and the last white slave 
liberated from the woods of Wisconsin."*3 A no-license 
vote, too, on closer viewing turned out a pointillist "snow­
storm of pure Christian prohibition ballots."** The outcome 
in some way depended on each ballot as much as on the 
combined power. Each Christian was equally bound to 
participate personally, to give of themselves in some form; 
under Christian government the idea of delegated 
responsibility could not be squared with individual 
conscience.*5
The metaphor of the chain, the web, the wire which 
connected the dots and gave them power was one of the most 
commonly used by temperance women, and one critical to their
“Stevenson, Brief History, p. 112.
“Willard, Do Everything, p. 29; Willard, "Address ... 
at Its First Triennial Meeting ... 1891", pp. 3-4.
“Willard, Werner's Recitations, p. 38.
“W.C.T.U., Plan of Work, p. 1.
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political theory.” For evangelical Christians the moral 
(i.e./ political) world was deeply responsive, a moral 
ecosystem balanced as delicately as we now know our ecology 
to be; any minor act or omission could cause unlooked-for 
changes many links down the chain. No part of the system 
could thus be insulated, neither public nor private; again 
in the concentric model, ever-widening rings of influence 
agitated and effective "to the remotest bound" of the 
outside circle.*7 One end of a chain of influence was 
tethered by the humblest citizen, the other held in the hand 
of God; for "society and government are but the connecting 
wires of God's great telegraphic system along which he sends 
shocks of power from His own heart."**
Such a political model— the WCTU's in both practice and 
theory— repudiated any centralized state in which God is not 
yet fully realized. The Union's emphasis on the importance 
of individual action, the personal obligation of each to 
each other, created an opening for a genuinely participatory 
politics. Many Union women understood maternal government
**Again, note the similarity to antebellum language in 
Chap. I.
*7Stebbins, Fifty Years History, p. 183; Stevenson, 
Brief History, p. 99.
“Willard, Do Everything, p. 147.
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as a loving, hands-on operation; their message to drunkards 
was "you take the pledge, we'll take it too; you wear the 
badge of ribbon, blue or red, we'll wear it too ..."“
The moving force here is not bold legislative strokes, 
nor presidential decrees from on high, but local action, 
accretion, stitches, steps. Evangelical feminists did not 
distinguish between the coming of righteous government and 
the coming of the Kingdom of God on Earth. And both, in 
their brand of pre-millennialism were achieved in the same 
way, "not suddenly, but little by little, imperceptibly,1 an 
accretion of pure habit and good deeds.'0 Like raising a 
child, raising a society was not done by edict, but was an 
ongoing evolutionary process furthered by "faith and courage 
and hope all the time, and God overhead," and it was fully 
participatory.11
“Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 177. In another 
place Willard recounts the thrill she had with her first 
experience of being hungry and without money, and how she 
walked the streets addressing herself in her mind to the 
poor, "I am a better friend than you dream; I know more 
about you than you think, for...I am hungry, too" (Glimpses, 
p. 344). In practice, of course, "participation" often ended 
up functioning rather undemocratically.
10willard, "Address ... at Its First Triennial Meeting 
... 1891," p. 35.
71Stevenson, Brief History, p. 112.
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Anti-Legalism
In addition to the mandate for personal participation 
at all levels, the WCTU's broad, branching agenda included 
yet another safeguard against electoral politics' growing 
monopoly. The WCTU departed sharply from antebellum 
evangelical precedent in their love affair with regulatory 
legislation. Male and female temperance groups alike were 
infatuated with the heady sense of power, the instant 
results, which a sweeping prohibition amendment or statute 
could bring. But female reformers were ambivalent as well 
about the prospects of the electoral and legislative 
spheres, standing as they did with one foot in and one foot 
out. Their optimism was tempered by their sense of betrayal 
by the political system, and its corruption. After all, the 
kingdom of electoral politics had not yet arrived for women; 
their place in the legislative process was tenuous at best.
Temperance women understood from bitter experience that 
the potential for good implicit in the lawmakers' power was 
undercut by high numbers of drunken and dishonest 
congressmen, governors, judges, and state legislators whose 
treacherous double-dealing defeated so many reform 
initiatives. They felt a strong sense of betrayal by such 
male "allies;" losing faith in men, one woman wrote, left 
only God and woman to redeem society, since legislative
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halls themselves turned out to be the font of the "seething, 
foaming tide of beer and whiskey." The court room proved no 
fairer battleground: some of Satan's "most efficient
agents" were covered in "judicial ermine."72 Lawyers 
"experienced in technicalities of law, guileful in device" 
also confounded courtroom justice with tactics like 
dismissing all temperance sympathizers from the jury panel 
in a prosecution for illegal sale of liquor, forcing the 
sheriff to complete the panel "a tales" with "drinking 
men."73
The evangelical temperance movement was in large part a 
movement of people untrained and unimpressed by the 
complexities of the common law, and reluctant to let legal 
process hinder a "just" result or provide a cloak of 
respectability for wrongdoing. As one Josiah Allen's wife 
asked, if a serpent is writhing through your town eating 
people, "Do you suppose they would rent out that serpent at 
so much a year to crunch and swaller folks accordin' to law? 
And would it be any easier for folks that was crunched and
72See inter alia Union Signal, vol. 4 no. 5 (1 Dec. 
1883), p. 1; vol. 4 no. 9 {1 March 1883), p. 1; Willard, 
Woman and Temperance, pp. 70 ff., 350, 379; Julia Ames, 
Platform Voices: Choice Temperance Recitations for Old and 
Young (Chicago, 1887), p. 26.
73Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 263.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
306
swallered, and for surviving' friends of the same, if they 
was killed by an act of Congress?"74 Mrs. Allen's folksy 
tone conveys the conviction that law in its complexity was 
itself a serpent in the garden. WCTU women often and 
fluently expressed their disgust with the strategems and 
devices of lawyers and theologians as a way of envisioning a 
world where anger, corruption, and self interest disguised 
as professional canons did not succeed.
Temperance women renounced the "legal striving" in 
order to find a "simple way," a route which required "entire 
surrender and perfect trust in God."75 Electoral politics 
was only capable of redemption to the extent that that 
process became simplified and purified, in the "good time 
coming" when "methods, useful in themselves but hitherto 
secular, shall be informed by the spirit which giveth life." 
In a fictitious debate over the moral nature of 
parliamentary procedure, Mrs. Plymouth Rock rhapsodized 
about an "election, so simple and unpremeditated, 
nominations all made in open meeting, and hymns, tears, and 
prayers coming in as freely as if no 'red tape' existed to
7<Ames, Platform Voices, p. 26.
75Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 203 (quoting a 
letter from Hannah Whitall Smith.)
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besmirch the world."16 Willard found a local Arkansas law 
"superb" which allowed "No 'remonstrance' or counter­
petition ... the simple question "Do we want dram-shops?' is 
answered by the signatures of men and women and that settles 
the matter— not for a year only, but 'once for ail.'" Only 
with such transparent and simple procedures can "conviction 
... be correlated with law. "71
Legal elaboration only allowed the possibility of 
corruption, "politics" in its worst sense, to defeat the 
pure will of the people, and provided a shield for 
chicanery. It was out of real frustration and apprehension 
that their interests were not being attended to that 
evangelical feminists expanded their precept "the letter 
killeth, but the spirit giveth life" to cover politics as 
well.
In fact, the WCTU's parallel rejections of formalism in 
law and theology gave birth to a reinterpretation of the 
relative roles of faith and works which was critical to 
their political theory. The Reformation had produced an 
emphasis on faith which, despite the lightening spontaneity 
and unpredictability of grace, became mired in theological
16Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 141.
17Willard, Woman and Temperance, pp. 340-341.
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wrangling and disputation— a dry, loveless legalism. By the 
Gilded Age, the minister modelled on the austere, colonial 
theologian had lost face. Congregations demanded attention 
be paid to "what the Pews Want from the Pulpit," not 
preaching or instruction but an active example. In the face 
of overwhelming social dislocation, many Christians rejected 
a "velvet-lined pew religion" in favor of "that Christianity 
that treads the streets. "7I
The WCTU fell in the same tradition as the economist 
Richard Ely, whose views they often cited. Ely explicitly 
criticized the church since the Protestant Reformation for 
ignoring the second of the two great commandments, "Thou 
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," a commandment which 
Ely placed on a par with the first.79 Ely represented the 
"applied Christianity" of the social gospel movement, 
Christianity in the streets. He suggested that the true 
study of religion was sociology and not theology; man, he 
believed, "'had been placed in this world to save it.'"*°
Re-enforcing temperance women's instinctive dislike of
70Lady Henry Somerset, Werner's Recitations, pp. 86-
87.
79Richard Ely, Social Aspects of Christianity (New 
York, 1889), p. 1.
,0Ely, Social Aspects, p. 72.
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hair-splitting theology, Ely openly substituted a standard 
of works for one of faith. In this light, the Christian 
social movement, of which the WCTU formed a part, can be 
seen as a counter-reformation of sorts— a conscious attempt 
to shift Christian thought away from legal questions of 
personal salvation and the nature of God, and to focus 
instead on worldly obligations to neighbors.
Regulatory Bureaucracy
The shift to a spiritual emphasis on works clearly 
reverberated in the political sphere. Temperance women had 
an ambivalent relation with law and faith, but they lauded 
the "faith which turns as readily to works as steam to 
water." The rejection of formal theology turned women's 
attention to work in the public sphere; and their rejection 
of and exclusion from the legal culture turned them toward 
less official networks of authority. The two combined to 
inspire temperance women all over the country to participate 
in creating and staffing a nascent bureaucracy designed to 
allow women to re-establish traditional networks of power at 
more official levels, while circumventing the unreliable 
political arena.
Women were not excluded from social programs at local 
levels by any civil barrier; they could conceive, implement,
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direct, and staff them. WCTU-affiliated women in many towns
took advantage of this to turn their formidable organizing
talents toward the state. Although such work— largely
centered around health, welfare, and education— had fallen
within the restricted scope of women's charitable
activities, WCTU workers did not classify their works as
private action, but rather as alternative public action.
In fact, Willard and others pictured themselves as
establishing through their organization and programs a whole
separate government, so that
we should thus have within National 
Government, as carried on by men, a republic 
of women, duly organized and officered ... 
and tending toward such mutual fellowship 
among women ... as should establish 
solidarity of sentiment and purpose 
throughout the Nation of woman Workers, (and) 
put a premium upon organized as against 
isolated efforts for human betterment.'1
One power of this republic of women lay in the 
combination of "the two great principles of co-operation and 
personal effort, in order that Christian public opinion 
concerning the political or moral welfare of Town, City, 
State, or Nation, may quickly and emphatically be heard."
The WCTU fostered a network of organization and opinion 
which encompassed like-minded groups nationwide who could
“Willard, "Address —  at the First Triennial Meeting 
... 1891," pp. 5-6.
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band together to express public sentiment to legislative 
bodies and combat "the evils existing at the caucus, 
convention, and ballot box"— an effective alternative to 
electoral politics.*2 One important tactic was to forge 
alliances with other sympathetic voluntary associations 
through communications networks, legislative alerts, 
solicitation of common members, exchange of periodicals, and 
simply contributing to others' causes— activity which 
merited an entire department for "Presenting Our Causes to 
Influential Bodies" to seek their cooperation in programs 
and petition drives.” In her address at the World's WCTU 
meeting at the Columbian Exposition in 1893, Willard 
described the coalition approach of the Fabian socialists, 
and urged members to look for contacts in all other clubs 
and organizations— an "extended concept of duties and 
privileges.nM
This approach was so successful that the Woman's 
National Council sought to replicate the WCTU's organization 
by confederating locally organized woman's societies— clubs,
“"Annual Leaflet of the National WCTU" (Chicago, 
1902), p. 46.
”"Annual Leaflet," p. 3.
“Willard, "Address ... 2nd Biennial Convention ... 
1893," p. 43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
312
service societies, temperance organizations, and others—  
and coordinating their work, the local confederation 
functioning autonomously under similar state and national 
confederations. Such a system could more efficiently pursue 
the "overthrow of all forms of ignorance and injustice,
(and) ... the application of the Golden Rule to society,
custom, and law."85 In their initiatives the WCTU
cooperated with reform, health, medical, and teachers' 
associations, and with groups of all descriptions.
In addition to co-opting voluntary associations, the
Union's strategy included gaining access for women to power
within local governing bodies. If such positions did not
exist, they lobbied to create them. Willard argued that
Locally, a woman's council should, in the
interest of that 'mothering' which is the
central idea of our new movement, seek to 
secure for women admission to all school 
committees, library associations, hospitals 
and other institutional boards entrusted with 
the care of the defective, dependent, and 
delinquent classes; also to boards of 
trustees in schools and colleges and all 
professional and business associations.88
“Frances Willard, "The Political Future of
Prohibition," Our Day, vol. 3 (April, 1889), p. 172.
88Willard, "Address ... at the First Triennial Meeting 
... 1891," p. 7. See also Willard, "Political Future of 
Prohibition;" Willard, Do Everything, p. 128; Cobbe, Frances 
Power, The Duties of Women (Boston, 1881), esp. chap. 6, 
"Woman as a Citizen of the State"; and "Minutes of the 
Monroe County WCTU" (New York, 1888), p. 27.
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Women seem to have had considerable success in this period 
in gaining such seats, or in lobbying those who did. Such 
victories were often reported triumphantly in the Union 
Signal,.
One of the WCTU's most effective initiatives, pursued 
nationwide at state and local levels, was the drive to 
introduce compulsory Scientific Temperance Instruction into 
public school curricula. In the course of this highly 
successful campaign workers in the department of STI 
mercilessly lobbied doctors' groups, teachers' 
organizations, boards of health, school boards, and 
legislative bodies at all levels. When they could the Union 
stacked boards with their own members, using their influence 
in local affairs to gain appointments. When they could not, 
the Dept, of S.T.I. often formed its own boards of experts 
from respected educators, clergy, and health care profes­
sionals to produce and pass on the quality of material to be 
used in public school instruction. Their recommendations 
were usually accorded great weight.
Under the meticulous planning and direction of Mary 
Hunt, the Union gathered its contacts and experts into a 
battering ram of "public opinion" which crushed opposition. 
According to Mrs. Hunt, "It is not too much to say that the
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school boards of the country ... are in a state of siege at 
the hands of mothers, urging that the schools shall utter 
nature's solemn warning against the cup."17 The Union in 
the 1890s had great success in persuading schools both at 
state and local levels to include WCTU-approved temperance 
materials as mandatory parts of public school curricula."
Such a wide mandate clearly moves well beyond the 
concern for alcohol abuse which was the Union's founding 
principle; in fact, it is hard to exclude any aspect of 
civic governance from the Union's stated list of concerns. 
The broad, perfectionist commitment to the community's 
health and welfare translated into a mandate for inquiry and 
reform of many state and local services— all under the broad 
banner of "Prohibition." One recitation, "Prohibition 
Defined," included a verse lumping the baker selling bad 
bread and the butcher selling bad meat with the saloon 
keeper selling rum. Halting such abuses, the Chorus reminds 
us, is public spirited— "And this is prohibition."”
"Quoted in Stevenson, Brief History, p. 34.
"The materials from and on this department are 
voluminous; the department itself published a series of 
texts, tracts, and leaflets, many of which are preserved in 
the WCTU microfilm series.
"Ames, Platform Voices, p. 75.
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Willard and others continued to reiterate the maternal basis 
of public action. In Occupations for Women, for example, 
she stresses the importance of women's gaining municipal 
government posts as "the work of salvation for other 
mother's little children."90 But the type of power which 
evangelical women were trying to appropriate for themselves 
went well beyond the bonds of private charity or home care. 
If laws were not being enforced, the WCTU was prepared to 
mount its own commission of inquiry, packed with influential 
citizens, male and female alike. A private commission, for 
example, was set up to investigate the liquor traffic in its 
relation to a broad range of subjects from domestic violence 
and the impoverishment of women to crime, unemployment, the 
collection of municipal revenue, and lawmakers' potential to 
profit from the liquor trade.91 Bypassing electoral 
politics, this strategy effectively restored to women some 
of the power lost in the breakdown of the traditional 
community. While this grass roots strategy did not put them 
in the legislature, temperance women‘thought of themselves 
as "the power behind the throne" in the battle for municipal
90Willard, Occupations for Women (New York, 1897), p.
360.
91Willard, "Address Before the Second Biennial 
Convention...1893," p. 10.
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improvement.”
Sometimes women actually sat on the throne: an article
entitled "Petticoat Rule" lauded the success of a woman 
mayor and an all-female council elected in a Kansas town in 
1889. By this account the women managed to pass and enforce 
a series of municipal ordinances improving morals and 
services both, and although the local merchants became ' "a 
trifle ugly" when the Sunday observance law was enforced for 
the first time, the board enjoyed great popularity and 
success. One initiative seemed doomed when the city 
attorney vetoed a ban on spitting tobacco juice on the 
sidewalk (where it clung to trailing hems) as an 
infringement on personal liberty. But citing the power of 
the moral community over statute, the councilwomen instead 
made a personal appeal to every chewer to spit elsewhere, 
and claimed that the cooperative approach proved even more 
effective than an ordinance.”
In Delavan, Illinois, women who were not elected 
officials nonetheless raised money from exhibitions and 
concerts to build sidewalks. As the (male) officials let
”Lucia Additon, Twenty Eventful Years of the Oregon 
Women's Christian Temperance Union. 1880-1900. (Portland, 
Or, 1904), p. 73.
”Reel 31, scrapbook 10, WCTU microfilm series.
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them fall into disrepair, women lamented
There are the sidewalks broken and worn,
And here is the Town Board all forlorn,
And there are the men who talk and talk,
Though once there were women who built a walk 
In this town of Delavan.”
The women's exhibit at the Columbian Exposition of 1893 
opened a futuristic perspective on the world of the maternal 
state which evangelical feminists imagined. The female 
world of philanthropy and reform— "and in the last analysis 
this includes church and state"— was to illustrate a 
socialized haven of the future with nurseries, day care 
centers, hospitals, cafes— every thing touching the "health, 
holiness, and happiness of the home people."9* For Willard 
and many others, this was a vision of a future that worked; 
they expected each woman to "come away with the feeling that 
God has given her a mighty work to do in the world.
Temperance women shared their program for better 
governance with a broad range of male and female citizens 
who considered themselves progressive and subscribed to what
“Willard, Woman and Temperance, p. 471.
95Willard, "Address ... at the First Triennial Meeting 
... 1891," p. 30.
“William Cameron, The World's Fair (Chicago, 1893), p. 
11. The women's exhibit included a detailed miniature model 
of a Swedish leper colony, which Willard thought showed "the 
sublime heights to which self-sacrifice can reach in caring 
for the afflicted" (p. 462).
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the WCTU called "the maternal state” as the most enlightened 
response to the problem of their day— the restructuring of 
work and family relations around the tenets of industrial 
capitalism. But temperance women took a unique approach/ 
scattershot in seeking multiple avenues of influence.
Frances Willard called women, unlike men, "natural 
branchers-out" who sought their goals through a variety of 
methods.97 Certainly they worked vigorously in electoral 
politics supporting candidates and initiatives, and they 
sought the ballot in anticipation of the day when the 
woman's vote could help establish their programs and reforms 
by legislative fiat. But they also strove consciously to 
develop an alternative to electoral politics through a two­
pronged scheme: a national, loosely organized voluntary
network of groups which could exert influence as a block; 
and an effort to create and fill posts at state and local 
levels with members of these groups, in a broadly defined 
area which included education, public health, and the 
provision of municipal and relief services.
When the WCTU was formed, the American state was just 
beginning to develop into the complex structure of today; 
and certainly Frances Willard for all her prescience never
97Willard, "Frances E. Willard and Woman's Temperance 
Work" (n.p., n.d.), p. 14.
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envisioned our national bureaucracy. But temperance women's 
efforts were channeled into the creation of agencies and 
departments below the national level, and in attributing to 
government through those departments obligations to the 
welfare of the general citizenry, in a way which helped set 
the stage for the later assumption of these obligations by a 
national bureaucracy. Although they never laid out a formal 
proposal or theory, WCTU women fully understood that they 
were creating an alternative type of politics, one over 
which they had more control and through which they could 
more effectively implement their own agenda. To some 
extent, Willard's vision of a "republic of women" within a 
national government was fulfilled in the next several 
decades, as women connected to the settlement house movement 
and related reforms continued the drive to create local 
bureaucracies through which to administer public welfare 
programs, culminating in the influence of women in the 
administrative bureaucracies of the New Deal.”
#aA great deal of work is currently being done, most of 
it unpublished as yet, on women's role in the growth of 
administrative agencies in the Progressive era and up to the 
Second World War. Linda Gordon and Kathryn Kish Sklar are 
both working on books in this field, as are a number of 
other scholars.
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Conclusion
Two uneasy components lurk under our label "liberal" 
today: a commitment to individual rights and liberties, and 
another to the welfare state. The antebellum feminist 
vision smoothed over this rift by linking rights designed 
for the growth of the individual to her duties and 
responsibilities to others; family, friends, and neighbors. 
Within later nineteenth-century feminism, however, these two 
elements were openly unreconciled, and bitterly at odds.
The tension between oneself and another, foreshadowed in the 
writings of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, emerged after the Civil 
War to split the American woman's movement into two 
competing camps.
NWSA feminists, who organized in 1869, shed much of 
their religious imagery, along with the radical 
perfectionist demands for widespread reforms touching all 
aspects of personal and social life. They adopted instead a 
more traditional constitutionalism. More responsive and
knowledgeable than evangelical feminists about the political 
process, they focused increasingly on civil rights, their 
political aspirations developing reciprocally with the 
government's ability to administer equal protection 
standards. The NWSA program was expressed most commonly in
320
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a plea for suffrage; as reformers steeped in the 
abolitionist tradition the group was disposed toward 
constitutional remedies, and the process of frising women's 
claims into the existing structure of civil rights narrowed 
the NWSA platform. But liberal feminism remained fiercely 
committed to personal autonomy, and hypersensitive to bonds 
or obligations, physical or legal; and the demand to rectify 
women's sexual standing remained an important secondary 
platform.1 Those concerns— as well as the plea for suffrage 
itself— came out of a tradition forged in abolitionism, 
familiar to liberal feminists, of the emancipated body— a 
powerful political paradigm because it combined the equality 
claim of revolutionary thought with liberal feminism's 
desire for bodily autonomy.
The WCTU by contrast rejected the liberal emphasis on 
autonomy as socially harmful, and forged instead a theory of 
the state which privileged the rights of the community over 
those of the individual. Using principles of "organized 
mother-love” the WCTU pushed to create a "maternal state" 
designed to administer the needs and not just the civil 
rights of its constituents. The resurgence of evangelical
bodily autonomy always remained first with Stanton, 
and on several occasions in her later year3 she criticized 
the movement for its focus on suffrage to the exculsion of 
other more fundamental issues.
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thought in the later nineteenth century complicated the 
scheme of individual rights in the constitutional path laid 
down during Reconstruction, addressing not the "equality” 
problem of admission to citizenship status or the granting 
of civil rights, but the thornier problem of how to deal 
with obvious inequality with its source in the "private" 
rather than the civil realm, a problem of class which 
individual rights language could not accommodate.
Evangelical feminists had recourse to many of the ideas of 
the antebellum woman suffrage movement, but differed 
substantially from them in a way that would ultimately lead 
them down a very different path, in hypothesizing a powerful 
state that could juggle and enforce the rights of groups.
These two views were based on very different 
conceptions of the body and its place in the public and 
private realm. As epitomized in Stanton's work, the liberal 
view— an outgrowth of the peculiar American conjuncture of 
abolitionism and the struggle against religious orthodoxy 
which resulted in liberal Protestantism— saw the body as an 
isolated and autonomous entity, a free agent in the world; a 
view which with some tailoring could be fit into the civil 
rights model of constitutional activism.
Evangelicals based their political philosophy on the 
idea of maternalism, or the connected body. Their
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interpretation of scripture did not stress growth and self 
development as did liberal Protestantism, but the more 
traditional Christian doctrines of the atonement, the 
passion, the parental quality of God. Christ had come to 
the world for self-sacrifice, not self development; within 
evangelical religion he himself presented a maternal image 
in his willingness to touch, heal, and physically love even 
the unlovable. Liberals stressed corporeal integrity in the 
instant; for evangelicals, corporeal integrity could only be 
established over time, through the accretion and discharge 
of ties and obligations to others.
Within organized feminism these differences expressed 
themselves most violently in the late part of the century 
over issues of church and state. In the 1890s in 
particular, the newly united suffrage organization under the 
banner of the National American Woman Suffrage Association 
(NAWSA), brought together the liberal NWSA with the more 
conservative AWSA, with its close ties to evangelical 
feminists. Some of the issues debated most violently at 
those meetings were whether feminists should intervene 
either for or against the Sunday closing of the proposed 
Columbian Exposition; what the relationship was between 
organized religion and the suffrage movement; and the debate 
over Stanton's project to rewrite the Bible, which was
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finally repudiated in a resolution of the NAWSA after a 
bitter fight.
Again, the root question was one of moral regulation—  
mother or not mother— of individual behavior. The WCTU had 
consistently used its clout to support evangelical 
coalitions round the country who were sponsoring legislation 
imposing curfews, censorship, school prayer and Bible 
reading, as well as prohibition. This vision of a morally 
regulated world met violent opposition from feminist 
advocates like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Matilda Joslyn 
Gage, who saw Protestant orthodoxy as the greatest enemy of 
woman's emancipation. Stanton, Gage, and others saw in the 
evangelical reformers' campaign an attempt to alter the 
established constitutional separation of church and state, 
imposing the moral imperative of a minority on an 
increasingly diverse society by legislative fiat. Stanton 
understood the struggle to contain the power of the 
Protestant Church over civic life to be as critical a 
condition of woman's freedom as the struggle against 
patriarchy: in fact they were one, and Stanton was not 
betraying her own priorities when she said that "much as I 
desire the suffrage, I would rather never vote than to see 
the policy of our government at the mercy of the religious
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bigotry of such women."2
In fact, there was real basis for Stanton's fears. 
Because of the declining importance of theology, and 
therefore of the dogmatic schisms which divided Protestant 
denominations at the beginning of the century, the 
possibility of a stronger Protestant union than ever before 
made the prospect of a "Christian state" more real a threat 
than in the past. With Protestant denominations no longer 
balancing each other's powers, many denominations made 
common cause to attack a common enemy, and openly sought to 
enhance the power of Christian moral governance within the 
state. This was the political and religious context in 
which the woman's movement split in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.3
2Quoted in Ellen DuBois, Feminism and Suffrage: the 
Emergence of an Independent Woman's Movement in America. 
1848-1869 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978).
3One problem which looms large for explaining rifts in 
nineteenth-century feminism using a church-state analysis is 
that the history of contemporary or second wave feminism 
falls out very much like the first, with a liberal, civil 
rights-oriented movement growing out of a civil rights 
movement of black Americans and later challenged by a 
revisionist feminism based on a difference rather than an 
equality analysis. This pattern developed in second wave 
feminism without any appreciable help from the churches or 
from a spiritual analysis (those schools certainly exist but 
have not been central to revisionist feminism); and I am 
certainly not willing to push for some kind of persistence 
of nineteenth-century patterns without further thought. But 
the split within feminism in the nineteenth century was not
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In the early twentieth century, the Woman's National 
Committee of the Socialist Party put out two pamphlets, one 
entitled "Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Socialism" and the other 
entitled "Frances E. Willard on Socialism."4 In these 
pamphlets, from speeches published sometime in the 1890s, 
both women agree that after 50 years of suffrage it is time 
to lay new groundwork: "Agitation of a broader Philosophical 
socialism is now in order," and competition must give way to 
cooperation; that the want of the working classes is the 
critical question of the time. Even, Stanton says, if most 
women's reforms--suffrage, temperance, purity— were 
achieved, they would make no change in the condition of the 
masses.
Little remains for either Stanton or Willard to 
document their immersion in socialist principles, which for 
both women took place very close to the end of their lives. 
The twin movements of temperance and suffrage which they had 
animated had moved on, in tandem, toward securing a national
parthenomitosis, but was contained within a broader American 
poltical culture which could not deal adequately with the 
problem of individualism, either; a condition in the 
political culture which still exists today and has 
presumably had some effect on the feminist movement working 
within it.
4"Elizabeth Cady Stanton on Socialism" (Chicago, n.d.); 
"Frances E. Willard on Socialism" (Chicago, n.d.); Rare Book 
Room in the Library of Congress.
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amendment for woman suffrage. Stanton and Willard had each 
moved on, too; had either woman lived much longer, it seems 
possible that she would have further severed her ties with 
her own organization and cast her lot with socialism.
For both women, the change came about after extended 
stays in Europe, particularly England, where both were 
introduced to Fabian socialism. For both it was a revelation 
of sorts, a release from the organizational mandates of 
temperance and suffrage; from platforms limited and shaped 
by political considerations; and from the recalcitrance of 
the rank and file they had been fighting for so long.
Fabian socialism combined a hospitality to the individual 
with a class-based analysis in a way that sparked both 
women, and enabled each to transcend the limitations of her 
own political world view. Stanton's dualism, born of the 
peculiar American strain between slave and free, rigid 
Calvimism and liberal Protestantism, blurred a little; and 
she relaxed her fierce individualism enough to begin to 
consider the interests of people in groups. Willard too, 
away from the American evangelical ethic of harmony between 
all people, turned to the problems of labor with a new eye 
for the realities of class conflict. The dilemma of 
nineteenth-century American feminists was very much a 
product of its time; on the Grand Tour with Stanton and
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Willard it took on a new life of its own.
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